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EXECUTIVE BRIEF 
ASSET LIABILITY MANAGEMENT IN BANKS IN INDIA 
WHAT BENEFIT DOES ALM BRING ? 
Assets Liability Management (ALM) is a strategic balance sheet management of risks 
associated with it namely credit risks, market risks (liquidity, Interest rate, currency, equity 
risks) and operational risks. 
ALM addresses the issue of defining adequate structures of the balance sheet and the 
hedging programmes for these risks. The mission of ALM is to provide relevant risk 
measures for these risks and keep them under control. The ALM Committee (ALCO) is in 
charge of implementing ALM decisions. 
WHY ALM IS IMPORTANT FOR BANKS ? 
Asset Liability Management (ALM) has been pushed to the forefront of today's banking 
landscape, because of:-
- Rising global competition, 
- Increasing deregulation, 
- Introduction of innovative products and 
- Innovative delivery channels. 
In a such scenario ability to gauge the ALM risks and take appropriate position will 
be the key to success. 
ALM PRACTICES IN INDIAN BAKS 
While most of the banks in other economies began with strategic planning for asset 
liability management as early as 1970, the Indian banks did not show progress in this 
direction. 
The paradigm shift took place in 1992, with the initiation of reform processes brought 
about in the light of Naraslmham Committee report on financial sector reforms process. 
While the deregulation of interest rates and the scope for new diversified product profile 
gave the banks greater leeway in their operations, it also exposed the banks to greater 
risks. 
Reserve Bank of India announced prudential nomris relating to Income recognition, asset 
classification and provisioning and the capital adequacy nomri for the banks. These were 
the radical steps towards ensuring International standards in risk management by Indian 
banks. 
WHY ALM HAS BECOME A KEY MANAGEMENT AREA FOR BANKS ? 
The developments that have taken place since liberalisation have led to remari<able 
transition In the risk profile of the banks. The changes In the profile of sources and uses 
of funds of borrowers, the industry profile, exposure limits, interest rate structure for 
deposits and advances etc. have led to the discriminate pricing policies. 
This has, therefore, highlighted the need to match the maturities of the assets and 
liabilities of the banks. The significance of A L M for the banks has grown further. 
ALIVI PRACTICES GLOBALLY 
Globally, especially in the developed countries, advanced ALM risk management 
practices are in vogue. Various products developed by them are wide spread in use. 
A few popular credit risk models, used are as under:-
• Portfolio Manager by KMV Corporation. This product uses Merton/Options based 
approach to calculating default probabilities. 
• Credit Metrices by JP Morgan Chase. It uses Monte Carlo simulations to measure 
portfolio loss distribution at the horizon date. 
• Credit risk by CSFB. This is based on mathematical models. Default risk is a series of 
continuous random variables, instead of an absolute level. This product requires lesser 
amount of data than the other two. 
The following are the different approaches employed by the banks for managing liquidity 
risk:-
• Static Liquidity Gaps 
• Dynamic Liquidity Gaps 
• Cash Matching 
• Models. Two commonly used models are the Baumol Model and the Miller and Orr 
Model. The cash management model of Baumol extends the economic order 
quantity concept used in inventory management to discuss the conversion size, which 
influences the average cash holding of the firm. The Miller and Orr Model considers 
that there will be different cash balances at different periods and a firm should 
accordingly decide on the amount and the timing for the transfer of funds from 
marketable securities to cash. 
For hedging currency risk, various products in usage are Currency Swaps,Currency 
Options and Forward instruments. 
The risk sensitive approaches for equity positions held in banking books are 
emphasized in the New Basel Accord. Various products in usage are: Bond Index Swap, 
Equity (Index) Swap, Equity Knockout Swap, Variable Notional Swap/Option, 
Basket Option, Bond Option, Equity Index Participation Note, Stock Index Future, 
etc. 
In compliance to the Basel Committee' emphasis for a sound practices for identifying, 
monitoring and control of operational risk, the banks with international presence have 
been on their toe to putting in place a comprehensive risk management structure i.e. 
Stronger Risk Management Culture, Improved Audits and Better Audit Efficiency, 
Operational Risk Management Tool, Best Practices Tool for Operational Risk 
Management, Regulator Focus on Operational Risk Management, Operational Risk 
Management Structures, Corporate-level-focused approach, Internal audit group model, 
Key Risk Indicators (KRIs), etc. 
Globally active banks have been using sophisticated techniques for measuring, 
managing and constantly monitoring various types of ALM risks. These banks are 
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warming up for implementing the Basel II norms. Under Basel II Accord, capital allocation 
will be based on ttie risk intierent in ttie asset. The implementation of Basel II Accord will 
strengthen the regulatory review process. 
OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH STUDY 
The objective of the study was to:-
i) Analyse and evaluate the ALM practices prevalent in Public Sector Banks (PSBs) 
in India, 
ii) Make a comparative study of PSBs with Private Sector and Foreign Banks, 
iii) Identify gaps in ALM practices in PSBs. 
iv) Suggest refinement in existing ALM practices of PSBs in view.of the gaps. 
To help realise above objectives purview of: a) various kinds of risks associated with ALM 
(in the introductory chapter), b) ALM system of developed countries and c) guidelines of 
RBI has been done. 
METHODOLOGY 
RESEARCH DESIGN. The research involved collection of primary as well as secondary 
data. Primary data, especially in the context of the objective of the research project was 
aimed at obtaining necessary information, throwing light on the ALM practices in Public 
Sector Banks (PSBs) and the leading Foreign and New Generation Private Sector Banks. 
The available secondary data provided a macro and general view in respect of Risk 
Management practices including ALM In Financial Institutions. 
Communication mode of obtaining desired infomriation using a data-collection 
instrument called questionnaire was used in this research. The respondent Banks were 
asked to choose from a set of alternatives. 
The questionnaire aiming at obtaining the relevant information on ALM practices in Banks 
in India was administered to all 27 PSBs, top Private Sector and Foreign Banks. The 
actual sample of 11 PSBs, which responded to the questionnaire relating to ALM 
practices, are: 
- Randomly representing PSBs 
- Deposits, Advances and Total Assets/Liabilities-wlse as well these are representative 
sample of all PSBs 
- Geographically also, they are representative of country-wide sample 
In the light of foregoing, the sample size adequately represents the sampling frame i.e. the 
population elements from which it has been drawn. 
The Banks covered in the study are as under:-
PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS HI) 
- Allahabad Bank - State Bank of Hyderabad 
Bank of Baroda - State Bank of India 
Bank of India - State Bank of Mysore 
Indian Overseas Bank - State Bank of Patiala 
Punjab National Bank - UCO Bank 
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 
OLD PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS (2) 
- Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. - Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 
NEW PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS (2) 
- HDFC Bank - ICICI Bank 
FOREIGN BANKS (2) 
- ABN Amro Bank - Standard Chartered Bank 
It was ensured that the data-collection instrument (questionnaire) meets the following 
qualifications:-
- Versatility 
- Objectivity 
- Accuracy 
- Structured-undisguised Questionnaire. This ensured advantages in a)reliability in 
respondent's responses (first obtained in 2002) and when they were asked again (in 
the year 2003) , they responded in the similar fashion; b) securing factual infomriation 
like in the present research—a clear-cut reply to the questions, hence validity and 
reliability of fixed alternative responses has been ensured in the present case and c) in 
easier to tabulation and analysis of the responses obtained. 
In the present research, the questionnaire was sent to the designated respondents with 
an accompanying cover letter. The respondent Banks completed the questionnaire at 
their leisure and mailed it back. 
In the present research project, the hypothesis fonnulation (i.e. null hypothesis, Ho; 
alternative hypothesis Hi) was based upon the parameters of structured questionnaire, 
administered to the sample Banks. 
I. EXISTENCE OF ALCO AND A CLEARLY DEFINED ASSETS LIABILITY 
MANAGEMENT POLICY 
H Q : Public Sector Banks (PSBs) have ALCO & a well documented ALM Policy 
H i : Public Sector Banks (PSBs) do not have ALCO& a well documented ALM Policy 
II. PERIODICITY OF HOLDING OF ALCO MEETING 
Ho: In PSBs, ALCO meet at least once a month 
n i : In PSBs, ALCO does not meet at least once a month 
III. CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) LOAN REVIEW MECHANISM 
Ho : PSBs have Loan Review Mechanism 
•• I : PSBs do not have Loan Review Mechanism 
ii)USAGE OF DERIVATIVES 
Ho . PSBs do not use credit derivatives for mitigation of credit risk 
H 1 : PSBs use credit derivatives for mitigation of credit risk 
IV. INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) MATURITY GAP ANALYSIS 
Ho : PSBs carry out Maturity Gap Analysis 
H1 : PSBs do not carry out Maturity Gap Analysis 
ii) DURATION ANALYSIS 
Ho : 50 per cent PSBs carry out Duration Analysis 
H 1 ; < 50 per cent PSBs carry out Duration Analysis 
V. LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) MATURITY PROFILE (LIQUIDITY GAP) PREPARATION 
Ho : PSBs carry out Maturity Profile (Liquidity Gap) preparation 
H i : PSBs do not carry out Maturity Profile (Liquidity Gap) preparation 
ii) LIQUIDITY PLANNING UNDER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
Ho : 50 per cent PSBs carry out Liquidity Planning under alternative scenario 
H i : < 50 per cent PSBs carry out Liquidity Planning under alternative scenario 
VI. EQUITY PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT 
STOCK/INDEX OPTIONS AND FUTURE CONTRACTS 
Ho : PSBs do not use Stock/Index options and Future contracts 
H i : PSBs use Stock/Index options and Future contracts 
VII. INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURES & RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURES 
H o : 70 per cent PSBs (leading) have international exposures 
H i : < 70 per cent PSBs (leading) have international exposures 
VIII. CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) SETTING UP OF OPEN POSITION AND GAP LIMITS 
H o : PSBs set up OPEN POSITION and GAP LIMITS 
H i : PSBs do not set up OPEN POSITION and GAP limits 
ii) CURRENCY SWAPS 
n o : 80 per cent PSBs use currency swaps 
H1 : < 80 per cent PSBs use currency sv»/aps 
IX. OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) OPERATIONAL RISKS MEASUREMENT, ASSESSMENT & MONITORING 
Ho : 30per cent PSBs have system of risk measurement, assessment and monitoring 
H 1 : <30per cent PSBs have system of risk measurement, assessment and monitoring 
li) OPERATIONAL RISKS EDUCATION 
H o : PSBs impart Risk Education amongst their employees 
H i : PSBs do not impart Risk Education amongst their employees 
X. INFORMATION ON COMPILATION OF ALCO RETURNS 
INFORMATION ON COMPILATION OF ALCO RETURNS 
Ho : PSBs do not follow on-line method (instead manual method) of compilation of ALCO 
information 
H i : PSBs follow on-line method of compilation of ALCO information 
XI. INFORMATION ON USING CONSULTANTS SERVICES ETC. 
WHETHER ANY EXPERTS/ CONSULTANTS SERVICES ON ASSETS LIABILITIES 
MANAGEMENT USED IN THE PAST BY THE BANK? 
H o : 60 per cent of PSBs are using consultant services 
H 1 : <60 per cent of PSBs are using consultant services 
Testing of hypothesis using t-distribution, which is the most appropriate distribution analysis 
nfor the given situation, was carried out (as per the detailed nnathematical calculation, given 
in a separate annexure to the report). 
FINDINGS 
The findings of the research is as under :-
• Public Sector Banks (PSBs) have ALCO & a well documented ALM Policy 
• In PSBs, ALCO meet at least once a month (in all of sample New Generation Private/ Foreign 
Banks, the periodicity is less than a week) 
• PSBs have Loan Review Mechanism 
" PSBs do not use credit derivatives for mitigation of credit risk(all of sample Foreign Banks use 
credit derivatives) 
• PSBs carry out Maturity Gap Analysis (all of sample New Generation Private/ Foreign Banks, 
carry out Maturity Gap Analysis) 
• Less than 50 per cent PSBs canry out Duration Analysis(all of sample New Generation Private/ 
Foreign Banks, carry out Duration Gap Analysis) 
• PSBs canry out Maturity Profile (Liquidity Gap) preparation (all of sample New Generation Private/ 
Foreign Banks, carry out Maturity Profile preparation) 
• Less than 50 per cent PSBs carry out Liquidity Planning under altemative scenario(all of sample 
New Generation Private/ Foreign Banks, carry out Liquidity Planning under alternative scenario) 
• PSBs do not use Stock/Index options and Future contracts (all of sample New Generation Private/ 
Foreign Banks use these products) 
" Less than 70 per cent PSBs (leading) have international exposures ( all of sample New 
Generation Private/ Foreign Banks have international exposures) 
• PSBs set up OPEN POSITION and GAP LIMITS exposures (all of sample New Generation 
Private/ Foreign Banks have such a practice) 
" Less than 80 per cent PSBs use currency swaps (all of sample New Generation Private/ Foreign 
Banks use currency swaps) 
• Less than 30per cent PSBs have system of risk measurement, assessment and monitoring (all of 
sample Foreign Banks do have and New Generation Private Banks are progressing in this 
direction) 
• PSBs impart Risk Education amongst their employees(all of sample New Generation Private/ 
Foreign Banks also do so) 
• PSBs do not follow on-line method (instead manual method) of compilation of ALCO information 
(all of sample New Generation Private/ Foreign Banks have on-line system of data compilation) 
• Less than 60 per cent of PSBs are using consultant services (all of sample New Generation 
Private/ Foreign Banks use such services) 
The findings of the research project highlight the current status of Asset Liability 
Management in Indian banks. These are summed up below:-
• awareness has built up on the need of an management of Asset Liability 
Management — banks have documented Asset Liability IManagement Policy 
" appropriate technological backbone support is yet to develop to adequately 
address ALM 
• default data build up has to be aggressively pursued 
• quantitative techniques for measurement of risks are at preliminary stages 
• sophisticated modelling techniques are yet to be acquired by Public Sector 
Banks 
" RAROC and VaR approaches are yet to be fully put into use 
• derivative products though t)eing introduced by RBI in phases, need to be 
actively embraced by the banks for managing their risks 
• skilled risk managers need to be developed by the banks 
The Indian banking system has to respond to the new needs of the liberalised financial 
environment. Each bank will have to graduate to the complexities of changing risk profile 
in banking business. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The suggestions for prudent Assets Liability Management by Indian banks or more 
appropriately for Best Practices Code for ALM are as under:-
CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT 
In the light of major areas of weakness of banks as regards credit risk management, it is 
suggested that the banks avoid indulgence in the following practices:-
X non-emphasis on due diligence and financial analysis, which can result into credit 
related frauds 
X resorting to simple indicators of credit assessment, for the sake of gaining a 
competitive foot holding; gk)baiisation of credit markets have increased the need for 
timely financial infonnation and In absence of inaccessibility to such information, 
banks should not dispense the much needed financial and economic analysis to 
support major credit decisions 
X giving a go- by to ns/c-sens/f/Ve pricing 
X subjective decision making by senior executive of the banks 
15 Essentials of Credit Culture 
A bank's credit culture forms the bedrock for risk taking. Its objective is to provide 
quality assurance and portfolk) integrity. A bank credit culture is built with: a) policy, b) 
process, c) audit and d) values. 15 essentials of a strong credit culture, mentioned below, 
must be adhered to by the Indian banks :-
1. Commitment to excellence coupled with respect to credit basics 
2. Sound value system that will cope with change 
3. Bank comes first and ahead of every profit center; an understanding of what the 
bank expects and the reasons behind its policies 
4. Conversant with historical perspective of the bank's credit experience 
5. Development of common credit language; each bank must bring qualitative 
transfomiation of credit management skills of its personnel by making them learn new 
instruments and new modes of financial engineering 
6. Good communicatkm at aH levels 
7. Unifomri approach to risk taking that provides stability and consistency 
8. Awareness of every transaction's effect on the bank; constant mindfulness of the 
bank's risk taking paranDeters 
9. A portfolio with integrity and appreciation of what properiy belongs in it 
10. Accountability for decisions and actnns 
11. Long-term as well as short4erm tNJsiness perspective 
12. Reconciliation of maritet practk» with use of common sense; realistic approach to 
markets and risk taking 
13. Use of independent judgment and not herd instinct 
14. Credit risk management framework with eariy waming system 
15. Initiation of appropriate preventive/corrective action at the right time 
The good credit culture will protect the bank from the shortcomings and risks. The 
measure of quality of the best credit culture of a bank is eventually seen in its 
bottom line. 
INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
The declining interest rate scenario has become a challenge for Indian banks to manage 
interest rate risk. The 12 essentials of interest rate risk management are as under:-
1) A structured framework is sine qua non for the banks to manage interest rate 
volatility, failing which banks may become vulnerable to asset liability mismatch. 
2) Banks must have an adequate and timely interest rate risk reporting system-
which includes ALM risk data warehouse and reporting aspects. 
3) Bank must make a clear distinction between their trading activity and balance 
sheet exposure. Banks with active trading positions must adopt VaR approach to 
measure risk associated with such exposures. 
4) Banks may try to maintain interest rate risk at a level close to zero, to the extent 
possible -though an ideal condition, the bank's profitability is affected in an 
environment of generally low credit/deposit ratio and with high liquidity status. A 
prudent approach would be accepting some interest rate risk if it helps in improving 
the profitability growth. 
5) If the yield curve is positively sloping, a bank can earn profit by booking longer 
duration liabilities. 
6) Banks can limit their exposure to changes in interest rates by restricting their 
quantum of mismatch between the re-pricing of assets in comparison to 
liabilities. The bank may limit the Gap/ assets or the ratio of rate sensitive liabilities. If 
risk sensitive assets (RSA) are more than risk sensitive liabilities (RSL), i.e. when Gap 
is positive, assets should be sold or liabilities added that mature or re-price in the 
period when the Gap is positive. 
7) In a falling interest rate scenario, the Gap should be maintained negative— as 
evident from the change in net interest income (Nil), which is defined as :-
A Nil = Gap X A r (where Gap= RSA-RSL , A r = change in interest rate) 
in a falling interest rate scenario, banks need to offer low interest rate on long 
maturities and high interest rates on short maturity deposits — as result the banks do 
not face any reinvestment risk. 
8) Banks may offer longer-term deposits at a floating rate and simultaneously offer fixed 
rates for similar maturity with higher or lower interest rates based on its perception 
about the movement of inflation and interest rate over the longer period. 
9) The banks should adopt the 'best exposure' position in respect of interest rate risk. It 
necessitates measurement of interest rate exposure : the interest rate margin is 
adequate in short-tenn, market value sensitivities of both assets and liabilities capture 
the entire stream of future flows and provide a long-temn view. 
10) The options generate a worst-case situation for banks. The combination of cap 
values of assets with floor values of liabilities generates a 'scissor effect' on the 
NPV. The goal of interest rate policies should be to control the risk of the NPV 
through both duration and convexity gaps. 
11) Banks must progress towards simulations ~ as without simulations, the ALCO would 
not have a full visibility on future profitability and risk. 
12) Derivatives, be used by the banks to modify the risk-return profile of the balance-
sheet as a whole. 
LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
Controlling liquidity risk implies spreading over time amounts of funding, avoiding 
unexpected market funding and maintaining a cushion of liquid stiort-term assets, so that 
selling them provides liquidity without incurring losses. 
The present day market scenario necessitates that banks in India keep in view the 
following 10 essentials of liquidity risk management:-
1) Liquidity gaps generate funding requirennents, or investments of excess funds, in the 
future. Such financial transactions occur in the future, at interest rates not yet known, 
unless hedging them today. Liquidity gaps generate interest rate risk because of the 
uncertainty in interest revenues or costs generated by these transactions. 
2) Cash matching is a basic concept of liquidity risk, implying thereby that the time 
profiles of amortization of assets and liabilities are kJentical. The nature of interest 
applicable and maturities also match i.e., fixed rates with fixed rates and floating rates 
revised periodically with floating rates revised at the same dates using the same 
reference rate. With cash matching, liquidity gaps are equal to zero. 
In general, deposits do not match loans, as these results from the customers' behaviour. 
However, it is feasible to structure the financial debt in order to replicate the assets' time 
profile. 
3) The cost of liquidity for banks often refers to another concept: the cost of maintaining 
the liquidity ratio at a minimum level. The liquidity ratio is the ratio of short-temn assets 
to short-tenm liabilities, and it should be above one. 
When a bank initiates a set of transactions such as borrowing short and lending long, the 
liquidity ratio deteriorates because the short term-liabilities increase without a matching 
increase in short-term assets. 
4) Excessive funding concentrations severely reduce the bank's ability to survive a 
liquidity crisis. Banks need to take advantage of good economic times to diversify their 
funding requirements. 
5) Banks need to develop a contingency funding plan, which includes triggering 
guidelines, metrics development, better quantification/ adequacy of projected funding 
sources and development of common contingency scenarios. 
6) Banks need to progress towards stress testing their funding plans, using various 
interest rate shocks and adverse economic and competitive scenarios to ascertain their 
impact on both the funding portfolio and maritet access. 
7) Communication lines between treasury functkDn and operational units, need to be 
significantly enhanced. Reporting systems need to be nnore effective. 
ALCO of the banks must have an appropriate risk management policies and procedures, 
active MIS reporting, limits and oversight programs. 
8) A historical funding patterns of various types of off-balance sheet items, need to 
be statistically analysed. Incorporating this into cakujiations of future funding 
requirements enhances the accuracy of funding projectkms. 
9) Selection of funding source must integrate with the bank's interest rate sensitivity, 
risk appetite, profit planning, diversification and capital management objectives. 
10) A rating services view on the bank's liquidity position need to be taken 
periodically and deficiencies be corrected in early stages. 
BEST PRACTICES IN LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT 
The Indian banks vary widely in their funding needs and their appetite for risk. The 
following strategies are essential for the banks to manage their liquidity risk effectively:-
1. Strategic direction: The bank' management must artrculate the overall strategic 
direction of the bank's funding strategy by detemnining what mix of assets and liabilities 
will be utilized to maintain liquidity. 
2. Integration: The bank's asset and liability management policy should clearly define 
the role of liquid assets along with setting clear tergets and limits. The liquidity 
management should be integrated into the day-to-day dedsk>n making process of core 
business line mangers. 
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3. Measurement systems: The bank management needs a set of metrics with position 
limits and benchmarl<s to quickly ascertain the bank's true liquidity position, ascertain 
trends as they develop, and provide the basis for projecting possible scenarios rapidly 
and accurately. The models may be based on:-
• Cash capital-this model has a general limit, which is frequently 
expressed in terms of a management set limit on the percentage of the 
discounted value of the bank's assets to total short-term funding; this 
general limit is then broken down more finely with sub-limits set on 
different types of short-term funding 
• Liquidity barometers-this model calculates the length of time a bank 
can survive by liquidating its balance sheet using just two assumptions-
that the bank continues to operate under normal operating conditions or 
that the bank has suffered a complete loss of access to the money 
market 
4) Monitoring: A monitoring system must be developed, consisting of guidelines, limits, 
and trend development, that enables management to monitor and confimri that 
compliance is within the approved funding targets and if not, to pinpoint the variances. 
5) Balance sheet evaluation: Both the bank's balance sheet and market access trends 
should be periodically evaluated for emerging patterns that could adversely affect 
liquidity, and the banks should develop strategies to manage these trends. Because 
many banks are becoming more reliant on credit sensitive funding, it is vital that the bank 
be perceived by third party funding sources as being both profitable and managed in a 
safe and sound manner. 
The monitoring program may consist of: a) turn downs and non-renewals, especially 
among key counier parties, during stressful market periods, b) unexpected declines in 
deposit balances, c) adverse turns in rate spreads, d) excessive funding concentrations 
etc. 
7) Off Balance sheet management practices: It is considered a best practice to 
periodically suppiument with statistical analysis of historical funding pattems of various 
types of off-balance sheet items. It enhances the accuracy of future funding projections-
assuring management that naturally occurring contingent liabilities will not strain the 
funding process. 
8) Funds management: The funding sources could be deposits, capital and purchased 
funds. The various factors that must be considered in funding source selection include 
integration with the bank's interest rate sensitivity, risk appetite, profit planning, 
diversification and capital management objectives. 
9) Contingency liquidity plan preparation: Banks should have a formal contingency 
plan of policies and procedures to use as a blueprint in the event the bank is unable to 
fund some or all of its activities in a timely manner and at a reasonable cost. 
A comprehensive contingency funding plan can provide a useful framework for meeting 
both temporary and long-range liquidity disruptions. 
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
With a view to manage the operational risk emanating from sources such as business 
processes, internal control systems, strategy adopted to carry out the business, 
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environment in which the business is carried out, technology used in processing and 
ultimately the people who are central to all these operations— the following 6 essentials 
measures are must for the Indian banks to put into practice:-
1) Every bank has a set of unique features i.e. branch network, volume of business, 
technologies in use, the top management perception on business strategies, the 
organizational culture and value systems followed by its personnel to increase the market 
share of the bank. 
Therefore, the exact approach chosen by each bank will depend on a range of 
factors that include its size, sophistication, nature and complexities of its 
activities. 
2) Not withstanding the size and complexities of individual banks, good management 
information systems, strong internal control culture, dynamic contingency 
planning and commitment of top management are crucial elements of an effective 
operational risk management 
3) Four key areas identified (by Basel Committee) to develop the framework for 
managing operational risk, need be seriously put into practice viz.: 
• Developing an appropriate risk management environment 
• Risk management: identification, monitoring and control 
• Role of supervisors 
• Role of disclosure 
4) Banks must strive to map the risk-potential of its staff from time-to-time based on 
their behavioural exhibits, both In and outside the organizational context— constantly 
evaluate their risk potential as it helps the management in picking right people for right 
job. 
Management should monitor against two of the most difficult people related risks viz., 
'moral hazard' and risk of 'adverse selection'. 
5) Human capability needs can be measured under the following heads: 
• technical competency to carry out the assigned role 
• zeal for learning 
• grasp over the business environment and client profile 
" managerial skills like decision making, sharing of knowledge, training the 
subordinates, etc. 
This will help in matching the required human capabilities for a job. It must be borne in 
mind that the human capabilities required for a given job are also assessed in the 
context of organizational strategy. 
6) Capability development plan should be drawn to fill up the gaps identified like skill 
development through training; succession planning and career development; mentoring 
etc. 
BEST PRACTICES OF OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
The following best practices need to be adopted by the banks in India with a view to 
effectively manage operational risk:-
1) Risk and control assessment. All the employees of the bank must understand the 
bank's business objectives and the risk associated with not obtaining those objectives. 
They must know the controls that mitigate against these risks. The banks must do an 
assessment of impact and probability and thereafter, devise suitable action plans. 
2) Developing operational risk taxonomy. This typically involves developing 
operational risk taxonomy and then determining which operational risks each business 
faces. This can be done qualitatively, by interviewing business managers and asking 
them about their historical operational losses. This approach results into a traffic light 
report with operational risk categories on one axis and business lines on the other axis. 
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These serve as Key Risk Indicators-- measure of progress in operational risk 
management, providing objective and non-financiai measure of risk, and can be updated 
as frequently as daily. 
This type of report is good for raising awareness of operational risk and 
developing management controls, but it does not help to quantify or capitalise 
operational risk. 
3) Building loss event database. This addresses the capital aspect. This involves 
recording operational losses and categorising them by type. This is useful in raising 
awareness of key operational risks like the traffic-light approach. This involves identifying 
control points in the bank's operations and linking them to losses. 
The best approach for large and rare risks is to measure the frequencies and severities of 
loss events In temns of observable and identifiable parameters. Historical data is 
important, but only for establishing parameters to the risk model. Turning these indicators 
into useful management tools is a process, requiring: 
" establishing a baseline from past performance 
• setting goals for future perfomnance 
" setting a threshold for unacceptable perfomiance that will trigger management 
action 
This approach is related to statistical process control or Six Sigma programmes that 
have been used for years In manufacturing sector and are being adopted by fonward 
thinking banks. 
This allows business lines to be capitalised appropriately and their risk 
adjusted returns on capital to t>e more easily compared. 
4) Economic capital. This is an important tool for raising awareness and changing 
behaviour and also for making sure that the banks are making the right investment 
decisions. 
A numk)er of intemationally active banks have methodology for estimating a measure 
of economic capital for operational risk. 
5) Operational risk alternatives. There are following alternatives to the banks 
seeking to manage or transfer operational risk: 
• risk mitigation or control through policy and audit 
• insurance 
• capital allocation 
A possible fourth altemative is securitisation and commoditisation of operational risk 
through the introduction of 'catastrophe' derivatives instruments, such as operational 
risk-linked bonds. 
INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT (IRM) 
Integrated or strategic or holistic risk management, is the new approach of looking at 
managing the risks in an effective and efficient manner. It requires management of the 
risks based on a robust analysis of aggregate exposures. 
The 10 essentials of IRM are mentk>ned below:-
1) The commitment of the management of the bank- CEO must champion the 
cause of a vibrant integrated risk management framework in the bank 
2) Setting up appropriate policies and systems in the bank 
3) A robust Management Information System (MIS) 
4) Identification of various risks 
5) Measurement / Quantificati'on of risks - making use of advance tools of 
measurement of risks 
6) Integrating the risk management processes 
7) Monitoring / review of risk management programmes 
8) Establishing communication channel with stake holders (internal as well as 
external) 
9) Risk Strategies formulation and Risk Budgeting 
10) Building an appropriate organisational culture to manage risks 
SIX STEPS IN IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT 
1) IRM Vision and IRM Strategy of the Bank 
An Indian bank depending on the size of its operations, may decide on its IRM 
strategy, interalia on its vision and resource commitments. Such a strategy necessitates 
the full commitment of the Bank's Board and its top executives. 
2) Risk identification 
This, first of all, requires assessing the current level of risk management practices, the 
risk management structure, processes and technology sophistication. 
This would throw light on the gaps in the bank's practices in managing credit, market 
and operational risks vis-a-vis the best practices in vogue. 
3) Defining Roadmap of IRM 
In the light of IRM strategy and the gaps identified in implementing the best practices, 
an appropriate roadmap for achieving sustainable competitive advantage is charted viz. 
• Ensuring Risk Based Supervision requirements 
• Ensuring Basel II requirements 
• Aligning the IRM strategy with the bank' decision making process in respect of: 
- Capital allocation for risks 
- NPA provisioning 
- Pricing of products 
- Optimising treasury operations 
-Streamlining systems and procedures with emphasis on risk management 
culture and reduction of costs 
4) Risk measurements including Early Warning Indicators 
ConskJering the existing gaps, advanced tools for measuring various types of risks 
shouW be brought into implementation. 
Banks need to capture early warning risk indicators, whereby timely corrective actions 
can be taken and the impact of risk hazards minimized. 
5) Executing IRM requirements 
This would require: 
• Elaborate check list of key success factors and generation of quantitative 
benchmarks 
• Testing of models and validating them on prototype basis 
• Applying weightages depending on the criticality of each activity and benchmark 
levels specified 
• Evaluation scores applied on the benchmark levels specified-thereby building 
through an aggregation process, risk process implementation score (reflective of 
the extent of capital optimisation possible) 
6) IRM Strategy: Alignment with Bank' Decision Making Process 
This calls for aligning the IRM with the decision making process and involves:-
• Building risk culture through awareness and training 
• Developing integrated risk reports and success measures 
• Aligning insurance programmes 
• Aligning risk strategies and business strategies 
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ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) IN ALM 
l.,d,an banks need lo leverage information technology in an efficient ™ 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 ASSETS LIABILITY MANAGEMENT AND ALCO 
Assets Liability Management (ALM) is a strategic balance sheet managennent of 
risks associated with it namely credit risks, market risks (liquidity, interest rate, 
currency, equity risks) and operational risks. ALM addresses the issue of defining 
adequate structures of the balance sheet and the hedging programmes for these 
risks. The mission of ALM is to provide relevant risk measures for these risks and 
keep them under control. 
The ALM Committee (ALCO) is in charge of implementing ALM decisions. The 
ALCO agenda includes 'global balance sheet management'. 
ALM scope varies across institutions:-
• it may be subordinated to business policy 
• it may be active in business policy making 
• it may be defined as a P & L unit with its own decision making functions, in 
addition to the hedging policy for the bank 
The traditional scope of ALM is dedicated to tools, procedures and processes 
for managing the risks associated with balance sheet globally. The wider scope 
envisages tools, models and processes, facilitating the implementation of both 
business and financial policy and an aid to decision making at the global level^"^. 
PAGE 11 [J 
1.2 AN OVERVIEW OF ALM RISKS 
In banks, there has been a significant extension of focus, from the traditional 
qualitative risk assessment towards the quantitative management of risks, due to 
both evolving risk practices and strong regulatory incentives^. The regulations, 
imposing capital charge against all risks, greatly helped this process. The 
underlying philosophy of capital requirement is to bring capital in line with the 
risks and it implies modeling the value of risk. Under an economic view, it implies 
modelling potential losses from each source of risk, which turns out to be the 
'economic' capital 'adequate' to risk. An overview of various ALM risks, is 
presented below :-
Credit Risk 
For banks, credit risk is the foremost of all the risks, in temris of importance^^°. 
Default risk, a major source of loss, is the risk that customers fail to comply with 
their obligations to service debt. Default triggers a total or partial loss of any 
amount lent to counter party. 
Decline in the credit standing of an obligor of the issuer of a bond or stock, is 
also a type of credit risk. Such deterioration does not imply default, but the 
probability of default increases. In the market, a deterioration of the credit 
standing of a borrower does materialise into a loss because it triggers an upward 
move of the required market yield to compensate the higher risk and triggers a 
value decline. 
The value of credit risk differs for the banking portfolio and trading 
portfolio. 
;PAGE n2r 
Banking portfolio. In banking portfolio, credit risk is critical since the default of a 
small number of important customers can generate large losses, potentially 
leading to insolvency. Various default events are a) delay in payment obligations, 
b) restructuring of debt obligations due to a major deterioration of credit standing, 
c) bankruptcies etc. Default means any situation other than a simple delinquency. 
Credit risk is difficult to quantify on an 'ex ante' basis, since we need an 
assessment of the likelihood of a default event and of the recoveries under 
default, which are context dependent. Besides, there is scarcity of data on 
interdependence between default events. 
Trading portfolio. The capability of trading market mitigates the credit risk since 
there is no need to hold these securities until the deterioration of credit risk 
materializes into effective losses. If the credit standing of the obligor declines, it is 
still possible to sell these instruments in the market at a lower value. 
However, in the case of over-the-counter instruments, such as derivatives 
(swaps and options), the bank faces the risk of losing the value, since the value 
varies during the entire residual life of the instrument. 
Measuring credit rick. The major credit risk are exposure, likelihood of default, 
or a deterioration of the credit standing, and the recoveries under default. 
Scarcity of data makes the assessment of these components a challenge. 
Ratings are traditional measure of credit quality of the debts. Because ratings are 
ordinal measures of credit risk, they are not sufficient to value credit risk. 
Portfolio models show that portfolio risk varies across banks depending on the 
number of borrowers, the discrepancies in size between exposures and the 
extent of diversification among types of borrowers, industries and countries. 
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Challenges of credit risk measurement. The various challenges of credit risk 
measurement may be enumerated as under:-
• Credit risk for traded instruments raises a number of conceptual and 
practical drfficulties:a) wtiat is the value subject to loss, or exposure, in future 
periods ?, b) does the cunrent price embed already the credit risk, since the 
market prices normally anticipate future events and to what extent ?, c) will it 
be easy to sell these instruments when signs of deterioration get stronger ? 
and d) will the bank hold these instruments longer than under normal 
conditions? 
• Modelling default probability directly with credit risk models remains a major 
challenge. 
• Another challenge of credit risk measurement is capturing portfolio effects. 
Due to scarcity of data, quantifying the diversification effects poses a great 
challenge. It requires assessing the joint likelihood of default for any pair of 
borrowers, which gets higher if their individual risks correlate. 
Interest Rate Risk 
The interest rate risk is the risk of a decline in earnings due to the movements of 
interest rates. Most of the items of bank' balance sheets are interest driven. 
Since interest rates are unstable, so are earnings^ ^ "^ '*. 
The lender earning a varieriaie rate has the risk of reduction in revenues, when 
interest rates decline. On the other hand, a borrower paying a variable rate bears 
higher costs when interest rates rise. Both the positions are risky, since the 
revenues and costs are Indexed to market rates. There are, however chances of 
gains, when reverse srtuatkm occurs. 
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Various complex indexations exist on market rates. Variable rate loans have 
their rates periodically reset using some market reference rates. In the case of 
transactions reaching maturity and renewed at that point will stick to the future 
and uncertain market conditions. Therefore, fixed rate become variable at 
maturity for loan renewa.s and variable rates remain fixed between two reset 
dates. This variety makes the measure of interest rate sensitivity of assets and 
liabilities to market rates more complex. 
Implicit options in banking products are another source of interest rate risk. A 
borrower of fixed rate loan will exercise the option of prepayment when the 
interest rate declines. Deposit holders transfer funds to term deposits, when 
interest rates for this rise. Optional risks are indirect interest rate risks. 
Besides arising from a change in interest rate, the behaviour of customer such as 
geographic mobility etc. do also have result in indirect interest rate risks. 
Measuring interest rate risk. Measuring the option risk is more difficult then 
measuring the usual interest rate risk , arising from simple indexation to market 
rates. 
NPV and Interest rate risk. The Net Present Value (NPV) is an alternative target 
variable to interest income. The sensitivity of interest rate assets and liabilities is 
the 'duration'. Since the NPV is the difference between mark-to-market values of 
loans and debts, its sensitivity to rate changes depends on their durations. 
The duration is the percentage change of a market value for a unit 'parallel' shift 
of the yield curve (up and down moves of all rates). The duration of assets and 
liabilities is readily available from their time profile of cash flows and the current 
rates. The interest rate sensitivity of the NPV depends on mismatches between 
the duration of assets and duration of liabilities. Such mismatches are duration 
gaps. The duration increases with maturity, but less than proportionately. It is a 
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convex function of maturity. The change in duration with maturity is the slope of 
the tangent to the curve that relates the duration to the maturity for a given asset. 
Controlling the duration gap between assets and liabilities allow us to maintain 
the overall sensitivities of the NPV within desired bounds. When interest rate 
drifts get wider, the difference in curvatures, or convexities of the asset-rate and 
the liability-rate profiles becomes significant, resulting in significant variation of 
the NPV even when slopes are similar at the current rate. This is convexity risk, 
which becomes relevant in times of high interest rate volatility. The duration is the 
first-order derivative with respect to interest rate, while the convexity is the 
second-order derivative. 
Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk refers to multiple dimensions such as a) inability to raise funds at 
normal cost, b) market liquidity risk and c) asset liquidity risk^ .^ 
Funding risk depends on how risky the market perceives the issuer and its 
funding policy. The cost of funding is a critical profitability driver. The cost of the 
funds depend on the bank's credit standing. In addition, the rating drives the 
ability to do business with other banks/financial institutions and to attract 
investors. 
The liquidity of the market relates to liquidity crunches because of lack of 
volume. In such a scenario, the prices become highly volatile, sometimes 
embedding high discounts from par, when counter parties are unwilling to trade. 
Market liquidity risk materialises as an impaired ability to raise money at a 
reasonable cost. 
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Asset liquidity risk results from lack of liquidity related to the nature of assets 
rather than to the market liquidity. In fluctuating market liquidity, holding a pool of 
liquid assets, acts as a cushion, to meet short-term obligations. 
When a bank gets into trouble, massive withdrawals of funds by depositors and 
closing of credit-lines by institutions, results into brutal liquidity crisis, ending up 
in bankruptcy of bank. 
Measuring liquidity risk. The time profiles of projected uses and sources of 
funds, and their 'gaps' or liquidity mismatches, capture the liquidity position of a 
bank. Given the market perception of the bank, the debt management has to be 
judicious. 
Challenges of liquidity risk measurement. Adequate techniques need to 
address fully the liquidity risk, in term;i of market liquidity or asset liquidity. The 
practices rely on empirical and continuous observations of market liquidity, 
whereas liquidity risk models appear too theoretical to permit instrumental 
applications. 
Currency Risk 
When a bank is involved in multi-currency operations, it is exposed to foreign 
exchange risk^ ®. The exchange rate keeps changing depending on value of the 
currency which is influenced by various factors which include demand and 
supply, balance of payments, trade deficit, Government borrowing, inflation, 
interest rates , political stability, etc. 
Foreign exchange exposure. These can be broadly classified into three 
categories:-
• Transaction exposure. The transaction exposure measures the risk 
involved due to the change in the foreign exchange rate between the time 
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the transaction is executed and the time it is settled. It is defined as a 
measure of the home currency value of assets and liabilities which are 
denominated in a foreign currency, to unanticipated changes in exchange 
rates, when the assets or liabilities are liquidated. 
Examples of foreign exchange transactions which may expose to 
transaction exposure :a) purchase or sale of goods and services made in 
foreign currency, b) dividends paid or received in foreign currency and c) 
loan repayments made in foreign currency. 
Banks, generally hold a square position at the end of day by going long 
(short) corresponding to every transaction (merchant transaction) with the 
customer which is short (long). The bank helps its customers to hedge 
their exposure while ensuring that it hedges its own exposure. A bank may 
also have transaction exposure of its own if it takes position/ trade on its 
own account. 
Translation exposure. Valuation of foreign assets and liabilities at current 
exchange rates results in losses or gains to the banks, depending on the 
composition of its assets and liabilities and the direction of the exchange 
rate movement. It affects the accounting profit and correspondingly the 
valuation of the banks in the market. This assumes greater significance 
when it involves preparing of a consolidated balance sheet for a parent 
company which includes all its subsidiaries, some of which may be located 
in different countries and hence operate in different currencies. 
• Operating exposure. In contrast to the transaction and translation 
exposures which affect the cas.h flows and the current balance sheet of 
the banks due to changes in the exchange rate, the operating exposure is 
a measure of the sensitivity of future cash flows and profits of a bank to 
unanticipated exchange rate changes. 
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The distinct features of operating exposures are: a) it cannot be related to 
specific transaction, b) dealing in foreign exchange is not a prerequisite for 
being subjected to operating exposure and c) it has a long-term 
implication beyond the current financial year. 
Managing currency risk. Managing an exposure refers to bringing the level of 
exposure to a targeted level. Banks acquire transaction exposure as a part of 
their normal business operations, and manage this exposure by hedging. 
Keeping in view the distinct nature of operating exposure, its management 
involves strategic decisions, which have long-term implications on capital 
investment. 
There are various internal and external techniques of exposure management:-
• Internal techniques, include netting, leading & lagging and invoicing. 
Netting presupposes a simultaneous occurrence of inflows and outflows in 
the same currency and for the same amount- though, these conditions in 
real life are difficult. To illustrate, if a bank has a FCNR(B) deposit 
maturing along with a foreign currency denominated loan, then netting the 
loan can take place. 
As the foreign exchange transactions materialize according to their tenor, 
the techniques of leading and lagging become handy for the purpose of 
such matching. Leading means making a flow occur earlier than the due 
date while lagging means delaying a flow beyond the due date. 
In the above two techniques, attempts are made to hedge the exposure it 
does not in any way affect the exposure, if any, of the counter party. The 
entire exchange risk is emanating because of the need to convert foreign 
currency into another currency. Invoicing technique helps in avoiding this, 
if an invoice is made in domestic currency. \n fact most of the internatior^al 
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trade gets denominated in US $, irrespective of the currencies of importer 
and exporter. Hence, managing exposure by invoicing is more an 
exception than rule. 
External techniques, include tools like fonfl/ard contract, currency futures, 
currency options and currency swaps. Under these techniques, the bank 
with the purpose of hedging, undertakes a transaction consequent to 
which a part or whole of the exchange risk is transferred to others. These 
tools can be used, either independently or in combination. 
A forward contract is an agreement to buy or sell foreign exchange for a 
predetermined amount, at a predetermined rate, and on a predetermined 
date. These contracts are OTC products that are entered into depending 
on the need of a hedger. The counter part in these transactions happens 
to be a banker and hence a bank acquires transaction exposure through 
such contracts. The bank normally covers its position by, in turn, entering 
into a fonward contract with another banker. This does not involve any 
cash flow at the time of entering a contract, but actual cash flows occur on 
the date of delivery. The forward rate of a currency can be at a premium or 
discount. 
Currency futures are similar to forward contracts to the extent that both 
provide for a delivery of foreign exchange by one party at a pre-
determined price on a specified future date. The essential difference is 
that forward contracts are OTC products and there is no secondary market 
for the same and they cannot be transferred. The only way to exit from 
such a contract is to cancel. However, currency futures are traded on an 
exchange and hence have a standard size, standard maturity date, and a 
set of guidelines stipulated by the exchange concerned for settlement and 
payment which includes depositing of margin money with exchange. The 
margin money to be deposited will change on daily basis depending on 
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the movement of the prices of the underlying futures. It is easier to exit 
from a futures contract, by simply selling it on the exchange at the 
prevailing prices. 
A currency option provides the hedger with an advantage which is not 
available under a fonward contract. A currency option contract gives the 
buyer of the option a right, without an obligation, to buy or sell foreign 
currency at a predetermined price on a specified future date. The contract 
which gives the right to buy is known as call option and the contract 
which gives the right to sell is known as put option. Options are traded 
on exchanges and hence have standard sizes, standard maturity dates 
and guidelines stipulated by the exchange concerned for the settlement 
and payment. The exchange stipulates margin maintenance only for 
sellers since they have obligations unlike the buyers who have only rights. 
Besides managing transaction exposures as above, it becomes imperative 
for the bank to look at the composition of its foreign currency assets and 
liabilities and take a view on whether there is a need to change the 
composition, depending on the future outlook about the currencies 
concerned. Currency swaps are useful in this context. Under a currency 
swap both the parties agree to exchange a series of cash flows over the 
life of a swap. 
Challenges of liquidity risk measurement. Measurement of operating 
exposure is relatively difficult as it is an attempt to assess the effect of exchange 
rate changes on future revenues, costs, cash flows and profits of the bank. 
Equity Risk 
The fail in the market price of shares has a bearing on the equity price risk^^. It 
adversely affects the investment portfolio of Banks. 
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The mark-to-market technique quantifies the loss in investment portfolio due to 
adverse movement in stock prices. Stock/index option and futures contracts are 
used to hedge this risk 
Operational Risk 
Operational risks relate to malfunctionf. of internal risk-monitoring rules, internal 
procedures, and reporting and information system^^'^^. The New Basel Accord 
defines operational risk as 'the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from 
external events'. 
In absence of efficient tracking and reporting of risks, some important risks 
remain ignored and can result into disastrous consequences. Operational risk is 
in essence 'event risk' and appears at different levels: a) people, b) processes, 
c) technical and d) information technology. 
Operational risks , relating to 'people', results from :-
• human errors 
• lack of expertise 
• fraud 
• non-compliance with existing procedures and policies 
Operational risks, linked to 'processes', results from:-
• inadequate procedures and controls for reporting, monitoring and decision-
making 
• inadequate procedures relating to processing information, such as errors in 
booking transactions and failure to scrutinize legal documentation/s, 
deficiencies in execution of documents etc. 
• deficiency in risk surveillance: management deficiencies in risk monitoring 
• errors in recording transaction/s 
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• technical deficiencies of information system or risk measures 
Operational risks, arising from 'technical' aspects have their origins in:-
• model errors 
• absence of adequate tools for measuring risks 
Operational risks, relating to information technology aspects, occur because of 
deficiencies of the information system and system failure. 
Measuring operational risk. The general principle for addressing operational 
risk measurement is to assess the likelihood and cost of adverse events. The 
methodology adopted begins first by data gathering phase, followed by data 
classification and analysis employing statistical techniques. 
There are historical data (external/internal statistics) on various incidents and 
their costs, which enable to measure the number of incidents and the direct costs 
attached to such incidents. 
Proxy sources on operational events such as expert judgments and opinions of 
local managers on possible events and their implications help in pooling data 
relating to frequencies anc costs of events. 
Challenges of operational risk meassurement. The practical difficulties lie in 
agreeing on a common classification of events and on data gathering process, 
with several potential sources of event frequencies and costs. 
1.3 QUANTITATIVE MEASURES OF RISK 
Risk management relies on quantitative measures of risks '^^ '*'^ .^ The various risk 
measures aim at capturing the variation of a given target variable e.g. earnings, 
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market value or losses due to default, etc. The quantitative indicators of risks fall 
into three categories:-
• Sensitivity, are ratios of the variation of a target variable, such as interest 
margin or change in mark-to-market values of instruments, to a forfeit shock 
of the underlying random parameter driving this change. Examples of 
underlying parameters are interest rates, exchange rates and stock prices. 
The interest rate gap is the sensitivity of the interest margin of the banking 
portfolio to a forfeit move of the yield curve. 
Market risk models use sensitivities widely. ALM uses gaps, which are 
sensitivities of the interest income of the banking portfolio, to shifts of interest 
rates. 
Sensitivities have drawbacks as well, firstly, they refer to a given forfeit 
change of risk drivers, without considering that some parameters are quite 
unstable while others are not and secondly, they depend on the prevailing 
conditions, the value of the market parameters and of assets, making them 
proxies of actual changes. 
• Volatility, which captures the variations around the average of any random 
parameter or target variable, both upside and downside. Unlike forfeit 
movements, volatility characterizes, the varying instability of any uncertain 
parameters, which is ignored by forleit changes. 
Volatility is a common statistical measure of the dispersion around the 
average of any random variable such as market parameters, earnings or 
mark-to-market values. Volatility is the standard deviation of the values of 
these variables (and standard deviation is the square root of the variance of a 
random variable). 
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Volatility need constant updating when new observations are available. An 
alternative measure of volatility is the implicit volatility embedded in option 
prices. It determines the value of volatility from the theoretical relationship 
(the Black-Scholes formula) of observed option prices with all underlying 
parameters, one of them being the volatility of the underlying. A benefit of 
implicit volatilities is that they are forward looking measures. A drawback of 
this approach is that implicit volatilities are fairly volatile, more than historical 
volatility. 
A limited number of observations might result in a distorted image of the 
dispersion. Thus, whei the sample size gets smaller, there is 'sampling error'. 
The Earnings at risk (rzaR) approach for estimating economic capital uses the 
observed volatility of earning values as the basis for calculating potential 
losses. 
Downside measures of risk, which focus on adverse deviations only. They 
characterize the 'worst case' deviations of a target variable, such as earnings, 
market values or credit losses, with probabilities for all potential values. 
Downside risk measures require modeling to have probability distributions of 
target variables. 
The 'Value at Risk' is a downside risk measure. It is the adverse deviation of 
a target variable, such as the value of a transaction, not exceeded in more 
than a preset fraction of all possible future outcomes. Downside risk is the 
most comprehensive measure of risk as it integrates sensitivity and 
volatility with the adverse effect of uncertainty. 
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VALUE AT RISK (VaR) AND CAPITAL 
The Value at Risk (VaR) is a potential loss. Practically, VaR is the maximum loss 
at a preset confidence leveP"^^. The confidence level is the probability that the 
loss exceeds this upper bound. 
Determination of VaR. VaR requires modeling the distribution of values at some 
future time point, in order to define various 'loss percentiles', each one 
corresponding to a confidence level. 
Applicability of VaR. VaR applies to all risks. Market risk is an adverse 
deviation of value during a certain liquidation period. Credit risk materializes 
through defaults of migrations across risk classes. Defaults trigger losses. 
Migrations trigger risk-adjusted value changes. VaR for credit risk is an adverse 
deviation of value, due to credit risk losses or migrations, at a present confidence 
level. VaR applies to various risks as long as we can build up a distribution 
of future values of transactions or of losses. 
VaR and Capital. VaR methodology serves to define risk-based capital, or 
economic capital- which is the capita required to absorb potential unexpected 
losses at the preset confidence level. The confidence level reflects the risk 
appetite of the bank. By definition, it is also the probability that the loss exceeds 
the capital, triggering bank insolvency. Hence, the confidence level is equivalent 
to the default probability of the bank. 
Advantages of VaR. The VaR concept has three distinct advantages:-
• it provides a complete view of portfolio risk 
• it measures economic capital 
• it assigns fungible values to risks 
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Because VaR captures the downside risk, it is the basis for measuring economic 
capital, the ultimate safety cushion for absorbing losses. Further, instead of 
assigning qualitative indicators (sensitivities, ratings, watch lists, excess limits, 
etc), VaR assigns a dollar or rupee value to risk. Valuation makes all risks 
fungible, whatever the sources of uncertainty. 
EARNINGS AT RISK (EaR) AND CAPITAL 
Earnings at Risk (EaR) measures, at present confidence levels, the potential 
adverse deviations of earnings. Though EaR is not VaR, but it shares the same 
underlying concept, and has the benefit of being relatively easy to measure. 
A simple way of approaching risk is to use the historical distributions of earnings. 
The wider the dispersion of time series of earnings, the higher the risk of the 
bank. 
Determination of EaR. Several measures of earnings can be used to capture 
their instability over time: accounting earnings, interest margins, cash flows, 
market values, especially for the trading portfolio. The volatility is the adequate 
measure of such dispersion. It is the standard deviation of series of observations. 
Once earnings distributions are obtained, it is easy to use loss volatility as the 
unit for measuring capita. Deriving capital follows the same principle as VaR. It 
implies looking for aggregated level of losses that is not likely to be exceeded in 
more than a given fraction of all outcomes. 
Applicability of EaR. EaR provides a very easy overview of risks. 
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EaR and Capital. EaR serves to define aggregated capital, but it does not allow 
us to trace back risks to their sources. EaR concept is a sinnpler route to capital 
than VaR. 
Advantages of EaR. Earnings at Risk (EaR) is a simple and practical version of 
VaR:-
• this is a quicker approach to risk management-- not time intensive 
• it does not require much data, as it relies on existing data, since incomes are 
always available 
• it requires less information technology resources; there is no need of 
constructing a risk data warehouse, since existing databases provide most of 
the information and relate it easy to transactions 
• it is easy to track major variations of earnings to some specific events and to 
interpret them 
• EaR provides a number of outputs; the earnings volatility, the changes of 
earnings volatility when the perimeter of aggregation increases, measuring 
the diversification of effect 
• the level of capital is an amount that losses are not likely to exceed 
Disadvantages of EaR. There are number of drawbacks to EaR:-
• a volatility calculation raises technical issues, for instance when trends of time 
series increase volatility-in such cases the volatility comes from trend rather 
than instability 
• It is not possible to define the sources of the risk making the earnings volatile. 
EaR does not relate the adverse deviations of eamings to the underlying risks 
because EaR aggregates the effects of all risks. Unlike VaR models, EaR 
captures risks as an outcome of all risks, not at their source. 
On the contrary VaR requires linking losses to each risk. VaR models the 
value of the risk ex ante , rather than after its materialization into losses. VaR 
models the value of risk and relates it to the instrumental variables, allowing 
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ex ante control of risk using such parameters as sensitivities to market risk, 
exposure limits, concentration for each credit risk, etc. 
Therefore, EaR appears to be an additional tool for risk management, but not a 
substitute. 
LIMITATIONS OF SIMPLE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL AND RISK BASED 
CAPITAL: REGULATORY AND ECONOMIC CAPITAL 
The common practice to define the required capital is to use regulatory capital. 
The fact is that the regulatory capital has many limitations, even after the 
enhancements proposed by the New Basel Accord. 
Using regulatory capital as a surrogate for economic capital generates important 
distortions because of the divergence between the real hsks and the forfeited 
risks of regulatory capital. For regulatory purposes, credit risk is dependent on 
outstanding balances (bock exposures) and on risk v\/eights. Such forfeits are 
less risk sensitive than economic measures. In addition, standardized regulatory 
approaches measure risk over a portfolio by a simple addition of individual risks 
for credit risk. This ignores the diversification effect and results in the same 
measure of risk for widely diversified portfolios and for highly concentrated 
portfolios. 
The shortcomings of forfeit measures have implications for the entire hsk 
management system. The most important benefit of economic capital is to 
correct such distortions. 
The VaR methodology applies to measure risk-based capital. The VaR differs 
from regulatory capital or from available capital in that it measures actual risks. 
Regulatory capital uses forfeits falling short of measuring actual risks. Economic 
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capital necessitates the VaR methodology, with the modeling of loss distribution, 
with the related complexities. 
MEASURING EXPECTED AND UNEXPECTED LOSSES : LOSS 
DISTRIBUTION AND CONFIDENCE LEVEL 
The two major ingredients for defining expected and unexpected losses are the 
loss distribution and the confidence level. 
Modelling loss distributions raises major technical challenges because the focus 
is on extreme deviations rather than on the central tendency. The confidence 
level results from a management choice reflecting the risk appetite, or the 
tolerance for risk, of the management and the bank's policy with respect to its 
credit standing. 
Since downside risk characterizes VaR and economic capital, loss volatility and 
the underlying loss distribution are critical. 
Loss Distributions. For market risk, loss distributions are simply the loss 
distributions of adverse price deviations of the instruments. Since there are 
approximately as many chance that value increases or decreases, such 
deviations tend to be bell shaped, with some central tendency. 
As for credit risk, historical data is scarce and does not necessarily reflect the 
current risk of banks. Therefore, it becomes necessary for modeling loss 
distributions. For credit risk, losses are not negative earnings, they result from 
defaults, or loss of asset value because of credit standing deterioration. Such 
distributions are highly skewed to the left, because the most frequent losses are 
very small. These distributions are shown in the following page (Figure 1.1). 
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FIGURE 1.1 
FAT TATT S AND EXTREME LOSSES 
I - Large losses 
.iiw probability 
UNEXPECTED LOSS AND VaR 20+ 
With distributions, tine visual representation of losses is simple. The VaR at a 
given confidence level is such that the probability of exceeding the unexpected 
loss is equal to this confidence level. The area under the curve at the right of 
VaR represents this probability. The maximum total loss at the same confidence 
level is the sum of the expected loss plus unexpected loss (or VaR). 
Losses at the extreme right hand side and beyond unexpected losses are 
'exceptional'. The VaR -epresents the capital in excess of expected loss 
necessary for absorbing deviations from average losses. A well known 
characteristics of loss distributions is th at they have 'fat tails'-extreme sections of 
the distributions, indicating large losses, although unlikely (low probabilities). 
The VaR is easy to determine under simplifying assumptions on the distribution 
curve of losses. With normal curve, the VaR is a multiple of loss volatility that 
depends on the confidence level. To illustrate, the 2.5 per cent one-tailed 
confidence level corresponds to a multiple of loss volatility of 1.96. Therefore, if 
the loss volatility is 100, the unexpected loss will not exceed the upper bound of 
196 in more than 2 or 3 cases out of 100 scenarios. Unfortunately, such multiples 
do not apply when the distribution has a different shape, for instance for credit 
risk. 
When implementing techniques based on confidence levels and loss percentiles, 
there is a need for common benchmarks, such as confidence levels, for all 
players (banks). 
Loss Percentiles (at Confidence Levels) of the Normal Distribution 
The normal distribution is a proxy for market random P&L over a short period, but 
it cannot apply to credit risk, for which loss distributions are highly asymmetrical. 
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FIGLRE 1.2 
VOLATILITY AND DOWNSIDE RISK 
Piol l i ihi l i ly 
CONFIDENCE LEVELS WITH THE NORMAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
21+ 
The VaR at a confidence level x is the 'loss percentile' L (x). The area under the 
curve in Figure 1.2, beyond the boundary value on the left-hand side, represents 
the probability that losses exceed this boundary value. Visually, a higher volatility 
means that the curve dispersion around its mean is v\/ider. Hence, the chances 
that losses exceed a given boundary value grow larger The confidence intervals 
are probabilities that losses exceed an upper bound (negative earnings, beyond 
the zero level). They are 'one-tailed' because only one-sided negative deviations 
materialise downside risk. 
When both upside and downside deviations of the mean are considered, the 
confidence interval is 'two-tailed'. With a symmetric distribution, the two-tailed 
probability is twice the one-tailed probability. When the probability of losses 
exceeding a maximum value is 2.5 per cent, the probability that losses exceed 
the lower or the upper bounds is 5 per cent. 
Confidence intervals are boundary values corresponding to a specified 
confidence level. In the normal curve, confidence intervals are simply multiples of 
the volatility. With the normal curve, the upper bounds of (negative) deviations 
corresponding to the confidence levels of 16 per cent, 10 per cent, 5 per cent, 2.5 
per cent and all other values are in the normal distribution. They correspond 
respectively to deviations from the mean of 1, 1.28, 1.65 and 1.96 times the 
standard deviation a of the curve. Any other confidence interval corresponds to 
deviations expressed as multiples of volatilities for this distribution. 
Issues in modelling VaR and Portfolio Risks 
A 'standalone' VaR serves only as an intermediate step for moving from 
'standalone' loss distributions of individual assets held in the portfolio loss 
distribution, which combines losses from all individual assets held in the portfolio. 
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The difficulty in VaR measures is the modelling of the loss distribution of a 
portfolio. The focus on high losses implies modeling 'the 'fat tail' of the 
distributions rather than looking at the central tendency. Even with market-driven 
P&L, ttie normal distribution does a poor job of modeling distribution tails. For 
credit risl<, the issue is worse since the loss distributions are highly skewed. 
Loss distributions depend on portfolio structure, size discrepancies 
(concentration risk on big exposures) and the interdependencies between 
individual losses (the fact that loss occurrence increases or decreases the 
likelihood of occurrence of other losses. The new portfolio models provide the 
ability to quantify concentration and diversification effects on the portfolio risk. 
'Fat tails' of actual distributions make the quantification of extreme losses and 
their probability of occurrence quite difficult. The major drawback of VaR 
modelling is that they are highly demanding in terms of data. 
MARK-TO-MARKET VALUATION AND MARK-TO-MODEL 
In traditional accounting, the book value of loan does not change when the 
revenues or the risks are higher or lower than average. Therefore, book values 
are not revenue-or risk-adjusted, while 'economic values' are. 
Accounting standards have evolved progressively. The Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB) promotes the Generally Accepted Accounting Practices 
(GAAP) that apply to all financial institutions that apply to all financial institutions. 
The International Accounting Standards (IAS) Committee promotes guidelines to 
which multinational banks, abide. All Committees and Boards promote the 'fair 
value' concept, which is a mark-to-market value. 
Mark-to-Market Measure. In essence, an 'economic value' is a form of mark-to-
market measure, as it is a discounted vaiue of future contractual cash flows 
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generated by assets, using appropriate discount rates. The discounting process 
embeds the revenues from the assets in the cash flows, and embeds the risk 
also in the discount rates. 
Marking-to-market does not imply that assets are actually tradable. The mark-to-
market values of the trading portfolio are market prices. However, a loan has also 
a mark-to-market value even though it is not tradable. 
Mark-to-Model. Risk models also rely on mark-to-market valuations. 'Mark-to-
Model' are similar to mark-to-market, but exclude some drivers. For example, 
isolating the effect of credit risk on value does not require using continuously 
adjusted interest rates. 
'Mark-to-future' is a 'mark-to-model' valuation at future time points, differentiated 
across scenarios characterising the random outcomes from current date up to a 
future time point. 
'Value at Risk models' use revaluations of assets at future dated for all sets of 
random outcomes, to provide the value distribution from which VaR derives. 
However, 'Fair value' is a significant step ahead because of the implication in 
terms of profitability. The relevant measure of profitability becomes P&L rather 
than accrual income. The main implication of fair value accounting is that 
earnings would result from the fluctuation of values, generating volatile P&L. The 
sensitivity of value to market movements is much higher for interest-earning 
assets with fixed rates than with floating rates. 
Risk models and their valuation building blocks. In many risk models, the 
valuation building block plays a critical role:-
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ALM-interest risk Models. The Net Present Value (NPV) of the balance 
sheet is the present value of assets minus the value of liabilities. It serves 
as the target variable of ALM nnodels because it captures the entire 
stream of cash flows generated by assets and liabilities. 
If assets provide excess return c-ver market yields, and liabilities cost less 
than market yields, assets are above par and liabilities below par value. 
The difference captures the expected profitability of the balance sheet in 
terms of present value. 
The NPV of the balance sheet uses a single set of market rates 
differentiated by maturity, but not by risk class. The calculation differs from 
mark-to-market and fair value, in that it does not differentiate the discount 
rates according to the risk of each individual asset. 
As per NPV concept, if we consider the bank as 'borrowing' from the 
market as its average cost of funding, which depends on its risk class-
then the bank could effectively bring back all future asset cash flows to 
present by borrowing against them. Borrowings 'against' those means 
borrowing the exact amount that would require future payments, inclusive 
of interest, identical to the cash flows of all assets at this future date. This 
is a mark-to-model rattier ttian a full mark-to-market. 
Market risk VaR Models. For market risk VaR models, the loss percentile 
derives from the distribution of future values of all assets at a future time 
point. The future value is random because of market movements and the 
distribution implies revaluation of assets at the future time point as a 
function of random market moves. 
Credit risk Models. For credit risk models, the same principle applies, 
except that we focus on random credit risk events to find the distribution of 
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uncertain values at a future hoiizon. The credit events include defaults 
and changes of credit standing, implying a value adjustment with market 
risky yields. The revaluation building block provides the spectrum of future 
values corresponding to all future credit states. 
The valuation calculation depends on various options. Full mari<-to-mari<et 
valuation uses all parameters influencing prices to find out the distribution of 
random values at future time points. This not so with ALM-interest risk model and 
Credit risk model. 
RISK MODELS 
The development of risk models for banks has been relatively fast and rich in the 
recent period, starting with ALM-interest risk models, followed by market VaR 
models and credit risk models. 
The ALM-interest risk models, the first to appear, aimed at capturing the 
interest rate risk of the banking book of commercial banks. Later they developed 
into several building blocks, some of them addressing the interest rate risk of the 
interest income, others the interest rate risk of the mark-to-market value of the 
balance sheet, and others aiming to value embedded prepayment options in 
banking products. 
As the regulations focused on capital requirements, the banks focused on 
economic capital. The capital adequacy principle led to the VaR concept and to 
VaR models for market risk and credit risk. Market risk models aim to capture 
the market portfolio risk and find the capital requirement adequate for making this 
risk sustainable. They address the behaviour of risk drivers, interest rates, 
foreign exchange rates and equity indexes. 
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Because of the requirements of the New Basel Accord, the new generation of 
risk models are aiming to provide better measures of credit risl< drivers and 
address both transaction risl< and portfolio risl< v/ith new approaches. Risk drivers 
are exposures, default probabilities and recoveries. 
New models appeared relating observable attributes of firms to default and 
ratings, using new techniques, such as neural network approach. Amongst 
various techniques for modeling ratings and default probabilities, neural networks 
approach, offers theoretical benefits over multivariate statistical techniques. 
Neural networks accommodate interdependencies and non-linear relationships. 
These features might improve accuracy. 
There are basic principles, defining the basic building blocks of risk models :-
• the risk-return profiles of transactions or portfolios are a centerpiece of risk 
management processes 
• risk-return measures appear as the ultimate goal of risk models and these 
models achieve this by assembling various techniques and tools that 
articulate to each other 
• risk models differ along two main dimensions: the nature of the risk 
(interest rate risk, market, credit, etc.) that they address; whether they 
apply to isolated transactions or portfolios, because the portfolios raise the 
issue of measuring diversification in addition to measuring the standalone 
risk of transactions. Accordingly, techniques to address various risks for 
standalone transactions or portfolios differ. 
There are four main building blocks of risk models:-
i) Risk drivers and standalone risk of transactions. Risk drivers are all factors 
influencing risks, which are necessary inputs for measuring the risk of individual 
transactions. When considered in isolation, the intrinsic of a transaction is 
'standalone'. 
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ii) Portfolio risk. Portfolio models aim to capture the diversification effect that 
makes the risk of a portfolio of transactions smaller than the sum of the risks of 
the individual transactions. They serve to measure the economic capital under 
the VaR methodology. 
iii) Top-dowr) and bottom-up links. These links relate global risk to individual 
transaction risks, or sub-portfolio risks. They convert global risk and return 
targets into risk limits and target profitability for business lines (top-down) and, 
conversely, for facilitating decision-making at the transaction level and for 
aggregating business line risks and returns for global purposes (bottom-up), 
iv) Risk-adjusted performance measuring and reporting, for transactions and 
portfolios. Both risk-return profiles feed the basic risk processes: profitability and 
limit setting providing guidelines for risk decisions and monitoring. 
RISK ADJUSTED PERFORMANCES : RAROC AND EVA 
Risk-adjusted performances are a compromise between accounting measures of 
performance and the necessity of adjusting income for risk. The popular risk 
adjusted measures of accounting profitability are the Risk-adjusted Return on 
Capital (RAROC) and the Shareholders Value Added (SVAf° Both combine 
profitability and risk. 
RAROC nets expected losses from accrued revenues and divides them by the 
capital allocated to a transaction, using a capital (risk) allocation system. The 
RAROC ratio should be above an appropriate hurdle rate representative of a 
minimum profitability. 
SVA nets both the expected loss from revenues and the cost of the required 
capital, valued with an appropriate price in line with shareholder's required return. 
A positive SVA implies creation of value, while a negative SVA implies 
destruction of value from the bank's shareholders' standpoint. 
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1.4 ll\APLICATIONS OF NEW BASEL il CAPITAL ACCORD ON 
BANKS 
With the changing perception of risks, the Basel II, set to be finalised soon, will 
provide a catalyst for change for banks and financial institution around the world. 
The objectives of the Basel II Accord^^ may be summarised as under:-
• To promote safety and soundness in the financial system 
• To enhance competitive equality 
• To provide a more comprehensive approach to addressing risks 
• To rationalise approaches to capital adequacy that is appropriately sensitive 
to degree of risks involved in a Bank's position and activities 
• To give greater emphasis on Bank's own assessment of risks to which they 
are exposed 
• To ensure that the Bank's management remain responsible for managing 
risks and ensuring that CAR is consistent with Bank's profile 
• To focus on internationally active Banks, although its underlying principles 
can be applied suitably to all types of Banks 
STRUCTURE OF NEW CAPITAL ACCORD 
Basel II is intended to be more sophisticated. This is where the complexities 
start. It consists of three mutually reinforcing pillars^ '^^ ^ aimed at attaining the 
above said objectives:-
i) Minimum capital requirements 
ii) Supervisory review process 
iii) Market discipline 
I .MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
One of the three reinforcing pillars of the new Basel accord, the minimum 
capital requirement lays emphasis on regulatory capital requirements for credit, 
market and operational risk. 
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Capital Adequacy Ratio = Total regulatory capital (Tier 1+ Tier II +Tier III) 
Risk weighted assets (Credit + Market +Operational) 
Three approaches have been proposed to deal with credit risk :-
a) Standardised approach with risk weights based on external credit 
assessments, and two internal ratin;3s-based approaches 
b) Foundation Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach, and 
c) Advanced Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach 
The standardised approach is risk sensitive and requires allocation of risk weight 
to each of the assets and of balance-sheet positions. For determining risk 
weights, banks may use assessment by External Credit Assessment Institutions 
(ECAIs). The Committee has modified the treatment of Bank's exposures to 
Sovereigns, Banks and Corporates by providing more than one risk bucket unlike 
one earlier for each category of exposure. Unlike, the 1988 Capital Accord, 
wherein banks are required to adopt the approach of applying a consistent risk 
weighting factor of 100 % for all corporate credits , the new Accord calls for a 
more risk-sensitive and balanced portfolio. 
The latter two approaches would be open to sophisticated Banks, if authonsed by 
supervisors. The IRB approaches require assessment of risk in the credit 
portfolio, internally by Banks, subject to strict methodological and disclosure 
standards. The estimated credit worthiness of the borrower will be translated into 
a potential future loss amount, which would form the basis of minimum capital 
requirement. In the case of Foundation IRB, the Banks estimate the probability 
of default (PD) of each borrower, while the supervisor supplies the other inputs. 
The Advanced IRB approach requires the Banks to be permitted to supply other 
necessary inputs as well, considering its sufficiently developed internal capital 
allocation process. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF NEW CAPITAL ACCORD ON OVERALL CHANGE IN 
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
As per the Quantitative Impact Study (QIS3) published by the Basel Committee 
in May,2003, the impact of new regulatory capital requirements^ "^^ ^ for the Banks 
operating in the different part of the globe would be as under :-
TABLE 1.1 
Croup 
GIO 
GROUP 1 
GIO 
GROUP 2 
EU 
GROUP 1 
EU 
GROUP 2 
OTHER 
Standardised 
Mean Max Min 
+11% +84% 
+3% +81 % 
+6% +31% 
+ 1% +81% 
+ 12% +103% 
-15% 
-23 % 
- 7 % 
-67 % 
-17% 
IRB Foundation 
Mean Max Min 
+3% 
-19% 
-4% 
-20% 
+4% 
+55% 
+41% 
+55% 
+41% 
+75% 
- 32% 
-58% 
-32 % 
-58 % 
-33% 
IRB Advanced 
Mean Max Min 
-2% +46% -36% 
• " " 
-6% +26% - 3 1 % 
- - -
- _ -
: OVERALL CHANGE IN CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS (INCLUDING IMPACT OF THE 
OPERATIONAL RISK CHARGE) Group I Banks are large internationally active Banks ; 
Group 2 Banks are more domestically / focused Banks, and tend to be smaller in size than 
Group 1 ; Other represents Banks from G 10 a id non-EU countries and they include Australia, 
China, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and a number of Latin American, Asian and 
Centra! and Eastern countries- in this case Group 1 and Group 2 Banks are combined. Source: 
BIS 
> In developing countries, the impact of Basel II will be mainly via the 
standardised approach , at least in the initial stages of implementation of the 
New Accord. 
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> The standardised approach is estimated to increase capital requirements by 
12 per cent in a group largely comprising of developing countries. 
> To the extent that regulatory capital is a binding constraint, Banks in the 
developing countries will :-
- either have to raise new capital, which may be difficult / costly 
( particularly for the weaker Banks) or 
- reduce their lending, and / or 
- increase the cost of lending, especially to lower rated borrowers 
> Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC), have noted that in strategy terms, the 
average results suggests that the biggest and most diversified institutions 
should seek to move to the more sophisticated approaches as soon as 
possible. The real capital savings can be made on credit risk and that the 
Banks with the largest exposure to the retail market have the opportunity to 
make the most significant gains. 
> Mercer predicts that the shake-out will result in a banking market dominated 
by five types of institutions: 
- large global Banks 
- super-monolines 
- asset gatherers and packagers 
- relationship Banks and 
- non-Bank specialists 
Basel II would play a major role of differentiation among Banks. Successful 
Banks are expected to stand out more clearly as transparency increases and 
capital is used more economical. 
> Banks will be forced to appropriate some percentage of capital to cover the 
unidentified but perceived operational risks. This additional commitment 
will certainly add to the pressures of a Bank in temns of committing an 
additional funds to capital, collating the necessary data, building the right 
framework, understanding the technology issues and the like. 
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Basel II, would undoubtedly bring better risk management. At the same time, the 
prospect of possible capital increase;, and declining profitability may trigger 
consolidation and merger and acquisition activity, which again in the long run 
may prove good for the Banking industry. 
II. PILLAR 2 OF NEW BASEL ACCORD : SUPERVISORY REVIEW PROCESS 
The objective of Supervisory Review Process is to ensure that Banks have 
adequate capital to support all the risks in their business. It entails an accurate 
risk profile for each Bank viz. assessment of financial, non-financial risks as also 
effectiveness of the Bank's structure, its management and control system. 
Continuous monitoring and evaluation of risk profile in tune with the business 
strategy and exposure will become imminent. 
Supervisory review process will, therefore, involve the principles of supervisory 
review, supervisory transparency and accountability in risk management 
guidance. The four key principles of supervisory review identified by Basel 
Committee are :-
• Having a process for assessment and maintaining capital adequacy levels in 
relation to risk profile of the individual Bank 
• Appropriate supervising actions be taken by supervisors if they are not 
satisfied with the result of this process 
• Supervisors should expect that the Banks operate above the minimum 
regulatory capital adequacy ratio and have the ability to hold capital in 
excess of the minimum 
• Supervisor's intervention at an early stage to prevent capital falling below the 
minimum levels required to support risk profile of a particular Bank and 
remedial action if capital not maintained / restored 
Banks are grappling with how to ensure that the substantial investment being 
made in Basel II preparation, can be made to yield a positive return. 
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III. PILLAR 3 OF NEW BASEL ACCORD: MARKET DISCIPLINE 
The new Basel guidelines on market discipline entail enhanced disclosure 
requirements for Banks, aimed at providing to the market participants, a better 
understanding of the Bank's profile, risk assessment methods and adequacy of 
their capital. 
The Committee has developed a set of specific quantitative and qualitative 
disclosures in four keys: scope of application, composition of capital , risk 
exposure assessment and measurement processes, and capital adequacy. 
Given the influence of internal methodologies on the capital requirements 
established, the Committee believes that comprehensive disclosure is important 
for market participants to understand the relationship between the risk profile and 
capital of an institution, and hence its soundness. The Committee expects all 
institutions to disclose basic information, subject to materiality. 
Basel II framework has evolved to reflect greater risk sensitivity through improved 
risk measurement and management techniques. The hallmark of Basel II lies in 
its alignment of minimum regulatory capital to be held against credit risk with 
formal risk assessment of individual counter parties and also for the first time 
capital allocation against operational risk has been proposed. 
The Committee has recommended that sophisticated, internationally active 
Banks make the full range of core and supplementary information publicly 
available, while generally, the concept of materiality will guide the necessity for 
supplementary disclosures to be made. 
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Building up a proper Asset Liability Management structure would be crucial 
for the banks in the future. The need for the banks is to develop technology 
based risk management tools—-the complex mathematical models 
programmed into risk engines to enable risk analysis, measurement, 
computation of risk adjusted returns on capital and active management of 
bank's risk portfolio. 
REFERENCES 
1. Joel Besis. Risk Management in Banking, John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2003. 
2. Crouhy, M., Galai, D and Mark, R. A comparative analysis of current credit 
risk models. Journal of Banking and Finance.24 p.59-117, 2000. 
3. Khurana, S.K Asset Liability management. Skylark Publications, N. Delhi, 
2000. 
4. Kumar, T. Ravi. Asset Liability Management. Vision Books, New Delhi, 2000. 
5. Chorafas, D N. Credit risk, market risk and the Basel Committee on banking 
supervision. In: Commercial banking handbook: strategic planning for growth 
and survival in the new decade- Hampshire: Macmillan, pp. 373-400,1999. 
6. Bhattacharya, Hrishikes. Banking Strategy, Credit Appraisal and Lending 
Decision: A Risk-Return Framework. Oxford University, Delhi, 1998. 
7. Damodran A. Risk management. In: Corporate finance: theory and practice/ 
New York: John Willey, pp. 776-797. 
8. Grouhy, Michael & others. Risk Management. McGraw Hills, New York, 2000. 
9. Michael, Richard. Efficient Asset Management. Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston, 1998. 
lO.Mikkalaya Murray. Discoveries in Retail Credit Risk Management, The RMA 
Journal, April, 2003. 
11. Jim Clarke. Part III: The Current State of Interest Rate Risk Management, 
The RMA Journal, October, 2003. 
DPAGE D35D 
12.Murty G.R.K. Interest Rates under Deregulated Regime and Market 
Dichotomy. Treasury Management. ICFAI press, December, 2002. 
13.Meera Sharma. Measuring Interest Rate Risk for the Banking Book, IBA 
Bulletin, January, 2003. 
14.Joshi, Anurag. Interest Rate Derivatives: The Futures' Full of Options, 
Portfolio Organizer, June, 2003. 
15. Paul A. Decker. The Changing Character of Liquidity and Liquidity Risk 
Management: A Regulator's Perspective. The Journal of Lending & Credit 
Risk Management, May, 2000. 
16.Rajwade, A.V. Foreign Exchange, International Finance, Risk Management. 
Academy of Business Studies, New Delhi, 1996. 
17. Larry Swedroe. Equity Valuations, Future Expected Returns, and the Equity 
Risk Premium. Portfolio Organizer, June, 2003. 
IS.Rajshekar.N. Operational Risk Management; Management Framework and 
Technology Issues. Treasury Management, ICFAI press, November, 2002. 
19. Suzanne Labarge. Clearing a Path for Operational Risk Management. The 
RMA Journal, February, 2003. 
20. Ferguson Roger W, Jr. Basel II : Risk Management in Banks. Professional 
Banker, July, 2003. 
21. James Lam. Ten Preoictions for Risk Management. The RMA Journal, May, 
2003. 
22. Michael K. Ong. The alpha, beta and gamma of Operational Risk. The RMA 
Journal, September, 2003. 
23. Peter Nakada and Andrew Hickman. Risk: Getting started in Operational 
Risk-Approaches and their drawbacks. The RMA Journal, May, 2003. 
24.Saha, Ashish and Subramanian, V. Risk Management: Emerging 
Perspectives. National Institute of Bank Management, Pune, 2003. 
25. Schwartz, Robert J. Advanced Strategies in Financial Risk Management. 
Institute of Finance, New York, 1993. 
26. Crnkovic, C. and Drachman, J. A universal tool to discriminate among risk 
measurement techniques. Journal of Risk 9, 138-143,1996. 
DPAGE D36D 
27. Hull, J.C. and White A. Value at risk when daily changes in market variables 
are not normally distributed, Journal of Derivatives, 5(3), Spring, 9-19,1998. 
28. Ju X and Pearson N. Using value-at-risk to control risk taking: how wrong can 
you be? Journal of Risk, 1, Winter, 5-36, 1999. 
29. Marshall C. and Siegel M. Value at risk; implementing a risk measurement 
standard. Journal Asia, 1997. 
30. Brian J. Ranson. The Merit of the Journey: A Counterpoint to RAROC 
Critics, The RMA Journal, November, 2003. 
31. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Overview of the New Basel Capital 
Accord, BIS, Basel, Switzerland, January, 2001. 
32. Christopher Karaolis: 'Basel II, The New Accord', in Treasury Management, 
pp.41-43, July, 2003. 
33. Jeffrey S. Morrison: ' Preparing for Basel II modeling requirements', in The 
RMA Journal, pp.56-61, May, 2003. 
34. Jose A. Lopez: 'Banks and Operational Risk', in Professional Banker, pp.29-
31, May, 2002. 
35.Moody's Investor Service: 'Global Credit Research, Special Comments', 
November, 2000. 
36.Stephen Timewell: 'Complex catalyst for change', in The Banker, pp.111-112, 
June, 2003. 
37.Stephen Timewell: 'Latest US move sets the pace for the world', in The 
Banker, pp. 22-24, August 2003. 
DPAGE D37D 
CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The first paper regarding tiie relevance of financial risk management was 
arguably written over forty years ago by Modigliani and Miller^  (1958). In that 
paper they showed that in frictionless markets with no taxes, the value of the 
corporation was independent of how it managed its financial risk on the balance 
sheet. The key idea used was the concept of arbitrage. From the point of view of 
the firm's shareholders, corporate risk management only matter if there are 
imperfections of some sort in capital markets (e.g., differential tax treatment 
across instruments or institutions or some sort of cost of financial distress). 
In another area of financial economics, Markowitz^ (1952) and Tobin' (1958) had 
developed algorithms that, given certain assumptions, reduced the 
dimensionality of the risk/ return problem facing economic agents to two i.e. 
mean and variance of returns or payoffs. This provided the minimum level of 
dimensionality that one could have in order to study the choice under uncertainty. 
The 1960s provided important extensions to the literature on choice under 
uncertainty and market equilibrium. On the pricing side, Borch* (1962), Linter^  
(1965), and Sharpe® (1964) extended the work of Markowitz and Tobin by 
studying the (partial) equilibrium pricing of risk. They showed, in somewhat 
different settings, that only systematic (or common) risk is priced in an otherwise 
frictionless market, be it for re-insurance or stocks. Importantly for later work, 
Borch viewed his agents as "firms" in the reinsurance market. While Linter and 
Sharpe viewed there agents as individuals participating In security markets. In 
both cases, agents were assumed to have objective functions that are concave in 
wealth. 
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Another key element came in risk management, in the early 1970s with the 
development of option pricing models by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1973). These authors used the idea that two portfolios with the same cash flows 
in every state of the world must sell for the same price in order to avoid arbitrage. 
Ross^ (1978) and Harrison and Kreps^° (1979) added an important link for 
purposes of future developments in asset pricing by providing general conditions 
under which the lack of arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a unique 'risk 
neutral' pricing operator for the economy under consideration. 
The late 1960s and early 1970s also brought extensions to the work on the 
theory of the firni under uncertainty. In particular, Leland^^ (1972) and Sandmo^^ 
(1971) utilized earlier results by Arrow^^ (1963) and Pratt^ * (1964) to study 
investment and financing decisions by firms that possessed 'utility' functions. 
This was one way to deal with the question of incompleteness and these authors 
derived a number of interesting results, for example, whether or not individual 
firms would increase their investment levels as uncertainty increased. 
Ederington^* (1979) and Rolfo^^ (1980) published important papers that 
combined ideas from the theory of the fimn literature and mean variance analysis. 
In particular, they examined the problem of 'hedging' or off-balance sheet risk 
management in a world where the firm, for whatever reason, takes positions in 
off-balance sheet instruments to maximise some mean/variance objective 
function or expected utility. A special case - namely that where the firm minimises 
the variance of cash flows- occurs in cases where the price of financial insurance 
is essentially zero (so called unbiased forward rates or prices). 
There were number of brejakthroughs in the analysis of risk sharing at both the 
macro- and micro-levels in the 1980s. Bryant^ ^ (1981) and Diamond and 
Dybvig^^ (1983) analysed problems of incomplete infomnation and inter-temporal 
risk sharing at the macro-level. Diamond and Dybvig showed that a bank would 
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possibly be able to improve an autarky in a world where Investors have private 
information concerning there consumption preferences. However, they also 
showed that there could also exist a bad equilibrium where depositors run on the 
bank even though they themselves do not prefer to consume early. 
Without aggregate uncertainty, suspension of convertibility eliminates this bad 
equilibrium. In the case of aggregate uncertainty, they showed that government 
intervention in the fomi of the provision of deposit insurance is necessary to 
achieve the first best allocation (Jacklin^ ,^ 1987). 
Work in the 1980s at ttie level of the firm focused on the fundamental question of 
what frictions might cause a firm to engage in risk management. Doherty and 
Tinic^° (1981) was one of the earliest papers to examine why firms might want to 
manage risk in equilibrium. The case they considered involved the demand for 
corporate insurance but the point is, of course, more general than the example. 
Stulz^\ 1984 and Smith and Stulz^, 1985 also discussed why firms might have a 
demand for risk management. These motivations ranged from costly financial 
distress to agency problems and non-linear tax rates. MacMinn" (1987) provided 
a general equilibrium model of risk management (via fonvard contracting) by 
value maximising firnis in market that are complete except for the fact that some 
tax credits are not tradeabie. 
Researchers were also realizing that multiple sources of risk (Anderson and 
Danthine^ ,^ 1981) and/or less than perfectly competitive markets (Morgan and 
Smith^ ,^ 1987) complicated the firm's management problem and generated 
results where full hedging was not necessarily optimal even if hedging had no 
impact on the mean cash flows of the firm. These so-called macro-hedging 
models were the original work in what has come to be known as enterprise risk 
management. 
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The model in Morgan and Smith (1987) was among the first to extend the firm's 
{in their case a banl<) macro-hedging problem to a dynamic setting. In their model 
the firm not only must coordinate current investment and financing decisions, but 
also must manage risk in a way that improves the fimi's options with regard to 
future investment and financing decisions. Morgan and Smith solved the dynamic 
programming problem by focusing on specific investments (ban/c loans) and 
using an expected utility approach to the firm's maximisation problem. Their 
model is a three-date model where a bank must choose to make long and short-
term loan decisions as well as hedging decisions at date 0. Short-term lending 
and financing decisions must also be made at date 1. 
As an effective credit risk management system hinges upon quantifying/ 
measuring such risks, efforts were made in this direction. Altman^ ® approach 
(1993) provided a three step procedure: a) estimation of default rates and losses 
associated with known credit standards since default rate associated with 
particular rating grades can be reliably tracked over a considerable period, b) 
objective measurement of borrower's credit quality i.e., consistent with those 
credit standards by applying credit rating process such as ZETA risk control 
systems that combines corporate financial data into a unique indexed value fore 
the company (Altman, Haldeman and Narayanan, 1977) and c) modelling the 
expected cash flow from each loan applying a present value calculation method 
and using an appropriate discount rate. If the present value of the loan is less 
than the amount to be advanced, the loan is unacceptable i.e., risker and falls 
beyond bank's risk taking capabilities. 
Davis^ ,^ 1993 came up with another approach, known as beta value based risk 
adjustment, which seeks to estimate an appropriate risk adjustment factor for 
different types of loans by utilising Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). To 
illustrate, a bank's equity beta vale measures the sensitivity of retum on an equity 
investment in the bank to stock market wide changes (due to say, macro 
economic factors) and ignores risk factors specific to the bank (say, fraud). 
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Higher the beta value, higher is the systematic risk. Since the beta value of 
portfolio is simply the weighted sum of the betas of the individual items, a bank's 
overall equity beta value depend, largely on the beta value of its own portfolio 
and this in turns depends on the beta value of the constituent loans both sector-
wise and individual. 
Leiand (1998) studied the joint problems of investment, hedging and leverage 
within a dynamic value maximisation framework. He showed that hedging 
permits more leverage and that the benefits of hedging are often the highest for 
firms that have low agency costs. 
Mello and Parsons^ ® (2000) argued that the optimal hedge for a fimn facing 
constraints is one that minimises the variability in the marginal value of cash 
balances. Both Leiand and Mello and Parsons used a particular type of financial 
distress cost (i.e. fractional recovery of value when the fimn is in financial 
distress). These researchers provided solutions for the optimal demand for 
hedging given this particular form of concavity. 
VaR is a concept that originated with th<j desire of market practitioners to have a 
summary measure of their risk exposure at the end of the trading day. It has now 
evolved into one of the mainstays for measuring risk in the financial services 
Industry. 
The paper by Alfred Lehar^ ,^ Martin Scheicher and Christian Schittenkopf (2000) 
examined usefulness of alternative models for pricing options, providing input for 
VaR calculations. The author considered extensions of the Black/Scholed model; 
a GARCH pricing model and a model that incorporates stochastic volatility. 
Using FTSE 100 option prices they found that the GARCH model is far superior 
(as measured by relative pricing errors) to either of the other two models for 
purposes of fitting option prices. However, there appears to be little difference 
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between the models in the area of hsk management as measured by a 
proportion of failures test and a distribution test. 
David Lando^° and Torben Skodeberg (2000) provided an extension to the 
standard historical based approach to estimating credit rating transition matrices 
over time, in their paper, they discussed in detail the fact that the standard 
discrete time approach will never give a positive probability to an event that has 
not happened (e.g., going from AAA to C in a given example). However, because 
the continuous time calculates transition probabilities based on continuously 
observed histories, such "non"-events historically can still have positive 
probability when looking fonward in time. Using 17 years of ratings history (1981-
1997) from S&P, they provided some interesting results concerning the stability 
of their transition probabilities. They showed in this sample that the longer a fimi 
is in a given ratings category, there is more likely that it will not move out of that 
category; either up or down. 
Anil Bangia^\ Francis Diebold and Til Scheuremann (2000) also addressed the 
issue of ratings migration over time. However, they have focussed on the end 
product of credit stress testing in different economic environments. They first 
showed (using S&P data from 1981-1998) that there is a clear path dependency 
in credit migration matrices and that the coefficient estimates are much more 
stable during times of recession than on an average. The paper provided an 
example of how this infomiation could be used in a VaR framework. 
Over the last four decades there have been major developments in the area of 
risk management at the level of individual, the corporation, and the economy as a 
whole. Since the mid-1980s, especially, risk management has taken great strides 
fonfi/ard. To substantiate this statement, it may be stated that it was only two 
decades back that capital market transactions were priced at absolute levels 
rather than by spreads; callable bonds had two pricing states (priced to call date 
or priced to maturity date, with no emphasis to volatility or time value) and all US 
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mortgages had a 12 year average life, irrespective of the fact that whether they 
were 2 years or 10 years old. It was only in 1983 that zero coupons and fonvard 
rates were brought into practice. 
Much advancement was dri\^en by unfortunate experiences of history and each 
advancement in risk measurement offered the opportunity to view ris/c better. 
Value at risl< (VaR) is considered ono of the latest advancements in risk 
management. However, VaR has its own limitations. Stock maricet crash of 1987, 
the bond mari<et collapse of 1994, the Mexican debt crisis of 1994 and Russian 
crisis of 1998, showed that predicting factors such as maximum volatility is 
difficult and that correlation relationships can change substantially during 
extreme mari(et moves. To compensate for the limitations of VaR, banks must 
design and implement risk management add-ons. Most users combine VaR with 
stress testing. Stress testing is the catchall term for doing a series of scenario 
• analysis to investigate the effect of violating some of the basic assumptions 
underiying the risk model. 
2.2 INDIAN SCENARIO 
While most of the banks in other economies began with strategic planning for 
asset liability management as early as 1970, the Indian banks did not show 
progress in this direction. In fact while deregulation was taking place in 
international markets in 1970s, in India, in 1969 nationalisation of banks took 
place. Till eighties, rather the Indian banks operated in a protective environment. 
The Indian banks did meet the objectives of nationalisation but this was at the 
cost of quality of assets and profitability of the banks. 
The paradigm shift took place in 1992, with the initiation of reform processes 
brought about in the light of Narasimham Committee^^ report on financial sector 
reforms process. The report highlighted the weaknesses in the Indian banking 
system and suggested refomi measures, based on the Basel nomis. 
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While the deregulation of interest rates and the scope for new diversified product 
profile gave the banks greater leeway in their operations, it also exposed the 
banks to greater risks. Reserve Bank of India announced prudential nomas 
relating to income recognition, asset classification and provisioning and the 
capital adequacy norni for the banks. These were the radical steps towards 
ensuring international standards in risk management by Indian banks. 
The developments that have taken place since liberalisation have led to 
remarkable transition in the risk profile of the banks. The changes in the profile of 
sources and uses of funds of bon-owers, the industry profile, exposure limits, 
interest rate structure for deposits and advances etc. have led to the discriminate 
pricing policies. This has, therefore, highlighted the need to match the maturities 
of the assets and liabilities of the banks. The significance of Assets Liability 
Management for the banks has grown further. 
2.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
In the above background, the present research study on 'Asset Liability 
Management in Banks in India' was taken. The objective of the study was to:-
i) Analyse and evaluate the ALM practices prevalent in Public Sector Banks 
(PSBs) in India, 
li) Make a comparative study of PSBs with Private Sector and Foreign 
Banks, 
iii) Identify gaps In ALM practices in PSBs. 
iv) Suggest refinement in existing ALM practices of PSBs in view of the 
gaps. 
To help realise above objectives purview of: a) various kinds of risks associated 
with ALM (in the introductory chapter), b) ALM system of developed countries 
and c) guidelines of RBI has been done. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
As we know that research design is the programme, that guides in the process of 
collecting, analysing and interpreting observations^ It has been ensured that the 
research design addresses the domain of generalisabijity of the conclusions. 
The research involved collection of primary as well as secondary data. Primary 
data, especially in the context of the objective of the research project was aimed 
at obtaining necessary infonnation, throwing light on the Asset Liability 
Management (ALM) practices in Public Sector Banks (PSBs) and the leading 
Foreign and New Generation Private Sector Banks. The available secondary 
data provided a macro and general view in respect of Risk Management practices 
including ALM in Financial Institutions. 
PRIMARY DATA 
SAMPLE (SIZE AND REPRESENTATIVE RANDOM SAMPLE) 
It is worthwhile to mention here that: -
> Majority of the business transactions is accounted by 27 PSBs in the country ,^ 
as is cleariy evident from the following statistics relating to the absolute level 
of deposits (79.61%) and advances (74.19 %)business as on 31.03.2003:-
TABLE 3.1 
BANKS IN INDIA ; STATISTICS AS ON 31.03.2003 (Rs. In crore) 
BANK-GROUP TOTAL ASSETS/ L!AB>UTIES DEPOSITS ADVANCES 
ALL 27 PSBs 1285236 1079394 549351 
(75.65%) (79.61%) (74.19%) 
TOP 21 PRIVATE 105108 91421 49437 
SECTOR BANKS 
(6.19 %) (6.74%) (6.68%) 
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ALL 9 NEW 192170 
GENERATION (11.31%) 
PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS 
TOP 36 FOREIGN 
BANKS 
TOTAL OF 
93 BANKS 
116384 
(6.85 %) 
1698898 
115742 
(8.54 %) 
69313 
(5.11%) 
1355870 
89515 
(12.09%) 
52171 
(7.05 %) 
740474 
It implies that any study relating to Banks in India has to take cognisance of the 
predominant role played by PSBs. 
Also, from the yardstick of total assets/liabilities, PSBs account for 75.65 per cent 
of total assets/ liabilities of above 93 Banks. 
> Branch-wise coverage by the PSBs is overwhelmingly high as compared to all 
other Banks taken together — it is simply non-comparable; of 70,000 odd 
branches of Scheduled Commercial Banks, majority of them belongs to 
PSBs. 
> The actual sample of 11PSBs, which responded to the questionnaire relating 
to ALM practices, are: 
- Randomly representing PSBs 
- Deposits, Advances and Total Assets/Liabilities-wise as well these are 
representative sample of all PSBs 
CLASSIFICATION OF 11 PSBs OF SAMPLE AS PER FOLLOWING 4 -SLABS 
< Rs.20.000 cr > Rs.20.000< 50.000 cr > Rs.50.000<100.000 cr >100.000 or 
DEPOSITS 
3 4 3 1 
Only one PSB belong to the slab >100,000 cr, and it has been included in the 
sample. 
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ADVANCES 
<R8.10.000 cr > R».10.000< 20.000 cr > R8.20.000<50.000 cr >100.000 cr 
3 4 3 1 
None of all 27 PSBs belong slab of > Rs.5 0,000<1,00,000 cr— Hence, column 
for this slab has not 54935lbeen kept. Further, only one PSB belongs to the slab 
>100,000 cr, and it has been included in the sample. 
TOTAL ASSETS/ LIABILITIES 
< Rs.20.000 cr > Rs.20.000< 50.000 cr > Rs.50.000<100.000 cr >100.000 cr 
2 5 3 1 
Only one PSB belong to the slab >100,000 cr, and it has been included in the 
sample, 
> Geographically also, they are representative of country-wide sample, as 
evident from the following:-
East-based PSBs West-based PSBs North-based PSBs South-based 
PSBs 
*One of PSBs, though with its presence in all parts of the country, has been 
grouped under west-based Banks, because it has its Corporate Office 
based in western part of the country. 
> 2 leading Foreign and New Generation Private Sector Banks, have been 
included in the study as a bench-mark comparison of their ALM practices. These 
Banks undoubtedly are the leading ones and enjoying greater share of business 
in their respective groups, as evident from the following data:-
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DEPOSITS 
ADVANCES 
TABLE 3.2 
Foreian Banks 
(ABN Amro Bank 
Standard Chartered 
Bank) 
23025 cr 
(33.22%) 
18489 cr 
(35.44 %) 
TOTAL ASSETS/ LIABILITIES 
188406 cr 
(29.97 %) 
New Generation Private Old Private 
Sector Banks Sector Banks 
(ICICI Bank (Bank of Raj. 
HDFC Bank) Karur Vysya) 
70545 cr 
(60.95%) 
65034 cr 
(72.65 %) 
130999 cr 
(78.93%) 
10421 
(11.40%) 
3985 cr 
(8.06 %) 
3254 
(10.82 %) 
Percentage in brackets indicate the per cent share amongst ail 9 New 
Generation Private Sector Banks, 36 Foreign Banks, and 21 Old Private Sector 
Banks respectively. These statistics have been obtained from IBA bulletin special 
issue of January 2004. 
In the light of foregoing, the sample size adequately represents the sampling 
frame i.e. the population elements from which it has been drawn. 
The questionnaire aiming at obtaining the relevant information on ALM practices 
in Banks in India was administered to all 27 PSBs. The idea was to obtain as 
many as possible responses on random sample basis from the PSBs. In the case 
of Foreign/ Private Sector Banks, it was at least ensured that information in 
respect of the leading amongst these Banks is obtained so as these sen/e as a 
benchmark of comparison for the various ALM practices. In their case also for top 
25 Foreign/ Private Sector Banks in India, the questionnaire was administered. 
In PSBs, 11 of them responded to the questionnaire. While in case of Foreign 
Banks, New Generation Private Sector Banks and the Old Private Sector Banks, 
the information could be obtained from 2 each of these Banks. Here, it must be 
mentioned that these were the leading Banks in their groups. While making a 
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generalised statement on ALM practices in PSBs, a comparison lias been made 
with Foreign/ New Generation Private Sector Banks. The Banks covered in the 
study are as under:-
PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS (11) 
• Allahabad Bank 
• Bank of Baroda 
• Bank of India 
• Indian Overseas Bank 
• Punjab National Bank 
• State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur 
• State Bank of Hyderabad 
• State Bank of India 
• State Bank of Mysore 
• State Bank of Patiala 
• UCO Bank 
OLD PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS (2) 
• Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. 
• Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. 
NEW PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS (2) 
• HDFC Bank 
• ICICI Bank 
FOREIGN BANKS (2) 
• ABN Amro Bank 
• Standard Chartered Bank 
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It needs to be mentioned here that the present research is an exploratory type of 
research, involving not only relying upon primary data through questionnaire but 
also interviewing knowledgeable peopkj, so as to bring in flexibility. In an 
unstructured interviewing conducted with the 20 key functionaries of various 
Banks, an insight into actiial ALM practices and extent of seriousness was 
attempted to be understood. 
3.2 QUESTIONNAIRE 
Communication mode of obtaining desired information using a data-collection 
instrument called questionnaire was used in this research. The respondent 
Banks were asked to choose from a set of alternatives. It was ensured that the 
data-collection instrument meets the following qualifications^:-
> Versatility 
Here in the given research context, versatility signifies that the practice prevailing 
in a particular Bank as stated in the questionnaire by their authorised Department 
at their Head Office or Corporate Office, is uniformly applicable to all its Zonal 
Offices or Local Head Offices across the length and breadth of the country. 
> Objectivity 
Unlike the belief that observation mode of collecting data is more objective, in the 
present research which adopted communication mode, here also the subject's 
perception was eliminated. Since the responses were given by authorised 
Department at Head Office, and the questionnaire passed through a system of 
scrutiny and counter scrutiny by superior officials of the Desk Officer preparing 
the Draft responses. In the process, it was ultimately ensured that the responses 
reflected a true picture of ALM practices in their Bank. 
> Accuracy 
Unlike a belief about communication mode of data collection that respondent's 
unwillingness or inability to provide the information, decided the accuracy of data 
collected. In the context of this researcti, this probability was also ruled out. Since 
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the questionnaire was addressed not to the individual but to the Banl<, the scope 
for any inaccuracy was ruled out. 
> Structured-undisguised Questionnaire 
It is known that in a typical structured-unciisguised Questionnaire, the responses 
as well as the questions are standardised. This was ensured in the present 
research also. This enabled advantages as under:-
• There was reliability in respondent's responses (first obtained in 2002) and 
when they were asked again (in the year 2003), they responded in the similar 
fashion. 
• It worked best when securing factual information like in the present 
research—a clear-cut reply to the questions. Hence validity and reliability of 
fixed alternative responses has been ensured in the present case. 
• it was easier to tabulate and analyse the responses obtained. 
In the present research, the questionnaire was sent to the designated 
respondents with an accompanying cover letter. The respondent Banks 
completed the questionnaire at their leisure and mailed it back. 
The rationale behind inclusion of vanous questions in the questionnaire is 
discussed below:-
I. Existence of Asset Liability Committee (ALCO) in banks in India 
One of the basic requirements of implementing ALM Policy is the need for a structured 
body like ALCO. 
II. Periodicity of holding of ALCO meeting 
Agility of functioning of ALCO and its responsiveness to market forces is 
indicated by periodicity of holding of ALCO meeting. 
DPAGE D55n 
III. Credit Risk Management 
Advances are major source of earning and have immediate bearing on tfie 
boUoin line of the Banks. Whether the Banks have a system of loan review, 
periodically. Also, whether the Banks are using credit derivatives, an instrument 
for hedging their credit risks. These questions were incorporated in the 
questionnaire. 
IV. Interest Rate Risk Management 
It has got an immediate impact on the profitability of Bank. 
To know whether Banks carry Maturity Gap Analysis and Duration Gap Analysis, 
questions were included in the questionnaire. 
V. Liquidity Risk Management 
Liquidity risk is a critical ALM risk, which under critical circumstances lead to 
insolvency of a Bank. Whether to address this, the Banks carry out Maturity 
Profile (Liquidity549351 Gap) preparation and /or Liquidity Planning under 
Alternative Scenario, appropriate questions were inserted in the questionnaire. 
VI. Equity Price Risk Management 
Turbulence in capital market exposes Banks to equity price risk. Whether the 
Banks use Stock/Index options and Future contracts, relevant questions were 
included in the questionnaire. 
VII. International Exposures 
To know as to how many of Banks had international exposures, question was 
suitably asked. 
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VIII. Currency Risk Management 
Volatility in FOREX market adversely affects Banks. Unless they adequately 
cover their FOREX exposure, it may prove to be precarious for them. Whether 
they have OPEN POSITION and GAP limits and how many of them use currency 
swaps, information was accordingly solicited in the questionnaire. 
IX. Operational Risk Management 
Gravity of operational risk need not be undermined. Rather this is one of the 
serious ALM risks, which ought to be comprehensively addressed at all levels of 
Human Resources in the Banks. Whether risk education, risk measurement, 
assessment and monitoring practices are in vogue in the Banks, appropriate 
questions were inserted in the questionnaire. 
IX. Information on compilation of ALCO returns 
Whether Banks have on-line data/information, question was suitably asked. The 
mode of compilation of data by the Banks was ascertained. 
X. Information on using consultant services on ALM 
Expert guidance does help in developing ALM system, taking into account the 
specific Bank' requirements, to addresses the challenges of today's banking. 
Whether Banks use consultant services, a question was appropriately put up in 
the questionnaire. 
SECONDARY DATA 
The research papers, reports, articles, and other literature available on ALM was 
made a perusal from various sources viz.: -
DPAGE DSTD 
a) Research papers/articles (55) published in RMA Journal, Professional Banker, 
Treasury Management, The ICFAI Journal of Applied Finance, IBA Bulletin etc. 
b) Research papers (12) published in Journal of Banking & Finance (www. 
aelsevier.com/ locate/ econbase) 
549351 
c) Basel Committee papers of management on liquidity risk and interest rate risk 
d) Reserve Bank of India guidelines on ALM 
e) Important websites providing information on the subject, like: 
> www.garp.com 
> www.almprofessional.com 
f) Books (11) on the subject by acclaimed authors 
The details for the various journals and books referred have been given at the 
end of each chapter as also in the Bibliography. 
3.3 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS ( AND VALIDATION OF CONCLUSION) 
The data collated was tabulated, analysed and inferences made thereof. 
SUITABLE TEST STATISTIC 
't-distribution' or 'Student's t-distribution' is the most appropriate 
distribution analysis'*'^ for ttie given situation, in view of the following basic 
assumptions for this distribution:-
• use of t-distribution is required whenever the sample size is 30 or less 
• population standard deviation is not known 
• furthermore, in using t-distribution we assume that the population is 
normal or approximately normal 
The table for t-distribution values does not focus on the chance that the 
population parameter being estimated will fall within our confidence interval 
Instead, it measures the chance that the population parameter we are estimating 
will not be within our confidence inten/al (that is, that it will lie outside it). 
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1-tailed or 2-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and 10 
degree of freedom (df) i.e. 11 sample PSBs, was obtained from the t-table 
(Mathematically Expected Value), and the Experimentally Obtained Value 
of t was compared it to arrive at the conclusion whether Null Hypothesis 
is true or false (in that case favouring the Alternative Hypothesis). 
HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
As we know that a statistical hypothesis is a statement about the population 
characterizing a population that we wish to verify on the basis of sample 
information available to us, the decision problem is either to accept the 
hypothesis (i.e. null hypothesis, Ho) or reject it in favour of alternative hypothesis 
(Hi). In the present research project, the hypothesis fonnulation was based upon 
ths parameters of structured questionna re, administered to the sample Banks. 
I. EXISTENCE OF ALCO AND A CLEARLY DEFINED ASSETS LIABILITY 
MANAGEMENT POLICY 
H o : Public Sector Banks (PSBs) have ALCO & a well documented ALM Policy 
n i : Public Sector Banks (PSBs) do not have ALCO& a well documented ALM Policy 
II. PERIODICITY OF HOLDING OF ALCO MEETING 
H o : In PSBs, ALCO meet at least once a month 
n i : In PSBs, ALCO does not meet at least once a month 
III. CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) LOAN REVIEW MECHANISM 
Ho : PSBs have Loan Review Mechanism 
u 
• • I : PSBs do not have Loan Review Mechanism 
DPAGE D59L 
ii)USAGE OF DERIVATIVES 
Ho : PSBs do not use credit derivatives for mitigation of credit risk 
H i : PSBs use credit derivatives for mitigation of credit risk 
IV. INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) MATURITY GAP ANALYSIS 
Ho : PSBs carry out Maturity Gap Analysis 
H i : PSBs do not carry out Maturity Gap Analysis 
ii) DURATION ANALYSIS 
H o : 50 per cent PSBs carry out Duration Analysis 
H i : < 50 per cent PSBs carry out Duration /^ .nalysis 
V. LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) MATURITY PROFILE (LIQUIDITY GAP) PREPARATION 
Ho : PSBs cany out Maturity Profile (Liquidity Gap) preparation 
H i : PSBs do not carry out Maturity Profile (Liquidity Gap) preparation 
11) LIQUIDITY PLANNING UNDER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
H o : 50 per cent PSBs carry out Liquidity Planning under alternative scenario 
H1 : < 50 per cent PSBs carry out Liquidity Planning under alternative scenario 
VI. INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURES & RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
• INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURES 
H o : 70 per cent PSBs (leading) have international exposures 
H i : < 70 per cent PSBs (leading) have international exposures 
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VII. CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT 
I) SETTING UP OF OPEN POSITION AND GAP LIMITS 
H o : PSBs set up OPEN POSITION and GAF LIMITS 
H i : PSBs do not set up OPEN POSITION and GAP limits 
ii) CURRENCY SWAPS 
H o : 80 per cent PSBs use currency swaps 
H1 : < 80 per cent PSBs use currency swaps 
VIII. EQUITY PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT 
STOCK/INDEX OPTIONS AND FUTURE CONTRACTS 
Ho : PSBs do not use Stock/index options and Future contracts 
H i : PSBs use Stock/Index options and Future contracts 
IX. OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) OPERATIONAL RISKS MEASUREMENT, ASSESSMENT & MONITORING 
Ho : 30per cent PSBs have system of risk measurement, assessment and monitoring 
n 1 : <30per cent PSBs have system of risk measurement, assessment and monitoring 
II) OPERATIONAL RISKS EDUCATION 
Ho : PSBs impart Risk Education amongst their employees 
H i : PSBs do not impart Risk Education amongst their employees 
X. INFORMATION ON COMPILATION OF ALCO RETURNS 
• INFORMATION ON COMPILATION OF ALCO RETURNS 
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Ho : PSBs do not follow on-line method (instead manual method) of compilation of ALCO 
information 
H i : PSBs follow on-line method of compilation of ALCO information 
XI. INFORMATION ON USING CONSULTANTS SERVICES ETC. 
-WHETHER ANY EXPERTS/ CONSULTANTS SERVICES ON ASSETS 
LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT USED IN THE PAST BY THE BANK? 
Ho : 60 per cent of PSBs are using consultant sen/ices 
H i : <60 per cent of PSBs are using consultant services 
Testing of hypothesis using t-distribution v/as done (as per the detailed mathematical 
calculation, given in a separate annexure to the report). 
LIMITATIONS OF PRESENT RESEARCH WORK 
The study lays focus on PSBs, which provide majority of banking business in the 
country. The findings of the study are applicable for PSBs, as an adequate sample of 
these were included in the study. However, these cannot be generalised for Foreign 
Banks and Private Sector Banks, as only the leading representative of these were 
included in the sample. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REGULATORY GUIDELINES ON ALM BY RBI 
The advent of liberalisation and globalisation has seen lot of changes in the focus 
of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) as a regulator of the banking industry. The focus 
has clearly shifted from micro monitoring to macro management. The focus of 
inspection is shifting from transaction-based exercise to risk-based supervision. 
4.1 REGULATORY MEASURES BY RBI 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had brought out guidelines on Assets Liability 
Management in February, 1999 (vide its circular no. DBOD. BP.BC/ 8/ 21.04.098/ 
99 dated 10.02.1999)\ This was followed by broad guidelines on Risk 
Management in Banks in October 1999, covering contours of management of 
credit, liquidity, interest rate, foreign currency and operational risks^. The 
objective was to establish appropriate Risk Management Architecture in Indian 
banks for a dynamic strsitegic risk management, in the light of liberalisation in 
Indian financial markets and its growing integration with external markets. The 
need was felt for structured and comprehensive measures. 
4.2 RBI' GUIDELINES ON ASSET LIABILITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN 
BANKS ( FEBRUARY. 1999) 
RBI in its guidelines on ALM System in Banks, has laid emphasis for addressing 
major risks of the banks in a structured manner by upgrading their risk 
management and adopting a more comprehensive ALM practices than has been 
done hitherto^ This note has laid down broad guidelines in respect of liquidity 
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and interest rate risks management systems in banks. It has identified three 
pillars of ALM: -
• ALM Information Systems. It encompasses: a) management infomnation 
system and b) information availability, accuracy, adequacy and 
expediency. 
ALM has to be supported by a management philosophy, which clearly 
specifies the risk poiicies and tolerance limits. The ALM framework 
needs to build on sound methodology and necessary infomiation system. 
" ALI\/I Organisation. The ALM organization envisages: a) structure and 
responsibilities and b) level of top management involvement. 
The ALM organisation should address: a) successful implementation of 
risk management process, b) adherence to the limits set by the board as 
well as deciding of the business strategy of the bank in tune with the 
decided risk management objectives, through ALCO set- up and c) the 
responsibilities of ALM support groups, towards analysis, monitoring and 
reporting of the risk profiles to the ALCO. 
Each bank has been called upon to decide on the role of its ALCO, its 
responsibilities and the decisions to be taken by it. The size of ALCO 
would depend on the size cf each institution, business mix and 
organizational complexity. 
• ALIVI Process. The ALM process would envisage defining the risk 
parameters, identification of risks, risks measurement, risk management 
and framing risk policies and setting tolerance levels. 
The scope of ALM function extends to management of market risks, 
including liquidity risk management, funding and capital planning and profit 
planning and growth, etc. 
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4.2.1 LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
Measuring and managing liquidity needs are vital for effective operation of 
commercial banks. For measuring and managing net funding requirements, the 
use of a maturity ladder and calculation of cumulative surplus or deficit of funds 
at selected maturity dates is adopted as a standard tool. A format for structural 
liquidity has been prescribed. Within each time bucket there could be 
mismatches depending on cash inflows and outflows. While the mismatches up 
to one year would be relevant since these provide early warning signals of 
impending liquidity problems, the main focus should be on the short-term 
mismatches viz. 1-14 days and 15-28 days. 
The statement of structural liquidity may be prepared by placing all cash inflows 
and outflows in the maturity ladder according to the expected timing of cash 
flows. 
Banks may estimate their short term liquidity profiles (1-90 days) on the basis of 
business projections and other commitments for planning purposes. An indicative 
format for estimating short-term dynamic liquidity has been prescribed by RBI. 
4.2.2 CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT 
Large cross border flows together with the volatility have rendered the bank's 
balance sheets vulnerable to exchange rate movements. Dealing in different 
currencies brings opportunities as also risks. Mismatched currency position 
besides exposing the balance sheet to movements in exchange rate also 
exposes it to country risk and settlement risk. 
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Presently, the banks are also free to set gap limits with RBI's approval but are 
required to adopt Value at Risk approach to measure the risk associated with 
forward exposures. 
4.2.3 INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
The immediate impact of changes in interest rates is on bank's eamings i.e. 
reported profits, by changing its net interest income. A long term impact of 
changing interest rates is on bank's market value of equity or net worth, as the 
economic value of bank's assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet positions get 
affected due to variation in market interest rates. 
In the light of poor Manajement Information System (MIS), the traditional gap 
analysis is considered as a suitable method to measure the interest rate risk in 
the first instance. However, RBI intends to move over to the modern techniques 
of interest rate risk measurement like duration gap analysis, simulation and value 
at risk over time, while the banks acquire sufficient expertise and develop 
sophisticated MIS. 
The gap report need to be generated by grouping rate sensitive liabilities, assets 
and off-balance sheet positions into time buckets according to residual maturity 
or next repricing period. The method of classifying items of rates sensitive assets 
and liabilities and off-balance sheet items have been prescribed. Reporting 
format for interest rate sensitive assets and liabilities, have been prescribed by 
RBI. 
Each bank is required to set prudential limits on individual gaps with the approval 
of the Board/ Management Committee. The prudential limits should have a 
bearing on the total assets, earning assets or equity. The banks may work out 
Earnings at Risk or Net Interest Margin based on their views on interest rate 
movements and fix a prudent level with the approval of the Board/ Management 
Committee. 
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4.2.4 General 
Banks which are better equipped to reasonably estimate the behavioral pattern, 
embedded options, roll-in and roll-out, etc. of various components of assets and 
liabilities on the basis of past data/ empirical studies could classify them in the 
appropriate time buckets, subject to approval from the ALCO/Board. 
RBI has emphasised that a scientifically evolved internal transfer pricing model 
by assigning values on the basis of current market rates to funds provided and 
funds used is an important component for effective implementation of ALM 
system. 
4.3 RBI' GUIDANCE NOTE ON MARKET RISK MANAGEMENT (2002^ 
The business decisions of the bank have to be based on a dynamic and 
integrated risk management system and process, driven by corporate strategy. 
The core principles for effective Banking Supervision of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) of the bank mandate that supervisors must be 
satisfied that banks have adequate policies and procedures for identifying, 
monitoring and controlling credit, market, operational, country and transfer risks .^ 
In view of above developments, RBI has found it essential that the banks adopt a 
more structured and comprehensive approach to market risk management. This 
Guidance Note on market risk management lays emphasis on the management 
of liquidity risk and market risk, the latter further categorized into interest rate 
risk, foreign exchange risf:, commodity price and equity risk. 
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4.3.1 POLICY FRAMEWORK AND ORGANISATIONAL SET-UP 
All banks should establish specific policies on market risk management. The 
responsibilities of Risk Management Committee, with regard to market risk 
management aspects are: a) setting policies and guidelines for market risk 
measurement, management and reporting, b) ensuring that market risk 
management processes (including people, systems, operations, limits and 
controls) satisfy bank's policy, c) revicjwing and approving market risk limits, 
including triggers or stop-losses for traded and accrual portfolios, d) ensuring 
certification of financial models-through appointment of qualified and competent 
staff-and the effectiveness of all systems used to calculate market risk and e) 
appointment of independent market risk manager/s, etc. 
The policy framework includes specifying the responsibilities of Risk Taking Unit, 
Line Management and Market Risk Manager. Ail Risk Taking Units must operate 
within an approved, current market risk product Programme-which should define 
procedures, limits and controls for all aspects of the product. 
Limits and triggers. All trading transactions will be booked on systems capable 
of accurately calculating relevant sensitivities on a daily basis, usage of 
sensitivity and Value at Risk limits for trading portfolios and limits for accrual 
portfolios, must be measured on daily basis. In instances, where daily monitoring 
is not done, Risk Taking Units must have procedures that monitor activity so that 
they remain within approved limits at all times. Further, approved Management 
Action Triggers or Stop-loss are needed for all mark to market risk taking 
activities. 
All trading activities are needed to be conducted on an arm's length basis in a 
manner conforming to applicable legal, i.ax, regulatory and accounting provisions 
of the country as well as bsnk's own internal policies and procedures. 
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Risk Monitoring. It calls for :a) a rate reasonability process to ensure that all 
transactions are executed and revalued at prevailing market rates, b) financial 
models used for revaluations for income recognition purposes or to measure or 
monitor price risk (independently tested and certified) and c) stress tests 
performed at least quarterly or trading and accrual portfolios. 
A Liquidity and Capital plan must be submitted annually and Contingency 
Funding Plans quarterly (and these should not show deficit for short tenors). The 
models used, should be subject to model assumption review on a periodic basis. 
The risk reporting should enhance risk communication across different levels 
and it should be timely, reasonably accurate, high light portfolio risk 
concentrations, in written commentary form and be concise. 
4.3.2 ORGANISATIONAL SET-UP 
The Board of the banks should articulate market risk management policies, 
procedures, pmdential risk limits, review mechanisms and reporting and auditing 
systems. The ALCO should function as the top operational unit for 
managing the balance sheet within the performance/ risk parameters laid 
down by the Board. 
The organization set up for market risk management should comprise: a) Board 
of Directors, b) Risk Management Committee c) ALCO and d) ALM Support 
Group. The role of ALCO should Include :a) product priclrtg for deposits 
and advances, b)decldlng on desired maturity profile and mix of 
incremental assets and liabilities, c) articulating Interest rate view of the 
bank and deciding on the future business strategy, d)revlewing and 
articulating funding strategy and e) reviewing economic and political 
impact on the balance sheet. 
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The ALM Support Groups consisting of operating staff should be responsible for 
analyzing, monitoring and reporting the risk profiles to the ALCO. The size of 
ALCO would depend on the size of the bank, business mix and organizational 
complexity. The CEO/CMD or the ED should head the Committee, to ensure the 
top management commitment and the chiefs of Investment, Credit, Resources 
Management or Planning, Funds Management/ Treasury (forex and domestic), 
International Banking, Technology and Economic Research ought to be the 
members. 
The Guidance Note on Market Risk Management of RBI has specified the roles 
of Middle Offices, Dealing Room and the Back Office, in details. 
4.3.3 LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
Measuring and managing liquidity needs are vital for effective operation of 
commercial banks. It is essential to understand how the funding requirements are 
likely to be effected under crisis scenarios. Since it is difficult to forecast with 
precision, the various factors affecting the liquidity of assets and liabilities of the 
bank, it is necessary to frequently review to determine their continuing validity, 
especially in the rapidly changing scenario of financial markets. 
The liquidity risk management has to address the different dimensions of liquidity 
risks: a) funding risk (need to replace net outflows due to unanticipated 
withdrawal / non-renewal of deposits), b) time risk (need to compensate for non-
receipt of expected inflows of funds) and c) call risk (due to crystallisation of 
contingent liabilities). 
RBI Guidance Note emphasises on putting in place an effective liquidity 
management policy, which should spell out the funding strategies, liquidity 
planning under alternative scenarios, prudential limits, liquidity reporting/ 
reviewing, etc. While the liquidity ratios are the ideal Indicator of liquidity of banks 
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operating in developed financial markets, these ratios, however do not reveal the 
intrinsic liquidity profile of Indian banks, which generally operate in illiquid market 
(e.g. assets like Government securities etc. have limited liquidity). 
RBI in its Note has advised tt\e banks to consider putting in place certain 
prudential limits to avoid liquidity crisis: a) cap on inter-bank borrowings, 
especially call borrowings, b) purchased funds vis-^-vis liquid assets, c) core 
deposits vis-^-vis core assets, d) duration of liabilities and investment portfolio, e) 
maximum cumulative outflows across all time bands, e) commitment ratio-track 
the total commitments given to corporates/ banks and other financial institutions 
to limit the off-balance sheet exposure and f) Swapped Funds Ratio I.e. extent of 
Indian rupees raised out of foreign currency sources. 
The Contingency Funding Plan has been deliberated in details In the Guidance 
Note. The ALCO need to implement the Contingency Funding Plan amending it 
in agreement with the Risk Policy Committee, where necessary, to meeting 
changing conditions, daily reports are to be submitted to the Treasury Head and 
the Risk Policy Committee, comparing actual cash flows with the assumptions of 
the Contingency Funding Plan. 
4.3.4 INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
The deregulation of interest rates has exposed Indian banks to the adverse 
impacts of interest rate risk. The Net Interest Income or Net Interest Margin of 
banks is dependent on the movements of interest rates ; these are also affected 
by any mismatches in the cash flows (fixed assets or liabilities) or repricing dates 
(floating assets or liabilities). 
Generally, the approach towards measurement and hedging of interest rate risk 
varies with the segmentation of the balance sheet. Banks broadly position their 
balance sheet into Trading and Banking Books. While the price risk is the 
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prime concern of banks in trading book, the earnings or economic value changes 
are the main focus of banking book. 
RBI has laid emphasis that the top management of banl<s should lay down 
policies with regard to volume, maximum maturity, holding period, duration, stop 
loss, defeasance period, rating standards, etc. for classifying securities in the 
trading book. The securities held in the trading book should ideally be marked to 
market on a daily basis, and the potential price risk to changes in market risk 
factors should be estimated through internally developed Value at Risk models. 
The changes in market interest rates have earnings (in short tenv) and economic 
value (in long term) impacts on the bank's banking book. RBI has advised that 
the bank should have measurement systems that assess the effects of the rate 
changes on both earnings and economic value. The variety of techniques ranges 
from simple maturity (fixed rate) and repricing (floating rate) gaps and duration 
gaps to static simulation, based on current on-and-off-balance sheet positions, to 
highly sophisticated dynamic modeling techniques (that incorporate assumptions 
on behavioural pattern of assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items and can 
easily capture the full range of exposures against basis risk, embedded option 
risk, yield curve risk, etc.). 
RBI has taken number of measures to correct the systemic rigidities, like: a) 
floating rate deposits, b) fixed rare lending, c) tenor-linked PLR, d) interest rate 
derivative products like interest rate swaps and forward rate agreements and e) 
pricing of rupee interest rate derivatives, banks have been allowed to use 
interest rate implied in foreign exchange market, etc. 
In tune with the Narasimham Committee II recommendations on Banking Sector 
Reforms, RBI has also prescribed 2.5 per cent risk-weight for capital adequacy 
fro market risk on SLR and non-SLR securities, w.e.f. from 31^* March, 2000 and 
2001 respectively. 
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In line with Basle Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank for Intemational 
Settlements' introduced capital charge for market risk, the banks in India are 
required to apply the 2.5 per cent risk-weight for capital charge for market risk for 
the whole investment portfolio and 100 per cent risk-weight on open gold and 
forex position limits. 
4.3.5 FOREIGN EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT 
There are tools available to hedge foreign exchange risk like over the counter 
forwards, futures, money market instruments, options, etc. Most currency 
management instruments enable the bank to take a long or a short position to 
hedge an opposite short or long position. 
RBI has advised that the banks can build up gaps, subject to the mandated gap 
limits, and do offsetting swaps to reduce gap risks if it so desires periodically. 
The bank's treasury might also do transactions to take advantage of equilibrium 
situations, subject to such transactions permissible. The banks can also do 
transactions to take advantage of expected interest rate changes by using either 
the money market route ( mismatched cash-flow maturities) or the forex market 
route ( by running a gap risk). 
RBI, has further stressed uoon the management to keep in place systems of stop 
loss discipline, proper monitoring and evaluation of open positions, etc. The 
management of the bank need to lay out clear and unambiguous performance 
measurement criteria, accountability nonvs and financial limits in its treasury 
operations. 
DPAGE n74D 
4.3.6 OTHER ASPECTS OF GUIDANCE NOTE OF RBI ON MARKET RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
In the subsequent pages the Guidance Note of RBI, deliberates in details on the 
treatment of market risk in the proposed Basel Capital Accord, interalia BCBS 
principles for interest rate risk management (Annexure-I); sources, effects and 
measurement of interest rate risk (Annexure-I I); Value at Risk (Annexure-I 11) and 
Stress Testing (Annexure-IV). The Guidance Note of RBI on Market Risk is 
available on its web site (www.rbi.org.in). 
4.4 RBI MEASURES ON DEVELOPMENT OF DERIVATIVES MARKET 
RBI's approach for introducing derivative market in the country has been in a 
phased manner. Derivative products like currency forwards, interest rate 
products, currency options (foreign currency - foreign currency) were introduced 
in 1993, followed by rupee interest rate derivatives in 1999 and currency options 
(Indian rupee-foreign currency) in 2003— in phases*"^ . 
RBI has brought out Guidelines on E>;change Traded Interest Rate Derivatives 
(IDMD.PDRS.4802(a)/03.64.00/2002-03dated11.06.2003) and Foreign Currency-
Rupee Options (A.P.-DIR Series-Circular No. 108 dated 21.06.2003). 
The Guidelines on ALM by RBI and Guidance Note on Market Risk, and the 
measures for developing derivatives market are important initiatives by RBI 
for managing the risks associated with ALM by Indian Banks. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ALM PRACTICES IN BANKS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 FINDINGS OF SURVEY BASED ON QUESTIONNAIRE AND INTERVIEW 
METHOD 
The findings based on the data collected from sample Public Sector Banks, Old 
Private Sector Banks, New Generation Private Sector Banks, and Foreign Banks 
have been discussed below. 
It has been stated in the earlier chapter three, with the supporting figures and 
facts that the majority of the business transactions in the country is accounted by 
PSBs. Therefore, in respect of sample PSBs, hypothesis formulation and its 
validation with statistical analysis for vahous parameters on ALM has been done. 
I.EXISTENCE OF ALCO IN BANKS IN INDIA AND A CLEARLY 
DOCUMENTED ASSETS LIABILITY MANAGEMENT POLICY 
DATA 
TABLE 5.1 
Existence of ALCO in banks in India and a clearly documented Assets 
Liability Management policy 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
100% 
0% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
// 
.^^^,.^-^'^^''r;^ 
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GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION (SAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.1 
COMMENTS 
> All the Banks from the sample confirmed existence of ALCO. 
> All the Public Sector, New Generation Private Sector, Foreign and old Private 
Sector Banks in the sample have stated that they have a clearly defined 
Assets Liabilities Management Policy. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs' 
For 2-tailed t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 value 
Experimentally Obtained Value of t is less than Mathematically Expected Value and 
hence Null Hypothesis that PSBs have ALCO and a cleady defined Assets Liabilities 
Management Policy is true 
*Detailed statistical analysis is given in an appendix to the report 
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II. PERIODICITY OF HOLDING OF ALCO MEETING 
DATA 
TABLE 5.2 
Periodicity of holding of ALCO meeting 
Less than a week 
Weekly 
Fortnightly 
Monthly 
More than a week 
Sample PSBs 
18% 
0% 
64% 
18% 
0% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
50% 
0% 
0% 
50% 
0% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
0% 
GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION (SAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.2 
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S Less than a 
week 
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D Fortnightly 
D Monthly 
• More than a 
week 
COMMENTS 
> Amongst the PSBs, a majority reported that they hold ALCO meeting at 
fortnightly intervals, while some at monthly intervals. In case of some of 
the PSBs, the periodicity of ALCO meeting was frequent, with 
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interval of less than a week viz. as and when the need arose. This is 
a good sign of proactive ness on the part of these PSBs, in their quest for 
remaining agile and sensitive to the market changes. 
> Amongst the Old Private Sector Banks, one of them reported frequency of 
ALCO meeting at monthly intervals, and the othernt at less than a week or 
as and when need arose. This is a healthy practice in vogue in these 
Banks. 
> In case of sample New Generation Private Sector and Foreign Banks, all 
of them stated to be holding the ALCO meeting at a periodicity of less than 
a week or as and when need arises. The adoption of the best international 
practices and a robust technology facilitates these Banks to remain 
sensitive to the changes and initiate needful corrective measures 
forthwith. 
> During interactions, it also came to light that actual schedule of holding of 
ALCO meeting was not always adhered in letter and spirit as documented 
by Banks. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-disthbution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 value 
Experimentally Obtained Value of t is less than Mathematically Expected Value and 
hence Null Hypothesis that PSBs ALCO meet at least once a month is true detailed. 
III. CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT 
The Credit risk management practices are as under:-
a) Loan Review Mechanism 
DATA 
TABLE 5.3 
Loan review mechanism 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
100% 
0% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
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FIGURE 5.3 
COMMENTS 
> Invariably the loan review mechanism backed by loan policy exists in all 
Banks. However, as regards to the managing and monitoring the 
credit risk and putting in place effective systems and controls, the 
degree of alertness varies in the Banks. 
> Loan Review Mechanism and Risk Management Practices are superior in 
Foreign Banks. New Private Sector and Public Sector Banks trail behind 
them. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 value 
Experimentally Obtained Value of t is less than Mathematically Expected Value and 
hence Null Hypothesis that PSBs have loan review mechanism is true. 
•PAGE 0810 
b) Credit Derivatives 
DATA 
TABLE 5.4 
Usage of Credit Derivatives 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
0% 
100% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
0% 
100% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION (SAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.4 
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COMMENTS 
> Credit derivatives are yet to become an accepted tool of credit risk 
management, as far as PSBs and Old Private Sector Banks are 
concerned. However, sample Foreign Banks confirmed usage of credit 
derivatives. 
> The New Generation Private Sector Banks have been envying towards 
using sophisticated credit risk management techniques. 
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STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-disthbution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 value 
Experimentally Obtained Value of t is less than Mathematically Expected Value and 
hence Null Hypothesis that PSBs do not use credit derivatives is true. 
IV. INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
a) Maturity Gap Analysis 
DATA 
TABLE 5.5 
Maturity Gap Analysis 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
100% 
0% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION (SAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.5 
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COMMENTS 
> Maturity Gap Analysis has been stated to be practiced by all sample 
PSBs. 
> Both the Old Private Sector Banks also carry out Maturity Gap Analysis for 
interest rate risk management. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 value 
Experimentally Obtained Value of t is less than Mathematically Expected Value and 
hence Null Hypothesis that PSBs carry out maturity gap analysis is true. 
b) Duration Gap Analysis 
DATA 
TABLE 5.6 
Duration Gap Analysis 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
45% 
55% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
0% 
100% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
75% 
25% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
Note: 
A leading Public Sector Bank carries out Static Simulation for measuring impact of Interest rate 
changes on Net Interest Income. Value at Risk technique is confined to spot FOREX business. 
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FIGURE 5.6 
COMMENTS 
> Duration Analysis techniques is not in vogue with all the sample 
PSBs. 
> Sample Old Private Sector Banks did not carry out Duration Analysis. 
> One New Generation Private and both the Foreign Banks use 
Maturity Gap and Duration Analysis techniques. During personal 
interaction, these Banks also stated to be employing advanced 
techniques of Value at Risk (VaR) and Simulation, by virtue of their 
techno-savvy feature. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-distiibution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 
value Experimentally Obtained Value of t is more than Mathematically Expected 
Value and hence Alternate Hypothesis that less than 50 per cent PSBs carry out 
duration gap analysis holds. 
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V. LIQUIDITY BISK MANAGEMENT 
a) Maturity Profile (Liquidity Gap) Preparation 
DATA 
TABLE 5.7 
Maturity Profile (Liquidity Gap) Preparation 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
100% 
0% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION (SAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.7 
COMMENTS 
> Sample PSBs stated that Maturity Profile Statement for assets and 
liabilities, as per RBI guidelines are prepared by them. 
> Similarly, sample Old Private Sector Banks also confirmed the practice of 
preparing the Maturity Profile Statement. 
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> New Generation Private Sector and Foreign Banks have the practice of 
preparing the Maturity Profile Statement. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 
value Experimentally Obtained Value of t is less than Mathematically Expected 
Value and hence Null Hypothesis that PSBs carry out Maturity Profile (Liquidity 
Gap) preparation is true. 
b) Liquidity Planning under Alternative Scenarios 
DATA 
TABLE 5.8 
Liquidity Planning under Alternative Scenarios 
• 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
45% 
55% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
50% 
50% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
Note: 
A leading Public Sector Bank carries out Structural Liquidity Analysis as also Dynamic Liquidity Forecasting 
New Generation Private Sector and Foreign Banks carry out Forecasting Analysis on a regular basis 
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FIGURE 5.8 
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COMMENTS 
> The practice of Liquidity Planning under alternative scenarios is not 
followed by the entire sample PSBs. 
> One of the two Old Private Sector Banks stated that the practice of 
Liquidity Planning under alternative scenarios takes places. 
> The sample New Generation Private Sector and Foreign Banlts are 
distinctly better placed in regards to the liquidity risk management 
techniques. These Banks follow the practice of preparing the Maturity 
Profile as also Liquidity Planning under alternative scenarios. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 
value Experimentally Obtained Value of t is more than Mathematically Expected 
Value and hence Alternate Hypothesis that less than 50 per cent PSBs carry out 
Liquidity Planning under Alternative Scenarios holds good. 
VI. INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURES & RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
DATA 
TABLE 5.9 
Currency swaps as a currency risk management tool 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
64% 
36% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
50% 
50% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
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GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION (SAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.9 
COMMENTS 
> More than half the sample PSBs, have International Exposures. 
However, one of the two samples Old Private Sector Banks stated to have 
exposure of this kind. All sample New Generation and Foreign Banks have 
International Exposures. 
> Leading PSBs having exposure on Overseas Banks, use country ratings 
of international rating agencies, to classify the countries into low risk, 
moderate risk and high risk. These Banks monitor periodically, the country 
and Bank exposure limits. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailecl t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 
value, Experimentally Obtained Value of t is more than Matfiematically Expected 
Value and hence Alternate Hypothesis that less than 70 per cent PSBs have 
International Exposures holds good. 
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VII. CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT 
a) Setting up of open position and gaps 
DATA 
TABLE 5.10 
Setting up of open position and gaps 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
100% 
0% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION (SAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.10 
COMMENTS 
> In regards to setting up of appropriate limits for open position and gaps, all 
sample PSBs have been complying with. The sample New Generation 
Private Sector and Foreign Sector Banks do follow such practices. The 
sample Old Private Sector also confirmed setting up of appropriate limits. 
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STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 value 
Experimentally Obtained Value of t is less than Mathematically Expected Value and 
hence Null Hypothesis that PSBs set up OPEN POSITION and GAP LIMITS is true. 
b) Currency swaps as a currency risk management tool 
DATA 
TABLE 5.11 
Currency swaps as a currency risk management tool 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
73% 
27% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION (SAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.11 
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COMMENTS 
> Currency swaps as a currency risk management tool is used by 
majority of sample PSBs. The sample New Generation Private and 
Foreign Banks have been using currency swaps for currency risk 
management. Incidentally, the sample Old Private Sector Banks also 
confirmed doing so. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 
value, Experimentally Obtained Value of t is more than Mathematically Expected 
Value and hence Alternate Hypothesis that 80 per cent PSBs use currency swaps is 
true. 
VIII. EQUITY PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT 
DATA 
TABLE 5.12 
Stock/Index Options and Future Contracts 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
9% 
91% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
50% 
50% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
GRAPHICAL PRESENTATIONOAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.12 
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COMMENTS 
> Turbulence in capital market exposes the Banks to equity price risk. 
However, the risk management practices on this front are yet not 
developed in PSBs in India. 
> Rarely these Banks confimned using Stock/Index Options and Future 
Contracts. Though, the two Foreign Banks use these Instruments for 
managing Equity Price Risk. The two New Generation Private Sector 
Banks also stated using these Instruments. One of the Oki Private Sector 
Banks of the sample confirmed using these instruments. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 va/t/e 
Experimentally Obtained Value of t is less than Mathematically Expected Value and 
hence NuH Hypc^hesis that PSBs do net use Stock/Index Options and Figure Contra(^s 
is true. 
IX. OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEHiEMT 
Al! the Banks in general have got intemal controls and internal audit system. 
a) Operational Risks Measurement, Assessment 
DATA 
TABLE 5.13 
& Mcnltci 
Operauona! R is l ^ Measurement, Assessment & Monitoring 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
27% 
73% 
Sample Okl 
Private Se<^or 
Banks 
0% 
100% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
Note: 
Banks in general have internal controls and audit system, though these vary in their efficacy 
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GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION (SAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.13 
COMMENTS 
> Some of the sample PSBs confirmed that they have system of 
measurement, assessment & monitoring of operational risk limits. 
However, none of the sample Old Private Sector Banks confirmed such a 
practice with them. On the contrary, the sample Foreign and New 
generation Private Sector Banks confirmed such a practice. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 value 
Experimentally Obtained Value of t is more than Mathematically Expected Value and 
hence Alternate Hypothesis that less than 30 per cent PSBs have system of 
measurement, assessment & monitoring of operational risk limits holds good. 
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b) Risk Education 
DATA 
TABLE 5.14 
Risk Education 
YES 
NO 
Sample PSBs 
100% 
0% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample New 
Generation 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign Banks 
100% 
0% 
GRAPHICAL PRESENTATIONfSAIWPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.14 
COMMENTS 
> All the sample Banks have the practices of educating their employees on 
various risks embedded in banking transactions, and the necessary 
measures for managing various kinds of risks. However, the extent of 
effectiveness in risk education varies in different Banks. 
STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR PSBs 
For 2-tailed t-distribution at 5 per cent significance and degree of freedom (df) 10 value 
Experimentally Obtained Value of t is less than Mathematically Expected Value and 
hence Null Hypothesis that PSBs have system of operational risk education is true. 
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VIII. INFORMATION ON COMPILATION OF ALCO RETURNS 
The feedback from the Banks, on their practices in regards to the compilation of 
assets and liabilities infomriation is as under:-
DATA 
TABLE 5.15 
Information on Compilation of ALCO Returns 
Whether separate A&L 
statements obtained 
from branches 
Whettier desired 
infonnation for ALCO 
extracted from weeidy 
returns of branches 
Whether desired 
information for ALCO 
extracted from monthly 
returns of i>ranches 
Whether desired 
information for ALCO 
extracted on-line from 
the branches 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
YES 
NO 
Sample 
PSBs 
100% 
0% 
64% 
36% 
64% 
36% 
0% 
100% 
Sample Old 
Private Sector 
Banks 
100% 
0% 
0% 
100% 
50% 
50% 
0% 
100% 
Sample 
New 
Generation 
Private 
Sector 
Banks 
0% 
100% 
0% 
100% 
0% 
100% 
100% 
0% 
Sample 
Foreign 
Banks 
0% 
100% 
0% 
100% 
0% 
100% 
100% 
0% 
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GRAPHICAL PRESENTATION (SAMPLE PSBs) 
FIGURE 5.15 
Whether separate A&L 
statements obtained from branches 
Whether desired information for ALCO 
extracted from weekly returns of branches 
Whether desired information for ALCO Whether desired information for ALCO 
extracted from monthly returns of branches extracted on-line from the branches 
NO ^ 
w-v^ K^  
r\ 
1 ] 
AES 
^ , ^ 6 4 % 
• YES 
' • N O 
COMMENTS 
> All sample PSBs and the two Old Private Sector Banks do obtain 
separate assets & liabilities data / information from their branches. 
> None of the sample New Generation Private Sector and Foreign Banks, 
obtain such separate data / information, as all required information Is 
available on-line any time. 
> Majority of the sample PSBs confirm that the data / information required 
for ALCO is extracted from weekly returns of branches. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 FINDINGS 
The findings of the research on ALM practices in Banks in India are as under :-
• Public Sector Banks (PSBs) have ALCO & a well documented ALM Policy 
• In PSBs, ALCO meet at least once a month (in all of sample New Generation Private/ 
Foreign Banks, the periodicity is less than a week) 
• PSBs have Loan Review Mechanism 
' PSBs do not use credit derivatives for mitigation of credit risk(all of sample Foreign 
Banks use credit derivatives) 
• PSBs carry out Maturity Gap Analysis (all of sample New Generation Private/ Foreign 
Banks, carry out Maturity Gap Analysis) 
• Less than 50 per cent PSBs carry out Duration Analysis(all of sample New Generation 
Private/ Foreign Banks, carry out Duration Gap Analysis) 
" PSBs carry out Maturity Profile (Liquidity Gap) preparation (all of sample New 
Generation Private/ Foreign Banks, canry out Maturity Profile preparation) 
' Less than 50 per cent PSBs carry out Liquidity Planning under alternative scenario(all of 
sample New Generation Private Foreign Banks, carry out Liquidity Planning under 
altemative scenario) 
" PSBs do not use Stock/Index options and Future contracts (all of sample New 
Generation Private/ Foreign Banks use these products) 
' Less than 70 per cent PSBs (leading) have International exposures (all of sample New 
Generation Private/ Foreign Banks have international exposures) 
• PSBs set up OPEN POSITION and GAP LIMITS exposures (all of sample New 
Generation Private/ Foreign Banks have such a practice) 
• Less than 80 per cent PSBs use cun^ency swaps (all of sample New Generation Private/ 
Foreign Banks use currency swaps) 
• Less than 30per cent PSBs have system of risk measurement, assessment and 
monitoring (all of sample Foreign Banks do have and New Generation Private Banks are 
progressing in this direction) 
PSBs impart Risk Education amongst their employees(all of sample New Generation 
Private/ Foreign Banks also do so) 
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• PSBs do not follow on-line method (Instead manual method) of compilation of ALCO 
infomiation 
(all of sample New Generation Private/ Foreign Banks have on-line system of data 
compilation) 
• Less than 60 per cent of PSBs are using consultant sen/ices (all of sample New 
Generation Private/ Foreign Banks use such services) 
The findings of the research project highlight the current status of Asset Liability 
Management in Indian banks. These are summed up below:-
• awareness has built up on the need of an management of Asset Liability 
Management, as these banks have documented Asset Liability 
Management Policy 
" appropriate technological backbone support is yet to develop to 
adequately address ALM 
• default data build up has to be aggressively pursued 
• quantitative techniques for measurement of risks are at preliminary 
stages 
• sophisticated modelling techniques are yet to be acquired by Public 
Sector Banks 
• RAROC and VaR approaches are yet to be fully put into use 
• derivative products though being introduced by RBI in phases, need to 
be actively embraced by the banks for managing their risks 
• skilled risk managers need to be developed by the banks 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Indian banking system has to respond to the new needs of the liberalised 
financial environment. Each bank will have to graduate to the complexities of 
changing risk profile in banking business. The recommendations/ suggestions for 
prudent Assets and Liability management by Indian banks are covered under the 
following headings:-
> Credit Risk Management 
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> Interest Rate Risk Management 
> Liquidity Risk Management 
> Operational Risk Management 
> Integrated Risk Management (IRM) 
> Role of Information Technology(IT) in ALM 
> Best Corporate Governance Practices 
6.2.1 CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT 
Lack of appropriate lending disciplines and inadequate systems of control 
generally results into setbacks to the banks. Banks have also suffered from poor 
transaction management, incomplete credit information, poor documentation and 
gross inadequacy in pricing risks. 
In the light of major areas of weakness of banks as regards credit risk 
management, it is suggested that the banks avoid Indulgence in the following 
practices:-
X non-emphasis on due diligence end financial analysis, which can result into 
credit related frauds 
X resorting to simple indicators of credit assessment, for the sake of gaining a 
competitive foot holding; globalisation of credit markets have increased the 
need for timely financial information and in absence of inaccessibility to 
such information, banks should not dispense the much needed financial and 
economic analysis to support major credit decisions 
X giving a go- by to risk-sensitive pricing 
X subjective decision making by senior executive of the banks 
Narasimham Committee I & II have also stated that the causes 'for high level of 
NPA are varied at a range from poor credit appraisal, inadequate credit 
monitoring and policy directions'. Subsequent to Vemia Committee 
recommendations for weak banks, serious discussions on the issue, has led to 
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the realisation of the fact that Indian banks have been suffering from some of the 
generic limitations in credit risk management system. 
6.2.1.1 15 Essentials of Credit Culture 
A bank's credit culture forms the bedrock for risk taking. Its objective is to provide 
quality assurance and portfolio integrity. Even the best credit system can be 
undermined if the credit disciplines are compromised. At the same time, the 
credit culture need to be imbued wit'i sufficient flexibility to compensate for 
change. A bank credit culture is built with: a) policy, b) process, c) audit and d) 
values. 
These elements are closely linked and interactive. Policy is the conscience of 
risk taking and a bank's policy is used to set objectives, perfomiance and also 
values. It provides the basis of managing the loan portfolio. A strong credit 
process will enable to maintain the integrity of the credit system and manage 
risk taking within set policies. The role of audit function is to review 
confomnance with policies, procedures and business plans as also to evaluate 
the risk-taking practices and specific risks. The values of bank personnel must 
exemplify the bank's risk taking attitude and its commitment to excellence. 
15 essentials of a strong credit culture, mentioned below, must be adhered to by 
the Indian banks:-
1. Commitment to excellence coupled with respect to credit basics 
2. Sound value system that will cope with change 
3. Bank comes first and ahead of every profit center; an understanding of what 
the bank expects and the reasons behind its policies 
4. Conversant with historical perspective of the bank's credit experience 
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5. Development of common credit language; each bank must bring qualitative 
transformation of credit management skills of its personnel by making them 
learn new instruments and new modes of financial engineering 
6. Good communication at all levels 
7. Uniform approach to risk taking that provides stability and consistency 
8. Awareness of every transaction's effect on the bank; constant mindfulness of 
the bank's risk taking parameters 
9. A portfolio with integrity and appreciation of what properly belongs in it 
10. Accountability for decisions and actions 
11. Long-term as well as short-term business perspective 
12. Reconciliation of market practice with use of common sense; realistic 
approach to markets and risk taking 
13. Use of independent judgment and not herd instinct 
14. Credit risk management framework with early warning system 
16. Initiation of appropriate preventive/ corrective action at the right time 
The good credit culture will protect the bank from the shortcomings and 
risks. The measure of quality of the best credit culture of a bank is 
eventually seen In its bottom line. 
6.2.1.2 Use of Covenants as a Pre-emptive Device 
The banks may use covenants effectively as a pre-emptive device before credit 
standing deteriorates or losses occur. The rationale behind use of covenants is 
as under:-
• they help to protect the banks from any significant deterioration in the risk 
profile of the borrower transactions without prior agreement 
• they allow banks to do restructuring of the loans in such instances 
• covenants make it costlier for the borrower to default, because he loses 
the value of continuing operations 
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• covenants are incentives against moral hazard, since they restrict 
borrov\/ers fronn taking additional risk that would increase bank's risk 
Banks may effectively use either financial (like minimum value of ratios or key 
parameters) or qualitative covenants. 
Default and credit event provision act as event -triggered clauses rather than 
obligations limiting 'ex ante' the risk of such events. Such clauses make the 
entire debt immediately due and payable under certain conditions. 
The 'pari passu' covenant stipulates that the default on any debt triggers 
default events on all other debts. Effective violation of such a covenant 
automatically makes full payment due immediately or accelerates all loan 
repayments. This pre-emptive clause allows bankers to take corrective 
timely actions that would become impossible once the deterioration 
materialises. 
Covenants fit well with active credit management and enhance the 
effectiveness of proactive credit risk management 
6.2.1.3 Coilateralisatlon in Credit Risk Mitigation 
A prudent coilateralisatlon practice can be effectively used to mitigate credit 
risk. Collateral is also an incentive for the borrower to fulfill debt obligations 
effectively. Collaterals may be in the form real assets, securities, goods, 
receivables and margin borrowing— the value of the collaterals vis a vis the loan 
amount, would depend upon the credit worthiness of the borrower and the level 
of risk associated with the credit facility. 
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In case the borrower fails to perform the debt obligations, the original credit risk 
turns into a recovery risk plus an asset value risk, which could be: a) accessibility 
risk (difficulty to effectively seize the collateral), b) integrity risk (the risk of 
damage to the collateral), c) legal risk (risk of disputes arising from various laws 
in connection with asset seizure) and d) valuation risk (the liquidation value of a 
collateral depends on the existence of a secondary market and the price volatility 
of such a maricet). These aspects need to be examined while deciding on the 
nature and extent of the collaterals. 
6.2.1.4 Managing Concentrations 
Banks in India will have to develop a conscious strategy to manage concentration 
risk in their credit portfolio. Concentrations arise because banks identify rapidly 
growing industries and use overly optimistic assumptions about an industry's 
future prospects, especially asset appreciations and the potential to earn above-
average fees and/ or spreads. 
Credit concentrations (as per Basel Committee) can be grouped into two 
categories: a) conventional credit concentrations which include concentrations of 
credits to single borrowers or counter parties, a group of connected counter 
parties and sector or industries and b) concentrations based on common or 
correlated risk factors to reflect subtler or more situation-specific factors can only 
be uncovered through analysis. 
Overlooking the dangers in such situations result into susceptibility to 
concentration risk. 
6.2.1.5 Capital Allocation and Risic Contributions 
The risk management framewori< of the Indian banks need to lay emphasis on 
prudent capital allocation system. Risk contributions are the foundation of the 
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capital allocation system and of the risk-adjusted perfomnance measurement 
system. Capital allocation defines meaningful keys for tracing back the overall 
risk to its sources. The capital allocation system allows us to break down and 
aggregate risk contributions according to any criteria as long as individual 
transaction risk contributions are available. The capital allocation system 
provides the risk contributions for individual facilities for both credit risk and 
market risk. 
Marginal risk contributions serve essentially for risk-based pricing with an 'ex 
ante' view of risk decisions, while absolute risk contributions are the basis for the 
capital allocation system (and are 'ex post' measure). The goal of risk-based 
pricing is to ensure a minimum target return on capital, in line with 
shareholders' requirements. A hurdle rate serves as a benchmark for risk-
based pricing and for calculating creation or destruction of value with 
'Shareholders Value Added' (SVA). Pricing on marginal risk contribution 
captures both the incremental risk and the increased diversification. 
Without risk-based pricing, we do not know the required revenues. Without 'ex 
post' risk-adjusted perfonnances based on absolute risk contributions, we cannot 
compare the risk-return profiles of facilities or sub-portfolios. Hence, both are 
necessary because they serve different purposes. 
Vendors' models provide different outputs in terms of risk contributions. KMV 
Portfolio Manager calculates absolute risk contributions, while Credit Metrics 
calculates marginal risk contributions. 
6.2.1.6 Risk Return Optimisation 
Risk return optimisation shows how to trade-off risk across exposures to enhance 
the overall portfolio return. There is a potential for enhancement because income 
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is proportional to size while risk is not. Portfolio optinnisation under global funding 
constraint means :-
• reducing risk, at a constant return 
• increasing revenue, at the same time 
Enhancing the risk-return profile of the portfolio can minimise risk given return, 
increase return at constant risk, or improve both if the portfolio structure Is 
inefficient. In addition, when removing funding constraints, it is no longer 
necessary to trade-off risks and return within the portfolio by changing the 
exposures. It becomes necessary to decide along which direction portfolio 
expansion is more efficient. 
KMV Portfolio Manger and Credit Metrics illustrate the two philosophies. The first 
model embeds a constrained optimisation module providing various optimized 
outputs, such as :-
• optimization at constant risk 
• optimization at constant return 
• in addition, it visualises the efficient frontier given the funding constraint 
Modeling the efficient frontier under no expansion guides the rebalancing of the 
portfolio retained by the leading bank and securitisations are examples of 
business transactions that rebalance the portfolio. 
Credit metrics does not offer optimisation functions. However, it provides the 
marginal risk contribution, rather than the absolute risk contribution. This is 
theoretically more adequate when considering expansion of exposures along 
various segments or individual obligors. 
Indian banks should make use of Models as the Models provide valuable insights 
for restructuring and expanding, or contracting, some portfolio segments or 
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individual exposures. In fact without such models there is no way to compare 
various 'what if scenarios and rank them in terms of their risk-return profiles. 
6.2.1.7 Effective use of Credit Risk Models 
Credit risk events, defaults and migrations, result in changes in value of credit 
facilities. The Indian banks need to make effective use of various credit risk 
models, depending on the size of portfolio :-
> For default-only models, the distribution of values for each facility 
collapses to two states, default and non-default. Credit risk* is a default 
model. 
> For full valuation models, migrations to a different risk class than the 
original result in changes in values because the risk changes. The most 
prominent models, KMV Portfolio Manager, Credit Metrics and Credit 
Portfolio View (CPV) are full economic valuation models. 
> Credit risk models value credit risk only, considering that other risks, 
market risk and interest rate risk, are taken care of by other tools. They 
use 'mari<-to-model' technique, restricting the 'mark-to-mari<et' of assets to 
migrations of credit risk only. 
> Valuation at horizon uses the credit spreads of various risk classes for 
discounting contractual cash flows, or, alternatively, expected cash flows 
that are lower because of default probabilities. This is a future valuation, or 
'mark-to-future', using the entire spectrum of possible credit states at a 
future time point. 
> Valuation is a key building block for determining the value distribution at a 
forward horizon. In risk models, valuation is forward, at the horizon, for all 
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possible credit risk scenarios, in order to derive a distribution of future 
values. Matrix value tion refers to the usage of credit spreads for valuing 
any asset at sonne horizon, using the array of credit states. Most portfolio 
models use the matrix technique. 
> Implementing the risk-neutral valuation is more challenging because of the 
need to have risk-neutral probabilities (for risk aversion). Only KMV 
Portfolio Manager provides risk-neutral valuation as an alternative option 
to matrix valuation. 
6.2.1.8 Progression towards Stress Testing 
Stress tests make risks more transparent by estimating the potential losses on a 
portfolio losses on a portfolio in abnormal markets. They complement the internal 
models and management systems used by banks globally for capital allocation 
decisions. Simply speaking, stress testing is a way to produce alternative 
scenarios using sensitivity analysis. 
Indian banks must strive to put in place sound stress testing processes for use in 
the assessment of capital adequacy. It should involve identifying possible events 
or future changes in economic conditions that could have unfavourable effects on 
a bank's credit exposures and assessment of the bank's ability to withstand such 
changes. 
The New Basel Capital Accord uses more quantitative approaches—methods 
where assumptions can be empirically evaluated. Stress testing should be able 
to link dramatically changes in the economic environment to the bank's portfolio. 
There are, however, issues such as data availability, portfolio diversity and 
standardisation of model inputs and outputs, which need to be addressed. 
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6.2.1.9 Effective use of Derivatives 
Derivatives help to customise the term structure of credit risk, independent of the 
underlying assets, bonds or loans. Credit derivatives allow better utilisation of the 
current credit capacity, even though there are no cash deals meeting eligibility 
and maturity criteria. The application of credit risk derivatives stem from two main 
features: 
• the capacity to trade credit risk only, in isolation 
• the ability to do so in a liquid fashion, with low transaction costs, since 
these are off-balance sheet 
Tailoring and customizing exposures is a major function of credit 
derivatives. This helps to reshape individual and credit risk profiles so that they 
meet eligibility criteria, for both lenders and investors. 
Credit derivatives allow us to engineer the credit risk quality and spreads using 
baskets. It is possible to engineer any credit standing independent of what exists 
in the mari<et by customizing the basket so that it has the desired credit standing. 
Fonvard credit swaps provide protection against downside moves in credit 
quality. If a bank fears that the spread on a subset of its loans might widen in the 
future, it can offset the loss in (mark-to-market) value by entering into a credit 
spread derivative with a protection seller. 
Indian banks need to make prudent use of derivatives for successful 
management of credit risk. 
6.2.1.10 Securitisation in Credit Risk IVlanaqement 
The motivations for banks in securitisations lie in the following potential benefits:-
• arbitraging the cost of funding in the market with funding on-balance sheet 
for a bank 
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• the second motivation is off-loading credit risk to free capital for new 
operations 
• to modify the risk-return profile of the loan portfolio of the banks 
The issue, when off-loading risks, is whether freeing up capital In this way Is 
economically acceptable. The solution lies in finding out whether this makes the 
risk-return profile of the banking portfolio more efficient (higher return for the 
same risk or lower risk for the same return). 
Analysing the economics of the securitisation transaction requires reviewing all 
costs and benefits resulting from the specific values of each of the various 
parameters at the time of securitisation. Several parameters influencing the 
economics of the securitisation for the seller(bank) are as under :-
• only some assets, depending upon their risk and return, are eligible for the 
securitisations 
• the market credit spreads across rating classes-these are market driven 
• the potential savings in economic and/or regulatory capital—these 
depend on the portfolio risk profile of the securitised assets and on their 
risk contribution to the bank's portfolio; full assessment of the economic 
capital savings requires running the portfolio model with and without the 
securitised assets to get their marginal risk contribution to capital and the 
assessment of the regulatory capital savings is much quicker since it uses 
forfeits 
• the structuring of the transaction determines the pool composition as well 
as the profile of the structured notes issued— the first influences capital 
savings directly and the second influences the cost of funding through 
securitisation directly 
• the costs of creating the structure, of operating the Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV) and of servicing the assets—these Increase the all-
inclusive cost of funding through securitisation since they add up to the 
cost of issued notes 
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It is high time thstthe Indian banks develop their competency to perform such an 
analysis to leverage out the potential advantages of the securitisation 
transactions. 
6.2.2 INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
The declining interest rate scenario has become a challenge for Indian banks to 
manage interest rate risk. 
6.2.2.1 12 ESSENTIALS OF INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
The 12 essentials of interest rate risk management are as under :-
1) A structured framework is sine qua non for the banks to manage interest 
rate volatility, failing which banks may become vulnerable to asset liability 
mismatch. 
2) Banks must have an adequate and timely interest rate risk reporting 
system- which includes ALM risk data warehouse and reporting aspects. 
3) Bank must make a clear distinction between their trading activity and 
balance sheet exposure. Banks with active trading positions must adopt 
VaR approach to measure risk associated with such exposures. 
4) Banks may try to maintain interest rate risk at a level close to zero, to the 
extent possible -though an ideal condition, the bank's profitability is affected 
in an environment of generally low credit/deposit ratio and with high liquidity 
status. A prudent approach would be accepting some Interest rate risk if it 
helps in improving the profitability growth. 
5) If the yield curve is positively sloping, a bank can earn profit by booking 
longer duration liabilities. 
6) Banks can limit their exposure to changes in interest rates by restricting 
their quantum of mismatch between the re-pricing of assets in 
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comparison to liabilities. The bank may limit the Gap/ assets or the ratio of 
rate sensitive liabilities. If risk sensitive assets (RSA) are more than risk 
sensitive liabilities (RSL), i.e. when Gap is positive, assets should be sold or 
liabilities added that mature or re-price in the period when the Gap is positive. 
7) In a falling interest rate scenario, the Gap should be maintained negative-
- as evident from the change in net interest income (Nil), which is defined 
as :-
A Nil = Gap X A r (where Gap- RSA-RSL , A r = change in interest rate) 
In a falling interest rate scenario, banks need to offer low interest rate on long 
maturities and high interest rates on short maturity deposits — as result the 
banks do not face any reinvestment risk. 
8) Banks may offer longer-term deposits at a floating rate and simultaneously 
offer fixed rates for similar maturity with higher or lower interest rates based 
on its perception about the movement of inflation and interest rate over the 
longer period. 
9) The banks should adopt the 'best exposure' position in respect of interest 
rate risk. It necessitates measurement of interest rate exposure : the interest 
rate margin is adequate in short-term, ma^ef value sensitivities of both 
assets and liabilities capture the entire stream of future flows and provide a 
long-term view. 
10) The options generate a worst-case situation for banks. The combination of 
cap values of assets with floor values of liabilities generates a 'scissor 
effect' on the NPV. The goal of interest rate policies should be to control 
the risk of the NPV through both duration and convexity gaps. 
11) Banks must progress towards simulations - as without simulations, the 
ALCO would not have a full visibility on future profitability and risk. 
12) Derivatives, be used by the banks to modify the risk-return profile of the 
balance-sheet as a whole. 
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6.2.2.2 Interest Rate Risk Reporting System 
Interest rate risk reporting system should provide all elements for decision-
making purposes to the ALCO. The reporting should provide answers to the 
following essential questions:-
• Why did the interest income vary in the last period? 
• Which interest income drivers caused the variations? 
> It is necessary to break down risk and perfonnance measures by 
transaction, product family, market segment and business line. To enable 
adequate analysis of interest income variations, the reports should break 
down the variations due to interest income drivers: changes in interest 
earned or paid, due to both amortisation and effects of new businesses or 
product mix-changss. 
> Since the bulk of revenues come from the existing portfolio, it necessitates 
appropriate and effective actions, which may include incentives for 
customers to convert some products into others like fixed to floating rates. 
> New business development policies necessitate projections of risk 
exposures and revenue levels. Conversely, interest rate and liquidity 
projections, call for defining new business policies. 
> Unlike the above on-balance sheet actions, the off-balance sheet actions 
necessitate hedging policies through derivatives and setting up a hedging 
programme for both the short and long-tenn. The hedging policy need 
arbitrages between revenues level, interest rate risk volatility and the 
costs of hedging (both opportunity costs and direct costs). 
> Defining and revising the hedging programme would depend on the 
expectations with respect the trade-off between hedging risk versus level 
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of rey^f]qQs ^nd on the 'risk appetite' of the bank, with some willing to 
neutralize risk while others belting on favourable market movements to 
various degrees level. 
6.2.2.3 Measurement of Interest Rate Risk 
In essence, the purpose of interest rate risk is to adopt the 'best exposure' 
position. The prerequisite for which is to measure interest rate exposure, and 
measures of interest rate risk include the sensitivity of the interest income to 
shifts in interest rates and that of the net market value of assets and liabilities. 
Though, the interest rate margin is adequate in short-tenn, market value 
sensitivities of both assets and liabilities capture the entire stream of future flows 
and provide a long-term view. 
It must be kept in view that :-
• future interest rates of borrowing or lending/ investing are unknown, if no 
hedge is contracted before 
" all funding or investing decisions resulting from liquidity gaps have an 
impact on interest rate risk 
• defining the 'best exposure' requires understanding the mechanisms 
driving the yield curve and making choices on views of what future rates 
could be 
• there is no 'zero' gain or loss for the bank, when there is movement in 
interest rate ( Exhibit 6.1) — the implication is that there is no escape to 
interest rate risk, and the only option for the banks is to choose their 
exposure 
• funding or investing decisions require a choice of maturity plus the choice 
of locking in a rate, or of using floating rates - - the choice of a fixed or a 
floating rate requires a comparison between current and expected future 
rates, and the interest rate structure is a basic input to make such a 
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decisions ( as it provides the set of rates available across the maturities 
range, besides embedding information on expected future rates) 
6.2.2.4 Interest Rate Arbitrage for Banks 
Risk neutrality is a criticiil concept for arbitrage issues. The difference in rates 
of different maturities raises the issue of the best choice of maturity for lending or 
borrowing over a given horizon. In such a situation, the long-term lender could 
think that the best solution is to lend immediately over the long-term. The 
alternative choice would be to lend short-term and renew the lending up to the 
horizon of the lender. 
The issue is whether taking interest rate risk leads to an expected gain. The 
choice depends on the expectations. The short-term lender hopes that interest 
rates will increase. The interest rate variation, however, may be large enough, 
either upward or downward. 
This necessitates a break-even value of the future rate such that the 
succession of short-term transactions or a floating rate transaction-with the 
same frequency of resets as the rollover transaction-is equivalent to a long fixed 
rate transaction. The choice would depend on whether the expected rates are 
above or below such break-even rates. The break-even rate is the 'fonward rate', 
derived from the terni structure of interest rates (i.e. the set of zero-coupon rates 
derived from Government or risk-free assets). 
6.2.2.5 ALM Simulations 
With the globalisation of Indian economy, it has become inevitable for the Indian 
banks to carry out ALM simulations, which model the behaviour of the balance 
sheet under various interest rate scenarios to obtain the risk and the expected 
values of the target variables, interest income or the maric-to-maricet value of the 
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balance sheet £|t market rates. Without simulations, the ALCO would not have a 
full visibility on future profitability and risk, making it difficult ta set up guidelines 
for business policy and hedging programmes. 
Simple Gaps do not capture the risk from options embedded in banking products. 
Simulations correct the limitations of the simple Gap Model :-
• they extend to various business scenarios 
• they calculate directly the target variable values, without necessarily 
relying on gaps only to derive new values of margins when interest rates 
changes this is feasible by embedding in the calculation any specific 
condition that influences the interest revenues and costs e.g. exercising 
prepayment options) 
Simulations serve to optimise the risl< and return trade-off, measured by 
the expected values and the distributions of the target variable across 
scenarios. ALM simulations addross both on and off-balance sheet 
management. 
7 steps through which full-blown ALM simulations need to proceed are as 
under:-
i) Select the target variables, interest income and the balance sheet NPV. 
ii) Define the Interest rate scenarios. 
iii) Build business projections of the future balance sheets. 
iv) Project margins and net income, or the balance sheet NPV. 
v) When considering optional risk, use more comprehensive Interest rate 
scenarios then for direct interest rate risk, 
vi) Combine all steps with hedging scenarios to explore the entire set of feasible 
risk and return combinations, 
vii) Select the best business and hedging scenarios according to the risk and 
return goals of the ALCO. 
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6.2.2.6 Hedging & Derivatives 
Derivatives alter interest rate exposures and allow to hedge exposures and make 
income independent of rates. Indian banks must take full use of derivative 
products, with the objectives of :-
• to take prudent advantage of opportunities (and risks) 
• prudent management aimed at hedging risks, totally or partially (to avoid 
adverse market movements) 
These derivatives may be fonward instruments (fon/vard rate agreements or 
swaps) and optional instruments, which allow capping the interest rate (caps) or 
setting a minimum guaranteed rate (floors). 
6.2.2.7 Basel Committee' s Interest Rate Risk Management Guidelines 
The Indian Banks would take steps in the right earnest after taking into 
cognisance the Basel Committee' eleven principles for banking supervisory 
authorities, intended to apply in assessing banks' management of interest rate 
risk, under the five major areas of a) role of the board and senior management, 
b) policies and procedures, c) measurement and monitoring system, d) internal 
controls and e) information for supervisory authorities. 
These principles are described in details in the Annexure-I of RBI Guidance 
Note on Market Risk Management (enclosed). 
6.2.3 LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
Liquidity Risk, resulting from size and maturity mismatches of assets and 
liabilities, make banks vulnerable to market liquidity risk. Liquid assets protect 
banks from market tensions because they are an alternative source of funds for 
facing the near-term obligations. Controlling liquidity risk implies spreading over 
time amounts of funding, avoiding unexpected mari<et funding and maintaining a 
cushion of liquid short-temi assets, so that selling them provides liquidity without 
incurring losses. 
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6.2.3.1 10 Essentials of Liauidiltv Risk Management 
The present day market scenario necessitates that Indian banks keep in view the 
following 10 essentials of liquidity risk nianagement:-
1) Liquidity gaps generate funding requirements, or investments of excess funds, 
in the future. Such financial transactions occur in the future, at interest rates not 
yet known, unless hedging them today. Liquidity gaps generate interest rate 
risk because of the uncertainty in interest revenues or costs generated by these 
transactions. 
2) Cash matching is a basic concept of liquidity risk, implying thereby that the 
time profiles of amortization of assets and liabilities are identical. The nature of 
interest applicable and maturities also match i.e., fixed rates with fixed rates and 
floating rates revised periodically with floating rates revised at the same dates 
using the same reference rate. With cash matching. Liquidity gaps are equal to 
zero. 
In general, deposits do not match loans, as these results from the customers' 
behaviour. However, it is feasible to structure the financial debt in order to 
replicate the assets' time profile. 
3) The cost of liquidity for banks often refers to another concept: the cost of 
maintaining the liquidity ratio at a minimum level. The liquidity ratio is the ratio 
of short-term assets to short-term liabilities, and it should be above one. 
When a bank initiates a set of transactions such as borrowing short and lending 
long, the liquidity ratio deteriorates because the short temi-liabilities increase 
without a matching increase in short-temn assets. 
4) Excessive funding concentrations severely reduce the bank's ability to 
survive a liquidity crisis. Banks need to take advantage of good economic times 
to diversify their funding requirements. 
5) Banks need to develop a contingency funding plan, which includes 
triggering guidelines, metrics development, better quantification/ adequacy of 
projected funding sources and development of common contingency scenarios. 
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6) Banks need to progress towards stress testing their funding plans, using 
various interest rate shocks and adverse economic and competitive scenarios to 
ascertain their impact on both the funding portfolio and market access. 
7) Communication lines t)etween treasury function and operational units, need 
to be significantly enhanced. Reporting systems need to be more effective. 
ALCO of the banks must have an appropriate risk management policies and 
procedures, active MIS reporting, limits and oversight programs. 
8) A historical funding patterns of various types of off-balance sheet items, 
need to be statistically analysed. Incorporating this into calculations of future 
funding requirements enhances the accuracy of funding projections. 
9) Selection of funding source must integrate with the bank's interest rate 
sensitivity, risk appetite, profit planning, diversification and capital management 
objectives. 
10) A rating services view on the bank's liquidity position need to be taken 
periodically and deficiencie s be corrected in early stages. 
6.2.3.2 BEST PRACTICES IN LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT 
The Indian banks vary widely in their funding needs and their appetite for risk. 
The following strategies are essential for the banks to manage their liquidity risk 
effectively:-
1. Strategic direction: The bank' management must articulate the overall 
strategic direction of the bank's funding strategy by detennining what mix of 
assets and liabilities will be utilized to maintain liquidity. This strategy should 
address the inherent liquidity risks, which are generated by the bank's core 
businesses. 
2. Integration: The bank's asset and liability management policy should clearly 
define the role of liquid assets along with setting clear targets and limits. The 
liquidity management should be integrated into the day-to-day decision making 
process of core business line mangers. 
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3. Measurement systems: The bank management needs a set of metrics with 
position limits and benchmarks to quickly ascertain the bank's true liquidity 
position, ascertain trends as they develop, and provide the basis for projecting 
possible scenarios rapidly and accurately. The models may be based on:-
" Cash capital-this model has a general limit, which is frequently 
expressed in terms of a management set limit on the percentage 
of the discounted value of the bank's assets to total short-temri 
funding; this general limit is then broken down more finely with 
sub-limits set on different types of short-temi funding 
" Liquidity barometers-this model calculates the length of time 
a bank can survive by liquidating its balance sheet using just 
two assumptions-that the bank continues to operate under 
normal operating conditions or that the bank has suffered a 
complete loss of access to the money market 
4) IMonitoring: Banks must be able to track and evaluate their current and 
anticipated liquidity position and capacity. A monitoring system must be 
developed, consisting of (juidelines, limits, and trend development, that enables 
management to monitor and confirm that compliance is within the approved 
funding targets and if not, to pinpoint the variances. 
5) Balance sheet evaluation: Both the bank's balance sheet and market access 
trends should be periodically evaluated for emerging patterns that could 
adversely affect liquidity, and the banks should develop strategies to manage 
these trends. Because many banks are becoming more reliant on credit sensitive 
funding, it is vital that the bank be perceived by third party funding sources as 
being both profitable and managed in a safe and sound manner. 
The monitoring program may consist of:a) turn downs and non-renewals, 
especially among key counter parties, during stressful market periods, b) 
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unexpected declines in deposit balances, c) adverse turns in rate spreads, d) 
excessive funding concentrations etc. 
7) Off Balance sheet management practices: It is considered a best practice to 
periodically supplement with statistical analysis of historical funding patterns of 
various types of off-balance sheet items. It enhances the accuracy of future 
funding projections-assuring management that naturally occurring contingent 
liabilities will not strain the funding process. 
8) Funds management: The funding sources could be deposits, capital and 
purchased funds. The various factors that must be considered in funding source 
selection include integration with the bank's interest rate sensitivity, risk appetite, 
profit planning, diversification and capital management objectives. 
9) Contingency liquidity plan preparation: Banks should have a fomial 
contingency plan of policiss and procedures to use as a blueprint in the event the 
bank is unable to fund some or all of its activities in a timely manner and at a 
reasonable cost. 
A comprehensive contingency funding plan can provide a useful framework for 
meeting both temporary and long-range liquidity disruptions. A good plan should 
emphsise a reliable but flexible administrative structure, realistic action plans, 
ongoing communications at all levels, and a set of metrics backed by adequate 
management information systems. Periodic testing of contingency MIS 
requirements ensures the availability of timely reports for rapid decision making. 
6.2.4 OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
The changing landscape of banking in an era of deregulation, globalisation and 
technological advancements—has more than eariier necessitated adequate 
operational risk management framework by the Indian banks. 
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6.2.4.1 6 ESSENTIALS OF OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
With a view to manage the operational risk emanating from sources such as 
business processes, internal control systems, strategy adopted to carry out the 
business, environment in which the business is carried out, technology used in 
processing and ultimately the people who are central to all these operations— 
the following essentials measures are must for the Indian banks to put into 
practice:-
1) Every bank has a set of unique features i.e. branch network, volume of 
business, technologies in use, the top management perception on business 
strategies, the organizational culture and value systems followed by its personnel 
to increase the market share of the bank. 
Therefore, the exact approach chosen by each bank will depend on a range 
of factors that include its size, sophistication, nature and complexities of 
its activities. 
2) Not withstanding the size and complexities of individual banks, good 
management information systems, strong internal control culture, dynamic 
contingency planning and commitment of top management are crucial 
elements of an effective operational risk management 
3) Four key areas identified (by Basel Committee) to develop the framework 
for managing operational risk, need be seriously put into practice viz.: 
• Developing an appropriate risk management environment 
• Risk management: identification, monitoring and control 
• Role of supervisors 
• Role of disclosure 
4) Banks must strive to map the risk-potential of its staff from time-to-time 
based on their behavioural exhibits, both in and outside the organizational 
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context— constantly evaluate their risk potential as it helps the management in 
picking right people for right job. 
Management should monit Dr against two of the most difficult people related risks 
viz., 'moral hazard' and risk of 'adverse selection'. 
5) Human capability needs can be measured under the following heads: 
• technical competency to carry out the assigned role 
• zeal for learning 
• grasp over the business environment and client profile 
• managerial skills like decision making, sharing of knowledge, training the 
subordinates, etc. 
This will help in matching the required human capabilities for a job. It must be 
borne in mind that the human capabilities required for a given job are also 
assessed in the context of organizational strategy. 
6) Capability development plan should be drawn to fill up the gaps identified 
like skill development through training; succession planning and career 
development; mentoring etc. 
6.2.4.2 BEST PRACTICES OF OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
The following best practices need to be adopted by the Indian banks with a view 
to effectively manage operational risk:-
1) Risk and control assessment. All the employees of the bank must 
understand the bank's business objectives and the risk associated with not 
obtaining those objectives. They must know the controls that mitigate against 
these risks. The banks must do an assessment of impact and probability and 
thereafter, devise suitable action plans. 
2) Developing operational risk taxonomy. This typically Involves developing 
operational risk taxonomy and then determining which operational risks each 
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business faces. This can be done qualitatively, by interviewing business 
managers and asking them about their historical operational losses. This 
approach results into a traffic light report with operational risk categories on one 
axis and business lines on the other axis. 
These serve as Key Risic Indicators— measure of progress in operational risk 
management, providing objective and non-financial measure of risk, and can be 
updated as frequently as daily. 
This type of report is good for raising awareness of operational risk and 
developing management controls, but it does not help to quantify or capitalise 
operational risk. 
3) Building loss event database. This addresses the capital aspect. This 
involves recording operational losses and categorising them by type. This 
is useful in raising awareness of key operational risks like the traffic-light 
approach. This involves identifying control points in the bank's operations and 
linking them to losses. 
The best approach for large and rare risks is to measure the frequencies and 
severities of loss events in terms of observable and identifiable parameters. 
Historical data is important, but only for establishing parameters to the risk 
model. Turning these indicators into useful management tools is a process, 
requiring: 
• establishing a baseline from past performance 
• setting goals for future performance 
• setting a threshold for unacceptable performance that will trigger 
management action 
This approach is related to statistical process control or Six Sigma 
programmes that have been used for tears in manufacturing sector and are 
being adopted by forward thinking banks. 
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This allows business lines to be capitalised appropriately and their risk 
adjusted returns on capital to be more easily compared. 
4) Economic capital. This is an important tool for raising awareness and 
changing behaviour and also for making sure that the banks are making the 
right investment decisions. 
A number of internationally active banks have methodology for estimating a 
measure of economic capital for operational risk. 
5) Operational risk alternatives. There are following alternatives to the 
banks seeking to manage or transfer operational risk: 
" risk mitigation or control through policy and audit 
• insurance 
" capital allocation 
A possible fourth alternative is securitisation and commoditisation of 
operational risk through the introduction of 'catastrophe' derivatives 
instruments, such as operational risk-linked bonds. 
6.2.5 INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT (IRM) 
Integrated or strategic or holistic risk management, is the new approach of 
looking at managing the risks in an effective and efficient manner. It requires 
management of the risks based on a robust analysis of aggregate exposures. 
The biggest problem facing Indian banks, however, is how to measure various 
risks in terms of their potential likelihood, their possible consequences and their 
correlation. 
Advances in risk methodologies and technologies are introducing a vast array of 
new tools for measuring and managing enterprise-wide risks, at a higher speed 
and lower cost. Indian banks need a judicious combination of quantitative as well 
as qualitative tools, for addressing the complexities of risks faced by them. 
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6.2.5.1 10 ESSENTIALS OF INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT 
There are certain basic essentials for an integrated risk management structure. 
These relate to structural changes, changes needed in policies and procedures, 
data capturing, analysis and modeling techniques. The Indian banks need to 
bring the needed changes without any delay. 
The 10 essentials of IRM ?re mentioned below:-
1) The commitment of the management of the bank- CEO must champion 
the cause of a vibrant integrated risk management framework in the bank 
2) Setting up appropriate policies and systems in the banic 
3) A robust Management Information System (MIS) 
4) Identification of various risks 
5) Measurement / Quantification of risks - making use of advance tools of 
measurement of risks 
6) Integrating the risk management processes 
7) Monitoring / review of risk management programmes 
8) Establishing communication channel with stake holders (internal as well 
as external) 
9) Risk Strategies formulation and Risk Budgeting 
10) Building an appropriate organisational culture to manage risks 
6.2.5.2 SIX STEPS IN IMPLEMENTING INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT 
Implementing an integrated risk management requires a scientific approach of 
putting in place an appropriate risk management framework. The size of 
operations of the bank and the prevailing practices, would decide upon how early 
a compatible framework of managing aggregate risks can be put in place. 
Following are the necessary steps in this direction:-
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1) IRM Vision and IRM Strategy of the Banl( 
An Indian bank depending on the size of its operations, decide on its IRM 
strategy, interalia on its vision and resource commitments. Such a strategy 
necessitates the full commitment of the Bank's Board and its top executives. 
2) Risk identification 
This, first of all, requires assessing the current level of risk management 
practices, the risk management structure, processes and technology 
sophistication. 
This would throw light on the gaps in the bank's practices in managing credit, 
market and operational risks vis-^-vis the best practices in vogue. 
3) Defining Roadmap of IRM 
In the light of IRM strategy and the gaps identified in implementing the best 
practices, an appropriate roadmap for achieving sustainable competitive 
advantage is charted viz. :-
• Ensuring Risk Based Supervision requirements 
• Ensuring Basel II requirements 
• Aligning the IRM strategy with the bank' decision making process in 
respect of: 
- Capital allocation for risks 
- NPA provisioning 
- Pricing of products 
- Optimising treasury operations 
-Streamlining systems and procedures with emphasis on risk 
management culture and reduction of costs 
4) Risk measurements including Early Warning Indicators 
Considering the existing gaps, advanced tools for measuring various types of 
risks should be brought into implementation. 
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Banks need to capture early warning risk indicators, whereby timely corrective 
actions can be taken and the impact of risk hazards minimized. 
5) Executing iRM requirements 
This would require: 
• Elaborate check list of key success factors and generation of quantitative 
benchmarks 
• Testing of models and validating them on prototype basis 
• Applying weightages depending on the criticality of each activity and 
benchmark levels specified 
• Evaluation scores applied on the benchmark levels specified-thereby 
building through an aggregation process, risk process implementation 
score (reflective of the extent of capital optimisation possible) 
6) IRM Strategy: Alignment with Bank' Decision Making Process 
This calls for aligning the IRM with the dejcision making process and involves:-
• Building risk culture through awareness and training 
• Developing integrated risk reports and success measures 
• Aligning insurance programmes 
• Aligning risk strategies and business strategies 
The Indian banks may put in practice a basic framework of IRM implementation 
plan prescribed by CRISIL and further build upon this as per their specific needs 
and complexities. It describes five phases: a) Definition phase- the bank defines 
the risk management vision and articulates the objectives; b) Diagnosis phase-
the bank compares its IRM vision with its current state and carries out gap 
analysis; c) Design phase- bank develops milestones, processes and 
frameworks; d) Davalopment phase- bank builds the systems of design phase 
and e) Deployment phase- this phase is concerned with roll-out and fine-tuning 
the systems developed and the task of gathering sophisticated data begins from 
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here. The Indian banks may put in practice such a basic framework and further 
build upon this as per their specific needs and complexities. 
6.2.6 ROLE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGYdT) IN ALM 
Indian banks need to leverage information technology in an efficient 
management of ALM. An appropriate technology would help the bank in 
providing multifarious benefits i.e.:-
<* new risk data warehouses required for an effective data gathering 
process and necessary for building historical data (as required by New 
Basel Accord) would be facilitated 
• new risk measures like VaR, necessitating models to produce market 
risk and credit risk measures will be enabled by IT 
• considering the .arge scale cf operations of bank systems, IT would 
enable creation cf the required risk data warehouse with the inputs and 
outputs of various models, and provide links to front-ends and 
reporting modules for end-users 
• 'On-line Analysis and Processing' (OLAP) systems, critical to fonward 
relevant information to end-users whenever they need it, will be 
facilitated 
• multiple risk measures, generating several new metrics for risks, which 
supplement the simple and traditional book exposures for credit risk, 
would be enabled 
• the risk views extending to expected and unexpected losses, capital 
and risk allocations, in addition to mark-to-market measures of loan 
exposures, will be facilitated by IT 
• new generation of IT systems can handle the complex 
multidimensional views of the bank's portfolio- such as reporting the 
risk-adjusted profitability by market segment; finding which 
transactions and obligors contribute most to the risk; 'what if 
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simulation capabilities to find out the outcomes of various scenarios; 
conducting sensitivity analysis to find out which risk drivers influence 
risk more, etc. 
6.2.7 BEST CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES 
With a view to build the basic foundations of governance in the banking industry, 
the Basel Committee has come out with several papers. These include Principles 
for the Management of Interest Rate Risk (September, 1997), Framewori( for 
Internal Control Systems in Banking Organisations (September, 1998), 
Enhancing Bank Transparency (September, 1998), etc. These papers have 
highlighted the fact that strategies and techniques that are basic to sound 
corporate governance include the clear articulation of corporate values and its 
•:<• strong internal control systems, including internal and external audit 
functions, risk management functions independent of business lines, and 
other checks and balances 
• special monitoring of risk exposures where conflicts of interest are likely, 
including business relationships with borrowers affiliated with the bank 
• appropriate information flows internally and to the public, etc. 
• Basel Committee has strongly recommended four important forms of 
oversight that shoud be included in the organizational structure of any 
bank in order to ensure the appropriate checks and balances: 
- oversight by the board of directors or supervisory board 
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- oversight by individuals not involved in the day-to-day running of 
the various business areas 
- direct line supervision of different business areas 
- independent risk management and audit functions 
6.3 DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The future direction of research may be in the following areas:-
i) For Indian Banks, non-availability of authenticate historical data, appears a 
severe handicap in continuous time approach calculation of transition 
probabilities based on continuously observed histories. A research project, 
comprehensively addressing this issue, seems to be an essentiality. 
ii) During stressful times it is often the case that liquidity dries up. One could 
model the VaR problem by adding 'liquidity premiums' during times where jumps 
occur. Hence, a study can be conducted to develop an equilibrium valuation 
model that includes an explicit 'value of liquidity' component. 
In a nutshell, ability to gauge the risks and take appropriate position will be 
the key to success—more aptly in other words that risk takers will survive, 
effective risk managers will prosper and risk averse are likely to perish. 
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APPENDIX 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON ASSET IJABILITY MANAGEMENT 
(PLliASli IICK MARK IN rilli APPLICABLH BOX) 
NAME OF BANK: 
WHETHER ASSET-LIABILITY 
COMMITTEE (ALCO) EXISTS IN 
YOUR BANK 
YES NO 
B. WHAT IS THE PERIODICITY 
OF HOLDING ALCO MEETING 
IN YOUR BANK? 
LESS THAN A WEEKLY 
WEEK 
FORTNIGHTLY MONTHLY 
MORE THAN 
ONE MONTH 
AS & WHEN 
NEED ARISES 
(PERIDICITY 
NOT SPECIFIED) 
i) 
PLEASE SPECIFY THE RISK 
MITIGATION PRACTICES 
FOLLOWED IN YOUR 
BANKS:-
FOR INTEREST RATE RISK 
MATURITY GAP ANALYSIS 
YES NO 
ii) DURATION ANALYSIS 
FOR LIQUIDITY RISK 
iii) MATURITY PROFILE (LIQUIDITY 
GAP) PREPARARTION 
LIQUIDITY PLANNING UNDER 
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
FOR CURRENCY RISK 
iv) CURRENCY SWAPS 
FOR CREDIT RISK 
vi) LOAN REVIEW MECHANISM 
YES NO 
USAGE OF CREDIT DERIVATIVES 
YES NO 
YES NO 
YES NO 
v) SETTING UP OF APPROPRIATE 
LIMITS FOR OPEN POSITION 
AND GAPS 
YES NO 
YES NO 
YES NO 
FOR EQUITY PRICE RISK 
vii) STOCK/INDEX OPTIONS AND 
FUTURE CONTRACTS 
YES NO 
FOR OPERATIONAL RISK 
viii) SETTING OPERATIONAL RISK 
LIMITS 
YES NO 
ix) RISK EDUCATION 
YES NO 
X) FOR INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURE 
DO YOU HAVE INTERNATIONAL 
EXPOSURES? YES 
WHAT ARE THE RISK MITIGATION 
PRACTICES ADOPTED? (PLEASE SPECIFY) 
NO 
FOR ANY OF THE ABOVE RISKS 
xi) OTHER TECHNIQUES IF ANY 
(PLEASE SPECIFY) 
D. i) WHETHER SEPARATE PRESCRIBED 
STATEMENTS ON ASSETS-
LIABILITIES DURATION ETC. OBTA-
INED FROM BRANCHES YES NO 
ii) SUCH INFORMATION AS DESIRED 
FOR ALCO ARE EXTRACTED FROM 
WEEKLY RETURN/S OF BRANCHES 
YES NO 
iii) SUCH INFORMATION AS DESIRED 
FOR ALCO ARE EXTRACTED FROM 
MONTHLY RETURN/S OF BRANCHES. 
YES NO 
WHETHER ANY EXPERTS/CONSUL-
TANTS SERVICES ON ASSESTs LIABI-
LITY MANAGEMENT USED IN THE 
PAST IN YOUR BANK YES NO 
F. WHETHER THE BANK HAS GOT A 
CLEARLY DEFINED ASSEST- LIAB-
ILITY MANAGEMENT POLICY 
(PLEASE ATTACH A COPY) YES NO 
* * * * * 
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STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: 
HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION AND TESTING OF 
HYPOTHESIS 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: 
HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION AND TESTING OF HYPOTHESIS 
SUITABLE TEST STATISTIC 
U-distribution' or 'Student's t-distribution' is the most appropriate distribution analysis 
for the given situation, in view of the following basic assumptions for this distribution:-
• use of t-distribution is required whenever the sample size is 30 or less 
• population standard deviation is not known 
• furthermore, in using t-distribution v^e assume that the population is normal or 
approximately normal 
The table for t-distribution values does not focus on the chance that the population 
parameter being estimated will fall within our confidence interval. Instead, it measures 
the chance that the population parameter we are estimating will not be within our 
confidence interval (that is, that it will lie outside it). 
If we are making an estimate at the 95 per cent confidence level, we would look into the 
table under 0.05 column (100 per cent - 95 per cent = 5 per cent). This 5 per cent of error 
(level of significance) is symbolized by a (alpha). We would find the appropriate t values 
for confidence interval 95 per cent under the column heading of 0.05. 
5 per cent area: 
rejection region (sliaded) 95 per cent confidence level area 5 per cent area: acceptance region (non-sltaded) rejection area (sliaded) 
- 2.228 
(Ho will be rejected if it 
falls in this shaded region) 
0.0 + 2.228 
(Ho will be rej ected if it 
falls in this shaded region) 
(in a one-tailed test this value is -L812, and the rejection region is in the lower tail of 
the distribution) 
Our sample size of 11, will have degrees of freedom (df) 10. Therefore in the table for t-
distribution, value of t at 95 per cent confidence level i.e. a of 0.05 per cent, would be 
2.228. If the calculated value oft is less than this, then our hypothesis would hold good, 
else it would be rejected. A two-tailed test of a hypothesis will reject the null 
hypothesis if the sample mean is significantly higher than or lower than the 
hypothesized population mean. In a two-tailed test, there are two rejection regions. 
However, in given research project, two-tailed test is not appropriate for validaiing of 
hypothesis in ail cases. Rather, left-tailed (or a lower tailed test) is suitable in certain 
instances where, Ho : H = MHO and Ho '• H < HHO when the sample mean is 
significantly below the hypothesized population mean that leads us to reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of the alternative hypothesis. Stated differently, the rejection 
region is in the lower tail of the distribution. 
If we use the t-distribution for one-tailed test, we need to determine the area located in 
only one tail. So to find appropriate t value for a one-tailed test at a significance level of 
0.05 with 10 degrees of freedom, we would look into Table for t-distribution under the 
0.10 column opposite the 10 degrees of freedom—and the value is 1.812. Here 0.10 
column represents the area imder the curve contained in both tails combined, and it also 
represents 0.05 of the area under the curve contained in each of the tails separately. 
We have to find out the sample standard deviation, as under:-
:y = V S (Xi -x)^ 
n-1 
where, Xi are sample variables, n the sample size and x the mean of the sample variables. 
t - statistic can be defined as under:-
t = \- n 
s/-^n 
where, s is sample standard deviation and ^ is hypothesized population mean. 
HYPOTHESIS FORMULATION AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
In this project, the hypothesis formulation is based upon the parameters of structured 
questionnaire, administered to the sample banks. 
As we know that a statistical hypothesis is a statement about the population 
characterizing a population that we wish to verify on the basis of sample information 
available to us, the decision problem is either to accept the hypothesis (i.e. null 
hypothesis, Ho) or reject it in favour of alternative hypothesis (Hi). 
I. EXISTENCE OF ALCO AND A CLEARLY DEFINED ASSETS LIABILITY 
MANAGEMENT POLICY 
Ho: Public Sector Banks (PSBs) have ALCO & a well documented ALM Policy 
Hi: Public Sector Banks (PSBs) do not have ALCO & a well documented ALM Policy 
BANKS(n) 
MEASUREMENT(x) 
A 
1 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
1 
E 
1 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
1 
J 
1 
K 
1 
Where YES =1 and 
Ho:fi = \ H,://=l 
NO = 0 
x = i;x 
5 = V £ (Xi -X? 
n - i 
/ = X- fJ 
5/Vn 
x = I,x, 11 
11 
= 1 
5 = V £(xi -x)^  = VO = 0 
n-1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t = x -// = 1-1 =0 
sHn 0/Vll 
For 2-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) =.'2.228 
. EOV < MEV , Ho: H= \ (Null Hypothesis is true) 
II. PERIODICITY OF HOLDING OF ALCO MEETING 
Ho: In PSBs, ALCO meet at least once a month 
Hi: In PSBs, ALCO does not meet at least once a month 
BANKSfn) 
MEASUREMENIfx) 
A 
1 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
1 
E 
1 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
1 
J 
1 
K 
1 
Where YES =1 and NO = 0 
Ho:// = l Hi:/i=l fiA 
x = Zxi 11 
11 
= 1 
5 = V S i x i ^ = Vo = 0 
n - 1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Vafue (EOV) t = x -// 
5/Vn 
= id =0 
0/Vii 
For 2-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) =2.228 
. EOV < MEV , Ho: pt - 1 (Null Hypothesis is true) 
III. CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) LOAN REVIEW MECHANISM 
Ho ; PSBs have Loan Review Mechanism 
Hi: PSBs do not have Loan Review Mechanism 
BANKSfn) 
MEASUREMENT(x) 
A 
1 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
1 
E 
1 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
1 
1 
J 
1 
K 
1 
Where YES=1 and NO = 0 
Ho: // = 1 
x = Sx 
= 
n 
H,:/;=l 
11 
- 1 
11 
5 = V sixi.rx£_ = i o = 0 
n - l 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t == x- fj = 1-1 =0 
5/Vn 0/Vll 
For 2-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) =2.228 
•VH':ASi:Ri:MENT(x) 
Where N()=l and YES - 0 
Ho:/y = l H,://.l 
X = I X 
X = IXj 11 
n 11 
I- I 
5 = V S (Xi -X) / = X - /J 
n - l 5/V n 
s = V S j Q c i ^ = VO = 0 
n-1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t = x - ^ 1-1 =0 
sNn 0/Vll 
For 2-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) =2.228 
. EOV < MEV , . . HQ: // = 1 (Null Hypothesis is true) 
IV. INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) MATURITY GAP ANALYSIS 
HQ : PSBs carry out Maturity Gap Analysis 
Hi: PSBs do not carry out Mat 
BANKSfn) 
MEASUREMENT(x) 
A 
1 
uritv Gap Analysis 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
1 
E 
1 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
1 
J 
1 
K 
1 
Where YES =1 and 
Ho:// = l Hi:;/=1 
N 0 = ) 
x = Y,x 11 
n 11 
5 = V I Txi -x^ 2 = V 0 = 0 
n-1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t 
s Hn 
= 1-1 
0/Vii 
=0 
For 2-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) =2.228 
. EOV < MEV , . . Ho:;/ = 1 (Null Hypothesis is true) 
ii) DURATION ANALYSIS 
Ho: 50 per cent PSBs carry out Duration Analysis 
Hi; < 50 per cent PSBs carry out Duration Analysis 
BANKS(n) 
MEASUREMENT(x) 
A 
0 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
0 
E 
0 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
0 
J 
0 
K 
0 
Where YES=1 and NO = 0 
Ho://=0.50 Hi:;/<0.50 
x = S X 5 
— = . — =0.4545 
//=0.50 
11 
s = V £ (Xi -x)^ = V 5x (0.5455')^ + 6 x (-0.4545-)^ = 0.5222 
n- ' l 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t - \-u = 0.4545-0.50 = -.2890 
sNn 0.5222/Vll 
For 1-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) = -1.812 
. EOV > MEV , . . Ho://<0.50 (Alternate Hypothesis is true) 
V. LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) MATURITY PROFILE (LIQUIDITY GAP) PREPARATION 
Ho: PSBs carry out Maturity Profile (Liquidity Gap) preparation 
Hi: PSBs do not carry out Maturity Profile (Liquidity Gap) preparation 
BANKSfn) 
MEASUREMENTfx) 
A 
1 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
1 
E 
1 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
1 
J 
1 
K 
1 
Where YES =1 and 
HQ: ft = I Hi://=1 
NO = 0 
J!: = S x 11 
-- =1 
11 
s = V SiXi^oc)! = i O = 0 
n - 1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) / - x-u = hi -0 
5/Vn 0/Vll 
For 2-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) =2.228 
. EOV < MEV , Ho:// (Null Hypothesis is true) 
ii) LIQUIDITY PLANNING UNDER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
HQ . 50 per cent PSBs carry out Liquidity Planning under alternative scenario 
Hi. < 50 per cent PSBs carry out Liquidity Planning under alternative scenario 
BANKSrn) 
MEASUREMENTfx) 
A 
0 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
0 
E 
0 
F 
0 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
1 
J 
0 
K 
0 
Where YES=1 and NO = 0 
Ho://=0.50 Hi://<0.50 //=0.50 
x = 'Lx 5 
.... = .— =0.4545 
11 
.V = V I (Xi -xf = V 5x (0.5455)^ + 6 x (-0.4545)^ = 0.5222 
n - 1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t = x - ^ = 0.4545-0.50 = -.2890 
WVn 0.5222/Vll 
For 1-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) = -1.812 
EOV > MEV , . HQ: pi <0.50 (Alternate Hypothesis is true) 
VI. INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURES & RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
• INTERNATIONAL EXPOSURES 
HQ : 70 per cent PSBs (leading) have international exposures 
Hi: < 70 per cent PSBs (leading) have international exposures 
BANKS(n) 
MEASUREMENXrx) 
A 
1 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
0 
E 
0 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
0 
J 
0 
K 
1 
«o: // = .70 
Ho: // = 1 
x = 'Lx 7 
H,://<.70 
H,:;/=l y" 
//=.70 
11 
= 0.6363 
^ = V Ilxi^x}! = V 7x (0.36371^ + 4 x (-0.6363)^ = 0.5045 
n-1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t= x-fx = 0.6363-0.70 = -0.4187 
^ / V n 0.5045/Vl 1 
For 1-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 pe; cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) = -1.812 
EOV > MEV , HQ: // <0.70 (Alternate Hypothesis true) 
VII. CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) SETTING UP OF OPEN POSITION AND GAP LIMITS 
Ho: PSBs set up OPEN POSITION and GAP LIMITS 
Hi: PSBs do not set up 
BANKSfn) 
MEASUREMENTfx) 
OPEN 
A 
1 
posr 
B 
1 
nON and GAP limit 
C 
1 
D 
1 
E 
1 
ts 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
1 
J 
1 
K 
1 
Where YES=1 and NO = 0 
Ho: // = 1 Hi:/^=1 i " = l 
x = 2x 11 
11 
= 1 
5 = V £ (Xj -x)^ = iO = 0 
n - l 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t = x-// 
j / V n 
M =0 
0/Vll 
For 2-tailed t-distribution value oft at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) =2.228 
. EOV < MEV , . . Ho:// = l (Null Hypothesis is true) 
W) CURRENCY SWAPS 
Ho: 80 per cent PSBs use currency swaps 
Hi < 80 per cent PSBs use currency swaps 
10 
BANKS(n) 
MEASUREMENT(x) 
A 
1 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
1 
E 
0 
F 
0 
G 
1 
H 
1 
1 
1 
J 
1 
K 
0 
Ho://= .80 H,://<.80 
x = 'Lx 8 
/y=.80 
n 11 
= 0.7272 
s = V Sixi^x)i = V 8x (0.2728f + 3 x (-0.7272^^ = 0.4670 
n- ' l 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t = x-u = 0.7272-0.80 = -0.517 
:? / V n 0.4670/Vl 1 
For 1-tailed t-distribution value oft at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) = -1.812 
. EOV > MEV , . Ho". fi<0.80 (Alternate Hypothesis is true) 
VIII. EQUITY PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT 
• STOCK/INDEX OPTIONS AND FUTURE CONTRACTS 
Ho 
: PSBs do not use Stock/Index options and Future contracts 
" 1 : PSBs use Stock/Index options and Future contracts 
BANKSfn) 
MEASUREMENXrx) 
A 
1 
B 
1 
C 
1 
I) 
1 
E 
1 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
1 
J 
1 
K 
1 
Where N0=1 and YES = 0 
Ho:// = l Ux'.fiA //=1 
x = Sx 
s = < £ (xj -x)^ / = X- li 
11 
n n-1 ' / V n 
x = Sxi 
n 
11 
11 
= 1 
n-1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t = x- fi = 
5/Vn 
M =0 
o/Vu 
For 2-taiIed t-distribution va'ue of t at 5 pc- cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) =2.228 
EOV < MEV . . HQ: ^ = 1 (Null Hypothesis is true) 
IX. OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
i) OPERATIONAL RISKS MEASUREMENT, ASSESSMENT & MONITORING 
Ho: 30per cent PSBs have system of risk measurement, assessment and monitoring 
" 1 : <30per cent PSBs have svstem of risk measurement, assessment and monitoring 
BANKS(n) 
MEASUREMENT(x) 
A 
1 
B 
0 
c 
0 
D 
0 
E 
0 
F 
0 
G 
0 
H 
1 
I 
0 
J 
1 
K 
0 
Ho:/^ = .30 H,://<.30 
x = Lx 3 
;/=.30 
0.2727 
11 
s = V l ixi^x}! = V 3x rO.7273)^  + 8 x (-0.2727^^ = 0.467 
n-1 10 
12 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t= x-u = 0.2727-0.30 = -0.1939 
.V / V n 0.467/Vl 1 
For 1-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) = -1.812 
. EOV > MEV , . . Ho:jj<0.30 (Alternate Hypothesis is true) 
ii) OPERATIONAL RISKS EDUCATION 
Ho; PSBs impart Risk Education amongst their employees 
Hi: PSBs do not impart Risk Education amongst their employees 
BANKS(n) 
MEASUREMENTfx) 
A 
1 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
1 
E 
1 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
1 
1 
J 
1 
K 
1 
Where YES^l and 
Ho: / / - I H,://=l 
NO = 0 
//=1 
x = Z X 11 
11 
5 = V IiXi_:x)i = iO = 0 
n -1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t = x-u = 1-1 =0 
j / V n O/VU 
For 2-tailed t-distribution value of t at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) =2.228 
13 
. EOV < MEV , . . Ho: /^  = 1 (Null Hypothesis is true) 
X. INFORMATION ON COMPILATION OF ALCO RETURNS 
• INFORMATION ON COMPILATION OF ALCO RETURNS 
Ho. PSBs do not follow on-line method (instead manual method) of compilation of ALCO 
infoimation 
Hi: PSBs follow on-line method of compilation of ALCO information 
BANKSfn) 
MEASUREMENTfx^ 
A 
1 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
I 
E 
1 
F 
1 
G 
1 
H 
1 
I 
1 
J 
1 
K 
1 
Where NO =1 and YES = 0 
Ho:/i = l Hi://=1 //=1 
x = S X 11 
11 
= 1 
s = V Z i x i . ^ = VO = 0 
n - 1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t = x - ^ = 1-1 =0 
sl<n O/VU 
For 2-tailed t-distribution value oft at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) =2.228 
. EOV < MEV , HQ: /^  = 1 (Null Hypothesis is true) 
14 
XI. INFORMATION ON USING CONSULTANTS SERVICES ETC. 
- WHETHER ANY EXPERTS/ CONSULTANTS SERVICES ON ASSETS LIABILITIES 
MANAGEMENT USED IN THE PAST BY THE HANK? 
Ho: 60 per cent of PSBs are using consultant services 
Hi: <60 per cent of PSBs are using consultant services 
BANKSfn) 
MEASUREMENT(x) 
A 
1 
B 
1 
C 
1 
D 
0 
E 
1 
F 
0 
G 
0 
H 
1 
I 
0 
J 
0 
K 
1 
Ho:/ /= .6 0 Hi: ;«.60 
x = S x 6 
f^=.60 
= 0.5454 
11 
5 = V £ rxj -x^^ - V 6x (0.401^ + 5 X (-0.60)^ = 0.5253 
n - 1 10 
Experimentally Obtained Value (EOV) t = x - ^ = 0.5454-0.60 = -0.346 
5/Vn 0.5253/Vll 
For 1-tailed t-distribution value oft at 5 per cent significance and df 10 i.e. 
Mathematically Expected Value (MEV) = -1.812 
. EOV > MEV , . . HQ-.JU <0. )0 (Alternate Hypothesis is true) 
]|c 3|E :|c ]|c ^ 
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APPENDIX 3 
RBI GUIDELINES ON ASSET LIABILITY MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM IN BANKS ( FEBRUARY, 1999) 
RESERVE BANK OF INDIA GUIDELINES ON ASSET LIABILITY 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN BANKS 
I. In the normal course, banks are exposed to credit and market risks in view of the 
asset-liability transformation. With liberalization in Indian financial markets over 
the last few years and growing integration of domestic markets and with 
external markets, the risks associated with banks' operations have become 
complex and large, requiring strategic management. Banks are now operating 
in a fairly deregulated environment and are required to detemriine on their own, 
interest rates on deposits and advances in both domestic and foreign currencies 
on a dynamic basis. The interest rates on banks' investments in government and 
other securities are also now market related. Intense competition for business 
involving both the assets and liabilities, together with increasing volatility in the 
domestic interest rates as well as foreign exchange rates, has brought 
pressure on the management of banks to maintain a good balance among 
spreads, profitability and long-term viability. Imprudent liquidity management can 
put banks' earnings and reputation at great risk. These pressures call for 
structured and comprehensive measures and not just ad hoc action. The 
management of banks has to base their business decisions on a dynamic and 
integrated risk management system and process, driven by corporate strategy. 
Banks are exposed to several major risks in the course of their business ~ 
credit risk, interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, equity/commodity price risk, 
liquidity risk and operational risks. It is, therefore, important that banks 
introduce effective risk management systems that address the issues related 
to interest rate, currency and liquidity risks. 
Banks need to address these risks in a structured manner by upgrading their risk 
management and adopting more comprehensive Asset-Liability Management 
(ALM) practices that has been done hitherto. ALM, among other functions, is also 
concerned with risk management and provides a comprehensive and dynamic 
framework for measuring, monitoring and managing liquidity, interest rate, 
foreign exchange and equity and commodity price risks of a bank that needs to 
be closely integrated with the banks' business strategy. It Involves assessment 
of various types of risks and altering the asset-liability portfolio in a dynamic way 
in order to manage risks. 
2.This note lays down broad guidelines in respect of interest rate and liquidity 
risk management systems in banks which form part of the Asset-Liability 
Management (ALM) function. The initial focus of the ALM function would be 
to enforce the risk management discipline viz, managing business after 
assessing the risks involved. The olDjective of good risk management systems 
should be that these systems will evolve into a strategic tool for bank 
management. 
3. The ALM process rests on three pillars: 
> ALM information systems 
=> Management Infomiation System 
=> Information availability, accuracy, adequacy and expediency 
> ALM organization 
=> Structure and responsibilities 
=> Level of top management involvement 
> ALM process 
=> Risk parameters 
=> Risk identification 
=> Risk measurement 
=> Risk management 
=> Risk policies and tolerance levels. 
4. ALM Information Systems 
ALM has to be supported by a management philosophy which clearly specifies 
the risk policies and tolerance limits. This framework needs to be built on sound 
methodology with necessary information system as backup. Thus, information is 
the key to the ALM process. It is, however, recognized that varied business 
profiles of banks in the public and private sector as well as those of foreign 
banks do not make the adoption of a i unifomn ALM system for all banks feasible. 
There are various methods prevalent world-wide for measuring risks. These 
range from the simple Gap Statement to extremely sophisticated and data 
intensive Risk Adjusted Profitability Measurement Methods. However, the 
central element for the entire ALM exercise is the availability of adequate and 
accurate information with expedience and the existing systems in many Indian 
banks do not generate information in the manner required for ALM. Collecting 
accurate data in a timely manner will be the biggest challenge | before the banks, 
particularly those having wide network of branches but lacking full-scale 
computerization. 
However, the introduction of base information system for risk I measurement 
and monitoring has to be addressed urgently.. As banks are I aware, 
intemationally, regulators have prescribed or are in the process of prescribing 
capital adequacy for market risks. A prerequisite for this is that banks must have 
in place an efficient information system. 
Considering the large network of branches and the lack of (an adequate) 
system to collect information required for ALM which analyzes information on the 
basis of residual maturity and behavioral pattem, it will take time for banks in the 
present state to get the requisite information. The problem of ALM needs to 
be addressed by following an ABC approach, i.e. analyzing the behaviour of 
asset and liability products in the top branches accounting for significant business 
and then making rational assumptions about the way in which assets and 
liabilities would behave in other branches. In respect of foreign exchange, 
investment portfolio and money market operations, in view of the centralized 
nature of the functions, it would be much easier to collect reliable information. 
The data and assumptions can then be refined over time as the bank 
management gain experience of conducting business within an ALM framework. 
The spread of computerization will also help banks in accessing data. 
5. ALM Organization 
5.1 a. Successful implementation of the risk management process would 
require strong commitment on the part of the senior management in the 
bank, to integrate basic operations and strategic decision making with risk 
management. The Board should have overall responsibility for 
management of risks and should decide the risk management policy of 
the bank and set limits for liquidity, interest rate, foreign exchange and equity 
price risks. 
b. The Asset-Liability Committee (y\LCO) consisting of the bank's senior 
management including CEO should be responsible for ensuring 
adherence to the limits set by the Board as well as for deciding the 
business strategy of the bank (on the assets and liabilities sides) in line 
with the bank's budget and decided risk management objectives. 
c. The ALM Support Groups consisting of operating staff should be 
responsible for analyzing, monitoring and reporting the risk profiles to 
the ALCO. The staff should also prepare forecasts (simulations) 
showing the effects of various possible changes in market conditions 
related to the balance sheet and recommend the action needed to 
adhere to bank's internal limits. 
52 The ALCO is a decision making unit responsible for balance sheet 
planning from risk-return perspective including the strategic management 
of interest rate and liquidity risks. Each bank will have to decide on the 
role of its ALCO, its responsibility as also the decisions to be taken by it. 
The business and risk management strategy of the bank should ensure 
that the bank operates within the limits/parameters set by the Board. The 
business issues that an ALCO would consider, inter alia, will include 
product pricing for both deposits and advances, desired maturity profile of the 
incremental assets and liabilities, etc. In addition to monitoring the risk levels 
of the bank, the ALCO should review the results of and progress in 
implementation of the decisions made in the previous meetings. The 
ALCO would also articulate the current interest rate view of the bank and 
base its decisions for future business strategy on this view. In respect of 
the funding policy, for instance, its responsibility would be to decide on 
source and mix of liabilities or sale of assets. Towards this end, it will have 
to develop a view on future direction of interest rate movements and decide 
on a funding mix between fixed vs floating rate funds, wholesale vs retail 
deposits, money market vs capital market funding, domestic vs foreign 
currency funding, etc. Individual banks will have to decide the frequency for 
holding their ALCO meetings. 
5.3 Composition of ALCO 
The size (number of members) of ALCO would depend on the size of each 
institution, business mix and organizational complexity. To ensure 
commitment of the Top Management, the CEO/CMD or ED should head the 
Committee. The Chiefs of Investment, Credit, Funds 
Management/Treasury (forex and domestic), International Banking and 
Economic Research can be members of the Committee. In addition, the 
Head of the Infomiation Technology Division should also be an invitee for 
building up of MIS and related computerization. Some banks may even 
have sub-committees and support groups. 
5.4 Committee of Directors 
The Management Committee of the Board or any other Specific 
Committee constituted by the Board should oversee the implementation of 
the system and review its functioning periodically. 
5.5 ALM process 
The scope of ALM function can be described as follows: 
> Liquidity risk management 
> Management of market risks 
> Funding and capital planning 
> Profit planning and growth projection 
> Trading risk management. 
The guidelines given in this note mainly address Liquidity and Interest Rate 
risks. 
6. Liquidity Risk IManagement 
6.1 Measuring and managing liquidity needs are vital activities of 
commercial banks. By assuring a bank's ability to meet its liabilities as they 
become due, liquidity management can reduce the probability of an adverse 
situation developing. The importance of liquidity transcends Individual 
institutions, as liquidity shortfall in one institution can have repercussions on 
the entire system. Bank managemant should measure not only the liquidity 
positions of banks on an ongoing basis but also examine how liquidity 
requirements are likely to evolve under crisis scenarios. Experience shows 
that assets commonly considered as liquid, like government securities and 
other money market instruments, could also become illiquid when the 
market players are unidirectional. Therefore, liquidity has to be tracked 
through maturity or cash flow mismatches. For measuring and managing net 
funding requirements, the use of a maturity ladder and calculation of 
cumulative surplus or deficit of funds at selected maturity dates is adopted 
as a standard tool. The format of the Statement of Structural Liquidity is 
given in Annexure I. 
6.2The Maturity Profile as given in Appendix-1 could be used for 
measuring the future cash flows of banks in different time buckets. The 
time buckets, given the Statutory Reserve cycle of 14 days, may be 
distributed as under: 
i. 1 to 14 days 
ii. 15 to 28 days 
ii. 29 days and up to 3 months 
iv. Over 3 months and up to 6 months 
V. Over 6 months and up to 1 year 
vi. Over 1 year and up to 3 years 
vii. Over 3 years and up to 5 years 
viii. Over 5 years 
6.3 The investments in SLR securities and other investments are assumed as 
illiquid due to lack of depth in the secondary market and are therefore 
required to be shown under respective maturity buckets, corresponding to 
the residual maturity. However, some of the banks may be maintaining 
securities in the 'Trading Book", which are kept distinct from other 
investments made for complying with the Statutory Reserve requirements 
and for retaining relationship with customers. Securities held in the 
'Trading Book' are subject to certain preconditions like: 
i. The composition and volume are clearly defined; 
i. Maximum maturity/duration of the portfolio is restricted; 
ii. The holding period not to exceed 90 days; 
V. Cut-loss limit prescribed; 
V. Defeasance periods (product-wise) i.e. time taken to liquidate the 
position on the basis of liquidity in the secondary market are 
prescribed; 
vi. Marking to market on a daily/weekly basis and the revaluation 
gain/loss charged to the profit and loss account, etc. 
Banks which maintain such Trading Books' and complying with the above 
standards are pemnitted to show the trading securities under 1-14 days, 15-
28 days and 29-90 days buckets on the basis of the defeasance periods. 
The Board/ALCO of the banks should approve the volume, composition, 
holding/defeasance period, cut-loss, etc. of the Trading Book' and copy of 
the policy note thereon should be fonvarded to the Department of Banking 
Supervision, RBI. 
Within each time bucket there could be mismatches depending on cash 
inflows and outflows. While the mismatches up to one year would be 
relevant since these provide early warning signals of impending liquidity 
problems, the main focus should be on the short-temi mismatches, viz. 1-14 
days and 15-28 days. Banks, however, are expected to monitor their 
cumulative mismatches (running total) across all time buckets by 
establishing internal prudential limits with the approval of the 
Board/Management Committee. The mismatch (negative gap) during 1-14 
days and 15-28 days in normal course may not exceed 20 per cent of the 
cash outflows in each time bucket. If a bank in view of its asset-liability 
profile and the consequential structural mismatches needs higher tolerance 
level, it could operate with higher limit sanctioned by its Board/Management 
Committee giving reasons on the need for such higher limit. The discretion 
to allow a higher tolerance level is intended for a temporary period, till March 
31,2000. 
6.4 The Statement of Structural Liquidity (Annexure I) may be prepared by 
placing all cash inflows and outflows in the maturity ladder according to 
the expected timing of cash flows. A maturing liability will be a cash 
outflow while a maturing asset will be a cash inflow. It would be 
necessary to take into account the rupee inflows and outflows on account 
of forex operations. While determining the likely cash inflows/outflows, 
banks have to make a number of assumptions according to their asset-
liability profiles. For instance, Indian banks with large branch network 
can (on the stability of their deposit base as most deposits are rolled-over) 
afford to have larger tolerance levels in mismatches in the long-term if 
their term deposit base is quite high. While determining the tolerance 
levels the banks may take into account all relevant factors based on their 
as set-1 liability base, nature of business, future strategy, etc. The RBI is 
interested in ensuring that the tolerance levels are determined keeping 
necessary factors in view and further refined with experience gained it 
Liquidity Management. 
6.5 In order to enable the banks to monitor their short-term liquidity on 
dynamic basis over a time horizon spanning from 1-90 days, banks may 
estimate their short-term liquidity profiles on the basis of business 
projections and other commitments for planning purposes. An indicative 
format (Annexure III) for estimating Short-term Dynamic Liquidity is 
enclosed. 
7. Currency Risk 
7.1 Floating exchange rate arrangement has brought in its wake pronounced 
volatility adding a new dimension to the risk profile of banks' balance 
sheets. The increased capital flows across free economies following 
deregulation have contributed to increase in the volume of transactions. 
Large cross-border flows together with the volatility has rendered the 
banks' balance sheets vulnerable to exchange rate movements. 
7.2 Dealing in different currencies brings opportunities as also risks. If the 
liabilities in one currency exceed the level of assets in the same currency, 
then the currency mismatch can add value or erode value depending upon 
the currency movements. The simplest way to avoid currency risk is to 
ensure that mismatches, if any, are reduced to zero or near zero. Banks 
undertake operations in foreign exchange like accepting deposits, making 
loans and advances and quoting prices for foreign exchange transactions. 
Irrespective of the strategies adopted, it may not be possible to eliminate 
currency mismatches altogether. Besides, some of the institutions may 
take proprietary trading positions as a conscious business strategy. 
7.3 Managing Currency Risk is one more dimension of Asset-Liability 
Management. Mismatched currency position besides exposing the 
balance sheet to movements in exchange rate also exposes it to country 
risk and settlement risk. Ever since the RBI (Exchange Control 
Department) introduced the concept of end of the day near square 
position in 1978, banks have been setting up overnight limits and 
selectively undertaking active day time" trading. Following the 
introduction of "Guidelines for Internal Control over Foreign Exchange 
Business" in 1981, maturity mismatches (gaps) are also subject to 
control. Following the recommendations of Expert Group on Foreign 
Exchange Markets in India (Sodhani Committee) the calculation of 
exchange position has been redefined and banks have been given the 
discretion to set up overnight limits linked to maintenance of capital to 
risk-weighted assets ratio of 8 per cent of open position limit. 
7.4 Presently, the banks are also free to set gap limits with RBI's approval but 
are required to adopt Value at Risk (VaR) approach to measure the risk 
associated with fonward exposures. Thus the open position limits together 
with the gap limits form the risk management approach to forex 
operations. For monitoring such risks banks should follow the 
instructions contained in Circular A.D. (M.A. Series) No. 52 dated 
December 27, 1997 issued by the Exchange Control Department. 
8. Interest Rate Risk (IRR) 
8.1 The phased deregulation of interest rates and the operational flexibility 
given to banks in pricing most of the assets and liabilities imply the need 
for the banking system to hedge the Interest Rate Risk. Interest rate risk is 
the risk where changes in market interest rates might adversely affect a 
bank's financial condition. The changes in interest rates affect banks in a 
larger way. The immediate impact of changes in interest rates is on 
bank's earnings (i.e., reported profits) by changing its Net Interest 
Income (Nil). A long-term impact of changing interest rates is on bank's 
Market Value of Equity (MVE) or Net Worth as the economic value of 
bank's assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet positions get affected due 
to variation in market interest rates. The interest rate risk when viewed 
from these two perspectives is known as 'earnings' perspective and 
'economic value' perspective, respectively. The risk from the earnings 
perspective can be measured as changes in the Net Interest Income (Nil) 
or Net Interest Margin (NIM). There are many analytical techniques for 
measurement and management of interest rate risk. In the context of poor 
MIS, slow pace of computerization in banks and the absence of total 
deregulation, the traditional Gap analysis is considered as a suitable 
method to measure the Interest Rate Risk in the first place. It is the 
intention of RBI to move over to modern techniques of Interest Rate Risk 
measurement like Duration Gap Analysis, Simulation and Value at Risk 
over time when banks acquire sufficient expertise and sophistication in 
acquiring and handling MIS. 
The Gap or Mismatch risk can be measured by calculating Gaps over 
different time intervals as at a given date. Gap analysis measures 
mismatches between rate sensitive liabilities and rate sensitive assets 
(including off-balance sheet positions). An asset or liability is nomially 
classified as rate sensitive if: 
i. Within the time interval under c:onsideration, there is a cash flow; 
ii. The interest rate resets/reprice s contractually during the interval; 
iii. RBI changes the interest rates (i.e. interest rates on Savings Bank 
Deposits, DR1 advances, Export credit, Refinance, CRR balance, etc.) 
in cases where interest rates are administered; and 
iv. It is contractually prepayable or withdrawable before the stated 
maturities. 
8.2 The Gap Report should be generated by grouping rate sensitive liabilities, 
assets and off-balance sheet positions into time buckets according to 
residual maturity or next repricing period, whichever is earlier. The difficult 
task in Gap analysis is determining rate sensitivity. All investments, 
advances, deposits, borrowings, purchased funds, etc. that mature/reprice 
within a specified time-frame are interest rate sensitive. Similarly, any 
principal repayment of loan is also rate sensitive if the bank expects to 
receive it within the time horizon. This includes final principal payment and 
interim instalments. Certain assets and liabilities receive/pay rates that vary 
with a reference rate. These assets and liabilities are repriced at 
predetermined intervals and are rate sensitive at the time of repricing. While 
the interest rates on term deposits are fixed during their currency, the 
advances portfolio of the banking system is basically floating. The interest 
rates on advances could be repriced on any number of occasions. 
corresponding to the changes in PLR. The Gaps may be identified in the 
following tinne buckets: 
i. 1-28 days 
ii. 29 days and up to 3 months 
iii. Over 3 months and up to 6 months 
iv. Over 6 months and up to 1 year 
V. Over 1 year and up to 3 years 
vi. Over 3 years and up to 5 years 
vii. Over 5 years 
viii. Non-sensitive. 
The various Items of rate sensitive assets and liabilities and off-balance 
sheet items may be classified as explained in Appendix- 2 and the Reporting 
Format for interest rate sensitive assets and liabilities is given in Annexure II. 
8.3 The Gap is the difference between Rate Sensitive Assets (RSA) and Rate 
Sensitive Liabilities (RSL) for each time bucket. The positive Gap indicates 
that it has more RSAs than RSLs whereas the negative Gap indicates that it 
has more RSLs. The Gap reports indicate whether the institution is in a 
position to benefit from rising interest rates by having a positive Gap (RSA > 
RSL) or whether it is in a position to benefit from declining interest rates by a 
negative Gap (RSL > RSA). The Gap can, therefore, be used as a measure of 
interest rate sensitivity. 
8.4 Each bank should set prudential limits on individual Gaps with the 
approval of the Board/Management Committee. The prudential limits should 
have a bearing on the total assets, earning assets or equity. The banks may 
work out earnings at risk (EaR) or Net Interest Margin (NIM), based on their 
views on interest rate movements and fix a prudent level with the approval of 
the Board/Management Committee. 
8.5 RBI will also introduce capital adequacy for market risks in due course. 
9. General 
9.1 The classification of various components of assets and liabilities into 
different time buckets for preparation of Gap reports (Liquidity and 
Interest Rate Sensitivity) as indicated in Appendices 7.1.1 and 7.1.2 is the 
benchmark. Banks which are better equipped to reasonably estimate the 
behavioral pattern, embedded options, rolls-in and rolls-out, etc. of 
various components of assets and liabilities on the basis of past 
data/empirical studies could classify them in the appropriate time 
buckets, subject to approval from the ALCO/Board. A copy of the note 
approved by the ALCO/Board may be sent to the Department of Banking 
Supervision. 
9.2 The present framework does not capture the impact of embedded options, 
i.e. the customers exercising their options (premature closure of deposits 
and prepayment of loans and advances) on the liquidity and interest rate 
risks profile of banks. The magnitude of embedded option risk at times of 
volatility in market interest rates is quite substantial. Banks should 
therefore evolve suitable mechanism, supported by empirical studies and 
behavioral analysis to estimate the future behaviour of assets, liabilities 
and off-balance sheet items to changes in market variables and estimate 
the embedded options. 
9.3 A scientifically evolved internal transfer pricing model by assigning 
values on the basis of current market rates to finds provided and funds 
used is an important component for effective implementation of ALM 
System. The transfer price mechanism can enhance the management of 
margin, j.e. lending or credit spread, the funding or liability spread and 
mismatch spread. It also helps centralizing interest rate risk at one place 
which facilitate effective control and management of interest rate risk. A 
well-defined transfer pricing system also provides a rational framework 
for pricing of assets and liabilities. 
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Appendix 
Maturity Profile —- Liquidity 
Head of Account Classification into time buckets 
AoOutflows 
1. Capilat, Resei^ ves and Surplus 
2. Demand Deposits Current and 
Savings Bank Deposits) 
3. Term Deposits 
4. Certificates of Deposit, Borro-
wings and Bonds (including 
Subordinated Debt) 
5. Other Liabilities and Provisions 
i. Bills Payable 
ii. Interoffice Adjustment 
Over 5 years bucket. 
Savings Bank and Current Deposits m^y be 
classified into volatile and core portions. 
Savings Bank (10%) and Current (15%) 
Deposits are generally withdrawable on 
demand. This portion may be treated as 
volatile. While volatile portion can be placed in 
the first time bucket, i.e. 1-14 days, the core 
portion may be placed in over 1-3 years 
bucket 
The above classification of Savings Bank and 
Current Deposits is only a benchmark. Banks 
which are better equipped to estimate the 
behavioral pattern, rolUln and roll-out, 
embedded options, etc. on the basis, of past 
data/empirical studies could classify them in 
the appropriate buckets, I.e. behavioral 
maturity instead of contractual maturity, 
subject to the approval of the Board/Auco. 
Respective maturity buckets. Banks which are 
better equipped to estimate the'behavioral 
pattern, roll-In and roll-out, embedded options, 
etc. on the basis of past data/empirical studies 
could classify the retail deposits In the 
appropriate buckets on the basis of behavioral 
maturity rather than residual maturity, 
l-lowever, the wholesale deposits should be 
shown under respective maturity buckets. 
Respective maturity buckets. Where cali/put 
options are built into the issue structure of any 
instrument/s, the call/put date/s should be 
reckoned as the maturity date/s and the 
amount should be shown in the respective 
time buckets. 
i. The core component whidi could 
reasonably be estimated on the basis of 
past date and behavioral pattern may be 
shown under over 1-3 years time bucket. 
The balance amount may be placecl In 1-14 
days bucket. 
ii. The net credit balance may be shown in 1-
14 days bucket. 
Head of Account Classification into time buckets 
iV. 
Provisions otiier tiian for loan 
loss and depreciation in 
investments 
Other Liabilities 
6. i. Export Refinance - Availed 
iii. Respective buckets depending on the 
purpose. 
iv. Respective maturity buckets. Items not 
representing cash payables (i.e., income 
received in advance, etc.) may be placed in 
over 5 years bucket. 
Respective maturity buckets of underlying 
Export Refinance - Unavailed assets 1-14 days bucket. 
B. Inflows 
1. Cash 
2. Balances v/ith RBI 
Balances with other Banks 
i. Current Account 
ii. Money at Call and Short 
Notice, Term Deposits and 
other placements 
4. Investments (Net of Provisions.) 
i. Approved securities 
ii. Corporate debentures and 
bonds, psu bonds, cos and 
cps, Redeemable preference 
shares. Units of Mutual Funds 
(close-ended), etc. 
iii. Shares/Units of Mutual Funds 
(open-ended) 
iv. Investments in 
Subsidiaries/Joint Ventures 
V. Securities in the Trading Book 
1-14 days bucket. 
While the excess balance over the required 
CRR/SLR may be shown under 1-14 days 
bucket, the Statutory Balances may be 
distributed amongst various time buckets 
corresponding to the maturity profile of DTL 
with a time lag of 14 days. 
i. Non-withdrawable portion on account of 
stipulations of minimum balances may be 
shown under 1-3 years bucket and the 
remaining balances may be shown under 1-
14 days bucket. 
ii. Respective maturity buckets. 
i. Respective maturity buckets excluding the 
amount required to be reinvested to 
maintain SLR corresponding to the DTL profile 
in various time buckets. 
ii. Respective maturity buckets. Investments 
classified as NPAS should be shown under 3-
6 years bucket (sub-standard or over 5 
years bucket (doubtful). 
iii. Over 5 years bucket. 
iv. Over 5 years bucket. 
V. 1-14 days, 15-28 days and 29-90 days 
according to defeasance periods. 
Provisions may be netted from the gross investments provided provisions are held security-wise. 
OlhcpMise prov^sions ^ houJd. be shown \\\ over 3 years bucket. 
Head of Account Classification into time buckets 
5. Advances (Performing) 
i. Bills Purchased and 
Discoiintod (includinc) l)ills 
under DUPN) 
li. Cash Credit/Overdraft 
(including TOD) and Demand 
Loan con'iponent oi VVoikino 
Capital 
iii. Term Loans 
NPAs (Net of provisions, interest 
suspense and claims received 
from ECGC/DICGC) 
i. Sub-standard 
ii. Doubtful and Loss 
Fixed Assets 
Other Assets 
i. Interoffice Adjustn'ient 
Leased Assets 
i. Re!5pective maturity buckets. 
ii. Banks should undertake a study at 
behavioral and seasonal pattern of 
availments based on outstandings and the 
core and volatile portion should be 
identified. While the volatile portion could 
be shown in the near-term maturity 
buckets, the core portion may be shov\/n 
under over 1-3 years bucket. 
iii. Interim cash flows may be shown under 
respective maturity buckets. 
i. Over 3-5 years bucket, 
ii. Over 5 years bucket. 
Over 5 years bucket. 
The net debit balance may be shown in 1-14 
days bucket. Intangible assets and assets not 
representing cash receivables may be shown 
in over 5 years bucket. 
Interim cash flows may be shown under 
respective maturity buckets. 
C. Contingent Liabilities/Lines of Credit committed/available and other 
Inflows/Outflows 
1. i. Lines of Credit committed from 
Institutions 
ii. Unavailed portion of Cash 
Credit/Overdraft/Demand loan 
component of Working Capital 
limits (outflow) 
2. Letters of Credit/Guarantees 
(outflow) 
i. 1-14 days bucket. 
ii. Banks should undertake a study of the 
behavioral and seasonal pattern of 
potential availments in the accounts and 
-the amounts so arrived at may be shown 
under relevant maturity buckets up to 12 
morths. 
Devolvement of Letters of Credit/Guarantees, 
initially entails cash outflows. Thus, historical 
trend analysis ought to be conducted on the 
devolvements and the amounts so arrived at in 
respect of outstanding letters of 
credit/guarantees (Net of Margins) should be 
distributed amongst various time buckets. The 
assets created out of devolvements may be 
-shown under respective maturity buckets on 
the basis of probable recovery dates. 
Head of Account Classirication into time buckets 
3. Repos/Bills Rediscounted Respective maturity buckets. 
(DUPN)/Swaps INR/USD, maturing 
forex forward contracts, etc. 
(outflow/inflow) 
4. Interest payable/receivable Respective maturity buckets 
(outflow/inflow) - Accrued interest 
which are appearing in the books 
on the reporting day 
Note: 
i. Liability on account of event cash flows, i.e. shortfall in CRR balance on reporting Fridays, 
wage settlement, capital expenditure, etc. which are known to the banks and any other 
contingency may be shown under respective maturity buckets. 
ii. All overdue liabilities may be placed in the 1-14 days bucket. 
iii. Interest and in.stalmcnts from a l^vances and investments, which are overdue for less than 
one month may be placed in the 3-6 months bucket. Further, interest and instalments due 
(before classificaiion as N'P,\S) n.ay be placed in the 6-12 months bucket without the grace 
period of one month if the earlier receivables remain uncollected. 
D. Financing of Gap 
In case the negative gap exceeds the prudential limit of 20 per cent of .outflows. (1-
14 days and 15-28 days) the bank may show by way of a footnote as to how it 
proposes to finance the gap to bring the mismatch within the prescribed limits. The 
gap can be financed from market borrov/ings (call/term), bills rediscounting, repos 
and deployment of foreign currency resources after conversion into rupees 
(unswapped foreign currency funds), etc. 
Appendix 
Interest Rate Sensitivity 
Head of Accounts Rate sensibility and time bucket 
Liabilfties 
1. Capital, Reserves and Surplus 
2. Current Deposits 
3. Savings Bank Deposits 
4. Term Deposits and Certificates 
of Deposit 
5. Borrov/ings - Fixed 
6, Borrowings - Floating 
7. Borrowingo - Zero Coupon 
8. Borrowings from RBI 
9. Refinances from other agencies 
10. Other Liabilities and Provisions 
i. Bills Payable 
li. Interoffice Adjustment 
ill. Provisions 
iv. Others 
11. Repos/Bills Red.iscounted 
(DUPN), Swaps (Buy/Sell), etc. 
Assets 
1. Cash 
2. Balance with RBI 
Non-sensitive. 
Non-sensitive. 
Sensitive to the extent of interest paying (core) 
portion. This may be included in the 3-6 months 
bucket. The non-interest paying portion may be 
shown in non-sensitive bucket. Where banl^ s 
can estimate the future behaviour/sensitivity of 
current/savings bank deposits to changes in 
market variables, the sensitivity so estimated 
could be shown under appropriate time buckets. 
Sensitive and reprices on maturity. The amounts 
should be distributed to different buckets on the 
basis of remaining maturity. However, in case of 
floating term deposits, the amounts may be 
shown under the time bucket when deposits 
contractually become due for repricing. 
Sensitive and repricas on maturity. The amounts 
should be distributed to different buckets on the 
basis of remaining maturity. 
Sensitive and reprices when interest rate is 
reset. The amounts should be distributed to the 
appropriate bucket which refers to the repricing 
date. 
Sensitive and reprices on maturity. The amounts 
should be distributed to the respective maturity 
buckets. 
Uptol month bucket. 
a. Feed Rale: As per respective maturity. 
b. Floating Rate: Reprices when interest rate is 
reset. 
i Non-sensitive. 
ii Non-sensitive. 
iii Non-sensitive, 
iv Non-sensitive. 
Reprices only on maturity and should be 
distributed to the respective maturity buckets. 
Non-sensitive. 
Interest earning portion may be shown in 3-6 
months bucket. The balance amount is non-
sensitive. 
Head of Accounts Rate sensibility and time bucket 
5. 
6. 
Balances with other Banks 
i. Current Account 
ii. Money at Call and Short 
Notice, Term Deposits and 
other placements 
Investments (Performing) 
i. Fixed Rate/Zero 
Coupon 
ii Floating Rate 
Shares/Units of Mutual Funds 
Advances (Performing) 
i. Bills Purchased and 
Discounted (including bills 
under DUPN) 
ii. Cash Credits/Overdrafts 
(including TODS)/Loans 
repayable on Demand and 
Term Loans 
i. Non-sensitive. 
ii. Sensitive on maturity. 
The amounts should be distributed to the 
respective maturity buckets. 
i. Sensitive on maturity. 
ii. Sensitive at the next repricing date. 
Non-sensitive. 
i. Sensitive on maturity. 
ii. Sensitive only when PLR/risk premium is 
changed. Of late, frequent changes in PLR 
have been noticed. Thus, each bank should 
foresee the direction of interest rate 
movements of funding options and capture 
the amounts in the respective maturity 
buckets which coincides with the time taken 
by banks to effect changes in PLR in 
response to changes in market interest rates. 
7. NPA (Advances and 
Investments)* 
1. Sub-standard 
ii. Doubtful and Loss 
8. Fixed Assets 
9. Oth^r Assets 
i. irfieroffice Adjustment 
ii. Leased Assets 
iii. Others 
10. Reverse Repos, Swaps 
i. Over 3-5 years bucket. 
ii. Over 5 years bucket. 
Non-sensitive. 
i. Non-sensitive. 
ii. Sensitive on cash flows. The amounts should 
bo distributed to the respective maturity 
buckets corresponding to the cash flow 
dates. 
iii. Non-sensitive. 
Sensitive on maturity. 
(Sell/Buy), Bills Rediscounted 
(DUPN) 
11. Other products (Interest Rate) 
i. Swaps 
ii. Other Derivatives 
i. Sensitive and should be distributed under 
different buckets with reference to maturity. 
ii. Should be suitably classified as and when 
Introduced. 
Amounts to be shown net of provisions. 
Name of the Bank 
Statement of Structural L 
-
M4 
days 
OUTFLOWS 
1. Capital 
2. Reserves & Surplus 
3. Deposits XXX 
i Current Deposits 
ii. Savings Bank 
Deposits 
lii. Term Depofits 
IV. Certificates of 
Deposit 
4. Borrowings xxx 
i. Call and Short 
Notice 
ii. Interbank (Term) 
ii. Refinances 
iv. Others (specify) 
5. Other Liabilities 
& Provisions xxx 
i. Bills Payable 
ii. Interoffice 
Adjustment 
iii. Provisions 
iv. Others 
6. Lines of Credit 
committed to xxx 
i. Institutions 
ii. Customers 
7. Unavailed portion 
of Cash Credit/ 
Overdraft/Demand 
Loan component 
of Working Capital 
8. Letters of Credit/ 
Guarantees 
9. Repos 
10. Bills Rediscounted (DUPN) 
11. Swaps (Buy/Sell)/ 
maturing forwards 
12. Interest payable 
Annexure 
iquidity as on 
16-28 29 Overs 
days days to months 
3 months and 
up to 
6 months 
xxx xxx xxx 
xxx xxx xxx 
xxx xxx xxx 
xxx xxx xxx 
1 
(Amounts in Crores of Rupees) 
Residual 
Over 6 Over 
months 1 year 
and and 
up to up to 
1 year 3 years 
xxx xxx 
xxx xxx 
xxx xxx 
xxx xxx 
Maturity 
Over Over Total 
3 years 5 years 
and 
up to 
5 years 
xxx xxx xxx 
xxx xxx xxx 
xxx xxx 
xxx xxx 
13. Others (specify) 
A. Total outflows 
INFLOWS 
1. Cash 
2. Balances with RBi 
3. Balances with 
other Banks xxx xxx 
1. Current Account 
ii. Money at Call and 
Short Notice, Term 
Deposits and other 
Placements 
4. Investments (inclu-
ding those under 
Repos but excluding 
Reverse Repos) 
5. Advances (Performing) xxx xxx 
i. Bills Purchased 
and Discounted 
(including bills 
under DUPN) 
ii. Cash Credits, 
Overdrafts and 
Loans repayable 
on demand 
iii. Term Loans 
6. NPAs (Advances , 
and Investments) 
7. Fixed Assets ' 
8. Other Assets xxx xxx 
i. Interoffice 
Adjustment 
ii. Leased Assets 
iii. Others 
9. Reverse Repos 
10. Swaps (Sell/Buy)/ 
maturing forwards 
11. Bills Rediscounted (DUPN) 
12. Interest receivable 
13. Committed Lines 
of Credit 
14. Export Refinance 
from RBI 
XXX 
xxx 
XXX 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
, 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
xxx 
j 
xxx 
xxx 
15. Others (Specif/) 
B. Total Inflows 
0. Mismatch (B-A) 
D. Cumulative Mismatch 
E. CasVotoA 
Net provisions. Interest suspense and claims received from ECG/DICGC. 
Annexure II 
Name of the Bank 
Statement of Interest Rate Sensitivity as on 
(Amounts in Crores of Rupees) 
Interest Rate Sensi t iv i ty 
Up to 1-3 Over 3 Over 6 Over Over Over 5 Non- Total 
1 months months months 1 year 3 years years Sensitive 
month up to G and and and 
months up to up to up to 
1 year 3 years 5 years ; 
LIABILITIES 
1 • Capital 
2. Reserves fk Surplus 
3. Deposits XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
Current Deposits 
li. Savings 
Bank Deposit 
iii. Term Deposits 
iv. Certificates 
of Deposit 
Borrowings XXX XX'X XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
i. Call and Short 
Notice 
JL Interbank (Tbrm) 
iii. Refinances 
iv. Others (Specify) 
5. Other Liabilities XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 
— » — 
XXX XXX 
& Provisions 
Bills Payable 
ii. Interoffice 
Adjustment 
Provisions 
iv. Others 
6. Repos 
7. Bills Rediscounted 
(DUPN) 
8. Swaps (Buy/Sell) 
9. Others (specify) 
A. Total Liabilities 
ASSETS 
1. Cash 
2. Balances with RBI 
3. Balances with x x x x x x x x x x 3 0 < x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
other Banks 
i. Current Account 
ii. Money at Call and 
Short Notice, Term 
Deposits and 
other placements 
4. Investments (inclu-
ding those under 
Repos but excluding 
Reverse Repos) 
5. Advances 
(Performing) xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 
i. Bills Purchased 
and Discounted 
(including bills 
under DUPN) 
ii Cash Credits, 
Overdrafts and 
Loans repayable 
on Demand 
iii. Term Loans 
NPAs (Advances ^ 
and Investmtjnts) 
7. Fixed Assets 
8. Other Assets x x x x x x x x x xxx xxx xxx x x x x x x x x x 
i. Interoffice 
adjustment 
ii. Leased Assets 
iii. Others 
9. Reverse Repos 
10. Sv^aps (Sell/Buy) 
11. Bills Rediscounted 
(DUPN) 
12. Others (specify) 
B. Total Assets 
C. Gap(B.A) 
Other Products x x x x x x x x x xxx x x x ' x x x xxx xxx xxx. 
(Interest Rate) 
I. FRAS 
ii. Swaps 
ill. Futures 
Options 
D. Total Other Products 
E. NetGap(C-D) 
F. Cumulative Gap 
G. EasyotoB 
Annexure III 
Name of the Bank 
Statement of Short-term Dynamic Liquidity as on 
(Amounts in Crores of Rupees) 
A. Outflows 
1. Net increase in loans and advances 
2. Net increase in investments: 
i. Approved securities ' 
il. Money mari<et instruments (other 
than Treasury Bills) 
ill. Bonds/Debentures/Shares 
iv. Others 
3. Interbank obligations 
4. Off-balance sheet items (Repos, 
swaps, bills discounted, etc.) 
5. Others 
Total Outflows 
B. Inflows 
1. Net cash position 
2. Net incraase in deposits (less Cr?R 
obligations) 
3. Interest on investments 
4. interbank claims 
5. Refinance eligibility (Export credit) 
6. Off-balance sheet items (Reverse 
repos, swaps, bills discounted, etc.) 
7. Others 
Toxal Inflows 
C, Mismatch (B - A) 
D. Cumulative mismatch 
E. C as a % to total outflow 
1-14 days 15-28 days 29-90 days 
APPENDIX 4 
ALM RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES GLOBALLY 
ALM RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES GLOBALLY 
The liberalisation, globalisation and technological advancement have revolutionised the 
contour of banking across the world. Globally, especially In the developed countries, 
advanced ALM risk management practices are in vogue. In the following 
paragraphs, the various product developed and their wide spread usage have 
been discussed. 
1.1 CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT 
During the last 5-7 years, there have been extensive changes in risk management 
strategies, derivatives products and regulatory requirements. The emergence of Basel II 
Capital Accord, and emergence of derivatives markets ttave charged the land scope of 
credit risk management. 
The focus of credit risk management, has been related to a function of three variables: 
a) the value of the position exposed to default (credit risk exposure), b) the proportion of 
the value that would be suffered in the event of a default and c) the likelihood of a default 
occurring. 
1.1.1 Credit Risk Assessment 
Several ways of measurement and analysis of exposures are used for determining the 
extent of the credit risk inherent in a financial instrument or portfolio of financial 
instruments viz. :-
• Current exposure associated with a derivative instrument lies In replacement 
cost, i.e. the present value of the expected future net cash flows of that 
instrument. 
• Probability analysis e.g. Monte Cario or historical simulation, option valuation 
models are used to estimate the potential exposure (whicli is an estimate of 
future replacement cost of a derivative transaction). 
• Expected exposure i.e. the most likely potential exposure, is found by taking the 
mean of all possible replacement costs (weighted by probability); the 
replacement cost in any outcome is taken as being equal to the maric-to-maricet 
present value if positive, and zero if negative. 
The worst case exposure, is also calculated, which gives an estimate of the 
exposure that might be expected if the maricets were to move through an amount 
dictated by a specified confidence interval. 
From the expected or worst case exposures of an instrument calculated over 
time, the resulting graph renewals a credit risk exposure profile. The highest 
point on the profile indicates the worst expected exposure generated by the 
instrument. 
Credit derivatives are instruments serving to trade credit risk by isolating the 
credit risk from the underiying transac^ons. The emergence of credit derivative 
instruments is a major innovation because, unlike other risks, such as market or 
interest rate risk, there was no way, until they appeared, to hedge credit risk. 
QPAGE DID 
Credit derivatives allovt/ us to separate trade in the credit risl< of assets from trade in the 
assets themselves since, like other classical derivatives, it is possible to trade them 
without trading the reference assets. Another salient feature of credit derivatives is that 
they are off-balance sheet and do not necessitate entering directly into loan 
arrangements or purchases of bonds, nor do they necessitate the prior agreement of the 
issuer of the reference asset. So many synthetic securitisations, structured with credit 
derivatives, have been developed in Europ(3. 
Wide range of instruments to manage credit risk have been in usage, as mentioned 
below. 
1.1.2 Swap. Option and Forward instruments 
Credit Default Swap. For protection related to a credit event on underlying credit 
obligation, credit default swap is commonly used. In a bilateral contract of credit default 
swap, a seller of credit risk (protection buyer) pays a premium to the buyer of the credit 
risk (protection seller). If during the life of the credit default swap, a credit event occurs, 
the protection seller will pay specified amount to protection buyer. Six credit events have 
been defined by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) viz. 
bankruptcy, failure to pay, restructuring in terms of an obligation, obligation acceleration, 
obligation default and repudiation/ moratorium. 
Basket Credit Default Swap. A credit default swap, which transfers credit risk with 
respect to multiple reference entities. For each reference entity, an applicable notional 
amount is specified, with the notional of the basket swap equal in the aggregate of the 
specified notional amounts. Various types of basket credit default swap include linear 
basket credit default swaps, first-to-default basket credit default swaps and first- loss 
basket credit default swaps. 
Total (Rate of) Return Swap. This credit derivative is distinct from a credit default 
swap, in that floating payments are based on the total economic performance of a 
specified asset and are not contingent upon occurrence of a credit event. 
Zero Coupon Swap. An off-market swap in which either or both of the counter parties 
makes one payment at maturity. Usually it is the fixed rate payments only that are 
deferred. The part not receiving payment until maturity incurs a greater credit risk than it 
would with an ordinary swap. 
Credit Linked Note(CLN). It is a collateralised credit default swap. A CLN pays a 
coupon and redeem at par provided that no aedit events have occunred in the reference 
entity/ obligation(s). On occun^ence of a credit event, the note is redeemed for an 
amount equal to par minus the loss on the defaulted credit. CLN may be issued directly 
by a financial institution or from a collateralised Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). 
Capital Protected Credit Linked Note. A credit-linked note, where the principal is partly 
or fully guaranteed to be repaid at maturity. In a 100 per cent principal- guaranteed credit 
linked note-, only the coupons are paid under the note. Such a structure can be 
analysed as a) a treasury strip and b) & stream of risky annuities representing the 
coupons, purchased from the note proceeds minus the cost of treasury strip; 
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Deleveraged Floating Rate Note (FRN). An instrument developed in US on the back of 
a positive yield curve to increase the yield of a floating rate assets by Indexing them to 
higher yielding long term fixed rate bonds. The underiyings are nomnally constant 
maturity treasuries. The rates are called deleveraged FRNs because the investor 
receives a portion (usually 50 per cent) of the reference rate of those securities plus a 
fixed spread (which increases the longer the FRN's maturity). 
Synthetic Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO). It uses credit derivatives to transfer 
credit risk in a portfolio. In such a transaction, the originating bank transfers the risk of a 
designated reference portfolio by buying protection, achieving regulatory (or economic) 
capital relief, while the assets themselves remain on the balance-sheet. This risk is then 
trenched up. The majority (around 90 per cent) of the underiying credit risk transfenred 
via a superior senior credit default swap. For the remaining 10 per cent, the bank buys 
protection from a SPV, which then issues notes. Credit events are settled by liquidating 
the collateral. 
This is in contrast to a traditional CDO, which is typically structured as a securitisation 
with ownership of the assets transferred to a separate Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)-
The assets are funded with the proceeds of debt and equity issued by the vehicle. 
Balance sheet synthetic CDOs are typically used by banks to manage risk capital and 
are easier to execute than traditional CDOs. 
Credit Option. These are put or call option on the price of either a) a floating rate note, 
bond, or loan, or b) an asset r.wap package, consisting of a credit-risky instrument and a 
corresponding derivative contract that exchange the cash flows of that instrument for a 
floating rate cash flow stream; typically these are of six months Libor plus a spread. 
Credit Spread Option. The underiying for a spread option is the price differential 
between two assets (a difference option) or the same assets at different times or places. 
An example of the financial difference option is the credit spread option, the underiying 
for which is the credit spread between two debt issues, derived from the relative credit 
rating of the two issues. The option will pay out the difference between the credit spread 
at maturity, for which a strike spread is detemiined at the outset. 
Credit Spread Forward is used as cash settled fonward contract with settlement 
amounts based on the credit spread between two predetemiined debt issues on the 
maturity dates. 
1.1.3 Credit Risk Models 
The ongoing developments of the Basel Committee's regulatory framewori< and the 
success of VAR-based models of mari<et risk have created lot of enthusiasm in credit 
risk modeling. 
The fact that default probabilities cannot be observed and the con-elation between 
defaults are difficult to measure, hence it is difficult to aggregate credit risk. Therefore, 
the robust modeling of credit risk is a difficult task than the maricet risk. 
Despite these constraints, a number of commercial models for portfolio credit risk are 
available. These are based on one of the two fundamental models, that are equity or 
DPAGE DSD 
ratings based. Merton type models treat the value of a credit exposure as a derivative 
written on tiie underlying assets. From the changes in the equity value, the volatility and 
correlation structures are the deduced. The credit ratings based models assume that 
credit risk exposures are defined by credit ratings. Transitions between different ratings 
and con'elations between ratings transitions are then modeled. 
A few popular credit risk models, used are as under:-
" Portfolio Manager by KMV Corporation. This product uses Merton/Options based 
approach to calculating default probabilities. 
• Credit Metrices by JP Morgan Chase. It uses Monte Carlo simulations to 
measure portfolio loss distribution at the horizon date. Each obligor is assigned a 
credit rating and a transition matrix Is used to detennine the probabilities that the 
obligor's credit rating will be upgraded or downgraded, or that it will default. The 
credit instruments are then repriced under each simulated outcome. 
• Credit risk by CSFB. This is based on mathematical models. Default risk is a 
series of continuous random variables, instead of an absolute level. This product 
requires lesser amount of data than the other two. 
Black-Scholes Model. This was developed by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in 
1973. In its simplest style it offers a solution to pricing European-style options on assets 
with interim cash payouts over the life of option. The model calculates the theoretical or 
fault value for the option by constructing an instantaneously risk-less hedge that is, one 
whose perfonnance is the min'or image of the option payout. The portfolio of option and 
hedge can then be used to earn the risk -free rate of return. 
The central to the model is the assumption, that the maricet returns are nomially 
distributed (i.e. have lognonnal prices), that there are no transaction costs, that volatility 
and interest rate remains constant throughout the life of the option, and that the maricet 
follows a diffusion process. The model has five major inputs a) the risk-free interest rate, 
b) the option's strike price, c) the price of the underiying, d) the option's maturity and e) 
the volatility assumed. Since the first four are usually determined by mari<et, option 
traders tend to trade the implied volatility of the options. 
This is also known as on-factor model, where in the model incorporates only one cause 
of uncertainty or variable: the future price. 
1.1.4 Securitlsatlon 
As a measure of credit risk transfer, securitisation has been used word-wide more 
particulariy the advanced ecc nomies. The basic premise of securitisation is conversion 
of assets into securities, which can be tracked more easily and cheaply than the 
underiying assets and generate better returns. Debt securitisation performs the 
important function of bringing together the lending expertise of commercial banks and 
financial institutions and the long temi funds available with the investment institutions. 
Synthetic Securitisation. The technique replicates the credit risk transfer benefits of a 
traditional cash securitisation, and Includes reduced cost, ease of execution and 
retention of on-balance sheet funding advantage. 
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1.2 MARKET RISKS 
The market risks entailing interest rate risks, liquidity risks, currency risks and equity 
risks, are core to the ALM of a bank and have been dealt in the following paragraphs. 
1.3 INTEREST RATE RISK MANAGEMENT 
Interest rate risk management requires addressing two types of interest rate risks: the 
first risk is that of interest income siiifts due to interest rate movements, given that 
all balance sheet' assets and liabilities generate revenues and costs directly related to 
interest rate references and a second risk results from options embedded in banking 
products, such as the prepayment option of individual borrowers, who can renegotiate 
the rate of their loans when the interest rate decline. 
These two risks, although related, need different techniques. The risk management use 
two target variables: the interest income and the Net Present Value (NPV) of assets 
minus liabilities. The stream of future interest incomes varies in line with the NPV. The 
main difference is that NPV captures the entire stream of future cash flows generated by 
the portfolio, while the interest income relates to one or several periods. The NPV 
necessitates specific techniques. 
There is wide range of instruments based on swap, option, fonvard rate agreement etc., 
to manage interest rate risk. 
1.3.1 Swap. Option and Forward rate Instruments 
Interest Rate Swap. It Is an agreement to exchange net future cash flows. Interest rate 
swaps, most commonly change the basis on which liabilities are paid on a specified 
principal. These are also used to transform the interest basis of assets. These provide 
users with a way of hedging the effects of changing interest rates. To illustrate, a bank 
can convert floating rate interest payments to fixed rate payments, if in the bank opinion 
the interest rate will rise (making its liabilities more expensive). 
Initially, interest rate swaps were transacted back-to-back, with a bank acting as an 
intermediary. In return for putting the differing requirements together and for taking the 
interest rate payments or credit risk, the bank took a fee, either a fixed or a small 
proportion of the interest payments. Later banks started running swap books and acted 
as principals in transactions. This necessitates for the banks to hedge the swaps they 
put on their books. 
Annuity Swap. An interest rate swap in which a series of in^egular cash flows are 
exchanged for a stream of regular cash flows of equivalent present value. 
Asset Swap. A package of a cash credit instruments and a corresponding swap that 
transfomis the cash flows of the non-par instalment (bond or loan), into a par (floating 
interest rate) structure . Asset swaps typically transform fixed rate bonds into par 
floaters, bearing a net coupon of Libor plus a spread. 
Mortage Swap. The largest mortgage swap martlet is in U.S. This is a kind of asset 
swap attached to fixed rate mortgage payments. Mortgage swaps enable flows from a 
portfolio of mortgages without taking a mortgage asset onto investor bank' assets. The 
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principal reduces if and wlien the outstanding mortgage principal reduces (which can 
occur if the mortgage holder pays off the mortgage or defaults). Such swaps are 
complicated because although the fixed-rate receiver receives a higher rate than on a 
normal swap, the amortization of the principal is not just a function of interest rates. 
Basis Swap. An interest rate basis swap is one in which two streams of floating rate 
payments are exchanged. This is also known as floating-floating swap. 
Basket Swap. A swap in which the floatinc] leg is based on the returns on a basket of 
underlying assets. The fixed leg is usually (but not always) a reference interest rate such 
as Libor, plus or minus a spread. 
Blended Interest Rate Swap. It is a technique that involves combining two interest rate 
swaps to produce a more attractive overall rate. It involves at least two transactions. To 
illustrate, if a counter party fixes its floating rate borrowing cost at 8 per cent and rate 
goes down to 5 per cent, it may do another swap with the same counter party at 5 per 
cent and combine the two to create a rate closer to the market. 
Callable Swap. An interest rate swap in which the fixed rate payer has the right to 
temiinate the swap after a certain time if rates fall. It is often done in conjunction with 
callable debt issues where an issuer is more concerned with the cost of debt than the 
maturity. 
The embedded option is, in effect, a swaption sold by the fixed rate receiver which 
enables the fixed rate payer to receive the same high fixed rate for the remaining years 
of the swap in the event that interest rates fall. The fixed rate receiver under the 
swaption offsets the fixed rate paid under the original swap effectively canceling the 
swap. 
In some definitions of a callable swap, the fixed rate receiver has the right to terminate 
the swap-hence, also known as cancellable swap. 
Puttable Swap. The puttable swap is the opposite of a callable swap. The fixed rate 
payee is effectively sold a swaption to the floating rate payee, who receives a higher 
fixed rate in compensation. 
In this interest rate swap, the fixed rate payer has the right to temiinate the contract after 
a specific period. Should the interest rates fall, the swap can thus be put back to the 
fixed receiver. This is also known as cancellable swap. 
Capped Swap. An interest rate swap with an embedded cap in which the floating 
payments of the swap are opped at a ceiain level. A floating rate payer can thereby 
limit its exposure to raising inierest rates. 
Index Amortising Swap (IAS). This is widely used by US regional banks, in their assets 
liability management. By using it, banks have been able to obtain the negative convexity 
of a mortgage baked security and avoid the risk of prepayments due to changes in 
consumer sentiment. 
In IAS, principle amortises on the back of an index, such as Libor or constant maturity 
treasuries. The fixed rate receiver effectively grants an option to the fixed rate payer to 
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amortise the swap. The option is triggered in increased rate movements after an initial 
locl<-out period. The notional principle amortises as rates fall or remains constant if rates 
remain the same. In return for granting the option, the fixed rate receiver gets as current 
fixed rates. 
The fixed rate receiver is exposed to both falling and rising rates. If rates fall, there is the 
possibility at each interest date that some or all of the swap will be temninated, creating 
a reinvestment risk. If rates rise, the swap may run to maturity, providing meager 
income. 
An IAS fixed rate receiver sells volatility to the payer for an enhanced yield. So the lower 
the volatility of the Index, the lower the option value and yield pick-up. A subsequent fall 
in volatility benefits the receiver because of the likelihood that the swap will amortise 
decreases. 
Reverse Index Amortising Swap, in this interest rate swap, the payments are linked to 
an index e.g. Libor or constant maturity treasuries, and increase if that index declines. It 
Therefore, the swap exhibits positive convexity. Receiving fixed in a reverse index 
amortising swap (reverse IAS) provides a hedge for instruments (such as mortgage 
swaps) that amortise as interest rates decline It is important to ensure that the indexes 
on which amortization or acaeting schedules are based are highly correlated. Unlike a 
conventional IAS, the fixed receiver of a reverse IAS is buying volatility (sometimes 
referred as optionality), which offsets the short option position of a mortgage portfolio. 
Periodic Resetting Swap. It is an interest rate swap in which the floating rate payments 
are an average of the floating rates that have prevailed since the last payments, as in a 
semi-annual swap, where the payments are based on a weighted average of monthly 
rates. This is also known as average rate swap. 
Reversible Swap. An interest rate swap in which one side has an option to alter the 
payments basis (fixed/floating) after a certain period. This is usually achieved by 
swaption. 
Spread Lock Swap. In this kind of swap, one payment stream is referenced at a affixed 
spread over a benchmark rate such as US treasuries. 
Embedded Option. Often an interest rate option, embedded in a debt instrument that 
affects its redemption e.g. mortgage-backed securities and callable and puttable bonds. 
Moving Strike Option. An option in which the strike is reset over time, such as an 
interest rate cap in which the strike is reset for the next period at the cunrent interest rate 
plus a pre-agreed spread. 
Pay Later Option. A pay-later option refers to any option for which a premium is not 
paid at the time the option if purchased. Payment of the premium may be defenred until 
expiry, when it may be deducted from an/ pay-out (a deferred premium option), or be 
contingent on the option b i^ng exercised (contingent premium option), or passing a 
given barrier level (as in mini premium option). 
Caption. It is an option on a cap and is a type of compound option in which the 
purchaser has the right but not the obligation, to buy or sell a cap at a predetemiined 
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price on a predetermined date. Captions can be a cheap way of leveraging into tlie more 
expensive option. 
1.3.2 Collar. Floor. Cap. Corridor 
Collar Swap. It involves the simultaneous purchase of an out-of-the money call and sale 
of an out-of-the-money put (or cap and floor in the case of interest rate options).The 
premium from selling the put reduces the cost of purchasing the call. The amount saved 
depends upon on the strike rate of the two options. If the premium raised by the sale of 
the put exactly matches the cost of the call, the strategy is refereed to as a zero cost 
collar. When it is used to hedge an out right position in the underlying, this locks the 
hedger into a range of values-this hedging strategy is known as cylinder. 
Collared Floater. A floating rate note whose coupon payments are subject to an 
embedded collar. Thus the coupon Is capped at a predetennined level, so the buyer 
forsakes some upside, but also floored, offering protection from a down turn in the 
reference interest rate. 
Floor. A contract, where the seller agrees to pay to the purchaser, in return for upfront 
premium, the difference between a reference rate and an agreed strike rate, should the 
strike rate exceed the reference rate. 
Floored Floater. It guarantees a premium coupon even if the reference rate drops 
below the minimum rate. This is achieved by embedding a floor in a vanilla note. A 
floored floater protects the buyer from large decreases in the reference rate. 
Floortion. An option in a floor. The purchaser has the right, but not the obligation, to 
buy or sell a floor at a predetennined price on a predetemiined date. 
Cumulative Cap. A cumulative cap interest rate cap protects against inaeases in total 
interest expense over a specified period of time. This period of time will incorporate 
several rate settings in determining the final interest expense e.g four three-month Libor 
settings for an annual interest expense amount. 
This defers from a standard cap, which caps an absolute rate of interest in each 
circulation period. Since a cumulative cap does not provide the period-to-period 
protection of a standard cap, it is generally cheaper than the conresponding standard 
cap. 
Participating Cap. It denotes the simultaneous purchase of an out-of-the-money cap 
and the sale of a lesser amount of an in-the-money floor. Because the in-the-money floor 
is worth more, the purchaser of a participating cap sells fewer floors for a zero cost 
combination and can therefore derive some benefits if rates fall. Although the purchaser 
will not derive as much benefit if rates fall as would have been the case vinth a straight 
fonvard cap, a premium does not have to be paid. 
Pay As You Go Cap. A pay-as-you-go cap allows the buyer to pay for protection from 
upward moves in an interest rate for only as long as necessary. Usually, the holder will 
pay an initial premium (which will be small compared with the premium for a normal cap) 
and a further payment at each reset date. This is also known as an installment cap. 
The holder can cancel the cap if one feels that the protection is no longer needed. 
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A pay-as-you-go cap is useful for those who feel that caps are too expensive, that 
interest rates will eventually stabilize below the capped level or that rates are in a short-
lived spiked move. 
Interest Rate Corridor. It is composed of a long interest rate cap position and a short 
interest rate cap position. The buyer of the corridor purchases a cap with a lower strike 
while selling a second cap with a higher strike. The premium earned on the second cap 
then reduces the cost of the structure as a whole. 
The buyer of the corridor is then protected from rates rising above the first cap's strike, 
but exposed again if they rise past the second cap's strike. It is possible to limit this 
liability by selling a knock-out cap rather than a conventional cap. The structure Is the 
known as a knock-out interest rate corridor. 
1.3.3 IWodels 
Ho-Lee IModel. This was the first model that set out to model movements in the entire 
term structure of interest rate. However, since the model has a single random factor, it 
makes the simplifying assumption that the volatility structure remains constant along the 
yield curve. 
Jarrow- Morton later generalized this model, using a more general form of volatility and 
introducing continuous trading. In addition, Ho-Lee allows for the possibility of negative 
interest rates. The model was developed using a binomial tree, although closed-fomi 
solutions have now been found for discount bonds and discount options. 
Hull-White Model. It is an extension of the Yasleek model for interest rates. This model 
was developed using a trinomial lattice, although closed form solutions for European 
style options and bond prices are possible. 
Both the above models are one-factor model. 
Market Model of Interest Rate. A special case of the Heath-Jarrow-Morton model due 
to Brace, Gatrek and Muslela, In which the terni structure of interest rates is modeled in 
temis of simple Libor rates which are log normally distributed with respect to fonvard 
measure) rather than instantaneous fonwitrd rates. 
This allows the modeler to exclude the possibility of negative Interest rates from the 
model and obtain prices for caps, floors and swaptions consistent with the Black-Schloes 
framewori(. The model can be calibrated using readily available maricet data, fonvard or 
swap rates volatilities and correlations, and is particulariy suited to path dependent 
instruments. 
Multi factor Model. Multi factor models are useful for two main reasons. Firstly, they 
permit more realistic modeling, particulariy of interest rates, although they are very 
difficult to compute. Secondly, multi factor options e.g. spread options 9 popular in 
commodity maricets), have several parameters, each with independent volatilities. Also 
the correlation between the underiying must be dealt separately. 
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1.4 LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
Liquidity risl< results from size and maturity mismatches of assets and liabilities. 
Liquidity deficits malce banlcs vulnerable to marlcet liquidity risk. Liquid assets 
protect banks from market tensions because tliey are alternative source of funds for 
facing the near-temi obligations. 
Whenever assets are greater than resources, deficits appear, necessitating funding in 
the market. When the opposite occurs, the bank has available excess resources for 
lending or investing. Both deficits and e>.cesses are liquidity gaps. A time profile of 
gaps results from projected assets and liabilities at different future time points. 
A bank with long-term commitments and short-term resources generates immediate and 
future deficits. The liquidity risk results from insufficient resources, or outside funds, to 
fund the loans. The standard technique for characterizing liquidity exposure relies 
on gap time profiles, excesses or deficits of funds, starting from the maturity schedules 
of existing assets and liabilities. The following are the different approaches employed by 
the banks for managing liquidity risk:-
Static Liquidity Gaps. The gaps based on existing assets and liabilities are 'static 
gaps'. They provide the liquidity posture of the bank. 'Static gaps' are time profiles of 
future gaps under cessation of all new business, implying a progressive melt-down of the 
balance sheet. It is a common practice to focus first on the existing assets and liabilities 
to calculate the gap profile. The reasons attributed to it is that there is no need to obtain 
funds in advance for new transactions, or to invest resources that are not yet collected; 
funding the deficits or investing excesses from new business occurs when they appear 
in the balance sheet and that the dynamic gap depend on commercial uncertainties. 
Dynamic Liquidity Gaps. When new assets and liabilities, derived from commercial 
projections, cumulate with existing assets and liabilities, the gap profile changes 
completely. Both assets and liabilities, existing plus new ones, tend to increase, rather 
than amortise. This new gap is the 'dynamic gap'. 
Sometimes, future excesses or deficits of liquidity motivate eariy decisions, before they 
actually appear. It might be advisable to lock in an interest rate for these excesses and 
deficits without waiting. Such decisions depend on interest rate expectations, plus the 
bank policy with respect to interest rate risk. 
Cash Matching. Cash matching is a basic concept for the management of liquidity and 
interest rate risks. It implies that the time profiles of amortization of assets and liabilities 
are identical. The nature of interest applicable to assets and maturities might also match: 
fixed rates with fixed fixed rates, floating rates revised periodically with floating rates 
revised at the same dates using the same reference rate. In such a case , the replication 
of assets' maturities extends to interest characteristics. 
With cash matching, liquidity gaps are equal to zero. When the balance sheet amortises 
over time, it does not generate any deficit or excess of funds. Cash matching is only a 
reference. In general, deposits do not match loans. 
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Models. There are various models that discuss the suitable ratio that can be maintained 
between the cash balance and investments. Two commonly used models are the 
Baumol Model and the Miller and Onr Model. 
The cash management model of Baumol extends the economic order quantity 
concept used in Inventory management to discuss the conversion size, which influences 
the average cash holding of the fimn. This model analyses the income foregone when a 
firm holds cash balances (rather than investing the same in marketable securities), 
against the transaction costs incunred when marketable securities are converted into 
cash. 
The Miller and Orr Model considers that there will be different cash balances at 
different periods and a firm should accordingly decide on the amount and the timing for 
the transfer of funds from marketable securities to cash. 
Thus the criteria, while taking such decisions, are to increase yields on investments and 
lower the costs of borrowings. Hence, the focus is on optimization in the investment-
deposit ratio to ensure that the level of idle funds/low yield funds at any point of time are 
not so high as to cut into the profitability of the bank. 
Amortising Loans. When maturities are contractual, they can vary considerably from 
one loan to another. There are bullet loans, and others amortise progressively. 
Prepayment risk results in an effective maturity different from contractual maturity at 
origination. The effective maturity schedule is more realistic. Historical data help to 
define such effective maturities. 
Prepayment models also help. Some are simple, such as usage of constant prepayment 
ratio applicable to the overall outstanding balances. Others are more sophisticated 
because they make prepayments dependent on several variables, such as the interest 
rate differential between the loan and the maricet, or the time elapsed since origination, 
and so on. The interest income of the bank is at risk whenever a fixed rate loan is 
renegotiated at a lower rate than the original fixed rate. 
Securitisation. It is another method of imparting liquidity into the system. Securitisation 
can impart liquidity on a continuous basis and has a little or no relation to the surplus/ 
deficit balances. This is an effective way to release the funds blocked in long temi 
project financing and asset financing activities of the bank. In the process of enhancing 
liquidity, securitisation also reduces the interest rate exposure for a bank since risks 
associated with rate fluctuations will also be eliminated. 
Multiple Scenarios. Whenever the future outstanding balances are uncertain, it is 
tempting to use convention and make assumptions. The problem with such conventions 
and assumptions is that they hide risks. Making these risks explicit with several 
scenarios is a better solution. 
For instance, if the deposit balances are quite uncertain, the uncertainty can be captured 
by a set of scenarios, such as a base case plus other cases where the deposits 
balances are higher or lower. If prepayments are uncertain, multiple scenarios could 
cover high, average and low prepayment assumptions. 
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The use of multiple scenarios makes more explicit the risk with future volumes of assets 
and liabilities. The price to pay is an additional complexity. The scenarios are 
judgmental, making the approach less objective. The choices should combine multiple 
sources of uncertainty, such as volume uncertainty, prepayment uncertainty, plus the 
uncertainty of all commercial projections of new business. 
1.5 CURRENCY RISK MANAGEMENT 
The cun-ency risk is that of incuning losses due to changes in the exchange rates. 
Variations in earnings result from the indexation of revenues and charges to 
exchange rates, or of charges of the values of assets and liabilities denominated 
in foreign currencies. 
The conversion risk results from the need to convert all foreign currency-denominated 
transactions into a base reference cunrency. This risk does exist, beyond accounting 
conversion in single cunrency, if the capital base that protects the bank from losses is in 
local cunrency. A credit loss in a foreign country might result in magnified losses in 
local currency if the local currency depreciates relative 
e to the currency of the foreign exposure. 
For hedging cunrency risk, various products in usage are listed below :-
1.5.1 Currency Swaps 
Basis Swap. A aoss cunrency basis swap, in which two streams of floating rate 
payments are exchanged. 
Correlation Swap. This is often used in cun-ency mari(ets. It is an Instrument that allows 
an investor to take three volatility swaps and bet on how much one currency will move 
compared to two others. 
Cross Currency Swap. A cross cunrency swap that involves the exchange of cash flows 
in one cun-ency for those In another. Unlike single currency swaps, cross cun-ency 
swaps often require an exchange of principle (notional), at the prevailing spot rate. 
Interest rate payments are then passed back on a fixed, floating or zero basis. The 
principle is then re-exchanged at maturity at the initial spot rate. 
Differential Swap. It involves the combination of a simple Interest rate swap in the 
denominating currency and a quantised swap denominated in the same cunrency but 
referenced to a different cun-ency. To illustrate, a counter party receives euro six-month 
Libor, denominated in euros plus a spread approximately equal to the difference 
between the fixed rates of the simple swap and quantified swap as quoted on the same 
basis e.g. semi-annual 350. 
Linear Fx-linked Swap. An interest rate swap with a quasi-fixed coupon that varies with 
the movement of a chosen spot foreign exchange rate over the life of the deal. These 
swaps can be structured to pay a higher (or lower) coupon if a given currency weakens 
(or strengthens) after the outset of the deal. The observation dates for the Forex 
component coincide with the Libor reset date for coupon calculation. 
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1.5.2 Currency Options 
Average Option. The purchaser of an average option (average price, average strike, 
average hybrid, average ratio) receives a pay-out which depends on the average value 
of the underlying. The average can be calculated in a numljer of ways (arithmetic or 
geometric, weighted or simple) from the spot rate on a predetennined series of dates 
(usually official fixing rates). 
An average rate (also known as average price) option is a cash settled option with a 
predetemnined (i.e. fixed) strike which is exercised at expiry against the average value of 
the underiying over the option's life. In general, hedging with an average option is 
cheaper than using a portfolio of vanilla options, since the averaging process offeets 
high values with low ones and therefore lowers volatility and premium. Average rate 
options are also known as Asian options, are particulariy popular in cunrency maricets. 
In contrast, the strike for an average strilce option is not fixed until the end of the 
averaging period which is typically much before the expiry. When the strike is set, the 
option is exercised against the prevailing spot rate. Unlike average price options, 
average strike options may be either cash or physically settled. 
In the case of an average hybrid option (also known as average-in/ average-out 
option), both the strike and settlement price of the options are detennined using the 
average, where the strike averaging period typically precedes the settlement price 
averaging period. 
For the average ratio option, both the strike and settlement price of the option are 
detennined using the average as in the hybrid case. The final payoff is detennlned by 
comparing the ratio of settlement price to strike and a fixed per cent strike. 
Joint Option. An option on an underiying, often a stock index, denominated in a second 
currency. Unlike a guaranteed exchange rate option, in which exchange rates are fixed, 
the purchaser of a joint call option benefits from upside in the currency in which the reset 
is originally denominated. 
Ladder Option. A path dependent option, most often based on an equity index or a 
foreign exchange rate. The pay-out of a ladder option increases stepwise as the 
underiying trades upwards (or downwards) through a specified barrier levels (the 'rungs' 
of the ladder). Each time the underiying trades through a new barrier level, the option 
pay-out is locked in at the higher levels. 
Spread Option. An example of the spread option is cross-currency cap, where the 
underiying is the spread between interest rates in two different cunrencies. 
Variable Option /Swap. An option or swap, where the notional value is linked to the 
underiying rate or asset price. Usually changes in the notional value will be directly 
proportional to changes in the underiying price i.e. they both decrease or increase 
together. An example using an option is the case where for hedging greater foreign 
currency revenue, it would require purchase of a variable currency option for this 
purpose. 
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1.5.3 Forward instruments 
Currency Forward. An agreement to exchange a specified amount of one currency for 
another at a future date at a certain rate. The exchange of currencies is priced so as to 
allow no risk-free arbitrage. It means that pricing is not a market estimate of the spot rate 
at that date, but is made according to the two cunencies' respective interest rates. 
Fonvards are more appropriate than options if a bank has a strong directional view of 
expected movements in exchange rates. But certainty is rare and hedging entirely with 
foHA^ ards may leave a bank locked into unfavourable exchange rates. Unlike options, 
forwards do not enable to take advantage of favourable currency movements. The 
purchaser of a fonward, unlike the purchaser of a future, carries the credit risk of the 
party from which it makes the purchase. Since the contracts are not reassignable, it is 
difficult to reduce this risk. 
Break Forward/ Capped Forward. A strategy that involves buying a synthetic off-
mari<et currency fonvard ( buying and selling a put and a call at the same strike price) 
and the simultaneous purchase of another option, allowing a purchaser to benefit from 
favourable exchange rate movements. The transaction is usually constructed for zero 
cost because the premium from the off- market forward pays for the option. 
Forward Spread Agreement. A contract in which counter parties contract into a spread 
between two variable rates, usually Libor, applied to a nominal amount of one currency. 
The settlement amount will be the spread between prevailing Libor minus the contracted 
spread. Differential swaps are therefore a string of fooA/ard spread agreements. 
Non-Deliverable Forward. Non-deliverable forward contracts (NDFs), also called dollar 
settled foHA/ards, are synthetic fonvards which entail no exchange of currencies at 
maturity. Instead, settlement is made in US dollars, based on the difference between 
the agreed contract rate at inception and a maricet reference at maturity. 
NDFs can be used to establish a hedge or take a position in one of a growing group of 
emerging maricet cun^encies where conventional fonvard maritets either do not exit or 
may not be accessible. As offshore instruments, NDFs offer the advantage of eliminating 
convertibility risk, since no emerging market cunrencies are exchanged at maturity. 
Participating Forward. It is the simultaneous purchase of a call option (put option) and 
sale of a put (call) at the same strike price, usually for zero cost The option purchased 
must be out-of-the-money and the option sold (to finance the option purchased) is for a 
smaller amount and will be in-the-money. 
Synthetic Agreement Fonivard Exchange (SAFE). SAFEs are the generic tenn for 
Forward Exchange Agreement (FXAs) and Exchange Rate Agreements (ERAs), and 
were developed by Midland Montago and Barclays Bank , respectively, to overcome the 
capital adequacy problems of foreign exchange forwards highlighted by Bank for 
International Settlements regulations. SAFEs are treated as interest rate, rather than 
foreign exchange instruments in BIS regulations, so banks have to provide less capital to 
support outstandings. 
FXAs are settled with reference to both the spot rate and the fonward 
premium/discounts, while ERAs with reference only to the fonward premium/discount. 
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Trigger Forward. This is primarily designed for trading purposes, although it can also be 
used as an alternative hedge. It is usually a zero cost structure, whereby the purchaser 
enters into an outright forward transaction at a rate significantly more attractive than the 
prevailing mari<et rate, but where the whole structure will be knocked out if a 
predetermined trigger level is reached at any time before the expiry date. 
Other variations on this structure in usage are the at-maturity trigger forward, double 
trigger fon«fard and the platfomi trigger fonward. 
The at-maturity trigger forward is an outright fonA/ard structure which is knocked out if 
a pre-determined trigger level is breached on the expiry date. 
The double trigger forwaro is a standard trigger forward with two trigger levels (one 
above and one below the cur-ent mari<et level). 
The platform trigger forward combines a regular trigger forward with the purchase of a 
vanilla option struck at the trigger level with the trigger forward. This provides extra 
protection should the trigger level be breached. 
Weekly Reset Forward. A weekly reset forward is a synthetic forward, where a portion 
of the contract is locked in each week, provided that the spot rate that week meets the 
predetermined fixing criterion. Hence the purchaser can deal at a rate better than the 
forward outright, but only in amount corresponding to the frequency with which the 
criterion has been met. If the criterion is not met in any of the weeks during the life of the 
contract, then the contract is not activated at all. If it is met every week, then the overall 
rate is favourable compared to the initial prevailing mari^ et rate. 
The weekly reset forward is used for those with cash-flows spread over time or to 
hedge balance-sheets. 
1.6 EQUITY RISK MANAGEMENT 
The risk sensitive approaches for equity positions held in banking books are 
emphasized in the New Basel Accord. The rationale is to remedy the possibility that 
banks could benefit from a lower charge when they hold the equity rather than the debt 
of an obligor. Various products in usage are as under-
Bond Index Swap. A swap in which one counter party receives the total rate of return 
of a bond maricet or segment of a bond mari<et in exchange for paying a money maricet 
rate. Counter parties may also swap the returns of bond martlets. 
The two most important indexes used to measure bond martlet returns are J.P.Morgan 
government bond index and the Salmon Brothers worid government bond index. There 
are also tax advantages in using bond swaps. In Japan, banks and securities houses are 
exempt from withholding tax. 
Equity (Index) Swap. A swap in which the initial or total or price return on an equity 
index, equity basket or single equity is exchanged for a stream of cash flows based on a 
short-term interest rate index (or another index). 
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Equity Knockout Swap. An interest rate or cross currency swap that gets terminated 
(l<nocl<ecl out) if a given stocl< or equity index readies a specified trigger level between 
inception and expiry. The l<nocl<out can be non-conditional once the pre-detennined 
equity level is reached, or the client can be given the choice to cancel the swap should 
the trigger level be reached. 
Variable Notional Swap/Option. An option or swap, where the notional value is linked 
to the underlying asset price or rate. Usually changes in the notional value will be directly 
proportional to changes in the underiying price i.e. they both decrease or increase 
together. In an equity swap, the fixed rate receiver can opt to receive the return of either 
a fixed number of stocks, or the number of stocks that could be purchased for a fixed 
sum. 
Basket Option. An option that enables a purchaser to buy or sell a basket of equities. 
Bond Option. An option offered on debt, usually Government securities, although OTC 
options are available on corporate debt. The options can be exchange traded/ listed on 
OTC. 
Bond options have traditionally been standard European style or American style puts 
and calls. There is more interest in exotic structures such as yield curve options, inter-
market spread options and quanto options. 
Low Exercise Price Option (LEPO). A LEPO is a call option with an exercise price set 
deep in-the-money. The limiting case, a zero price option, is when the strike price is 
zero. It is virtually certain to be exercised arid the value and perfonnance of its intrinsic 
value is effectively identical to that of under lying equity. 
These features are designed 'o allow participation in the performance of an equity price 
where there are legal or financial obstacles to purchasing the underiying directly. If the 
LEPO is cash settled, the buyer profits to the same extent as with a direct holding in the 
underiying, but without having to transact in it. However, a LEPO holder does not earn 
dividends or have voting rights. 
Out performance Option. It is a two factor option, giving the purchaser the right to 
receive the out-perfonnance of one asset over another asset. To illustrate, a purchaser 
with a view that CAC index will outperform the DAX index should buy the out-
performance option which pays notional multiplied by the out«parformance of the CAC 
index over the DAX index. In this case payout Is zero If CAC under-perfom™ DAX. The 
value of an out-perfomiance option will largely be dictated by the historical con-elation 
between the underiyings. 
Equity index Participation Note. A note (bond) in which interest paid is tied to the 
movement of an equity index or single stock. 
Structured Note. Structured notes are over-the-counter products, which bundle several 
disparate elements to create a single product, generally by embedding options in a debt 
instrument such as medium term note. They are generally tailored to be attractive to 
investors with highly focused risk/reward appetite. 
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These were heavily promoted in the early1990s, but later fell out of favour as a 
sequence of widely publicized issues, which pointed to the difficulty of pricing and 
trading such instruments. 
Equity Warrant. A warrant which gives the purchaser the right, but not the obligation, to 
buy shares in a company at a specific price for a given period of time. 
The wan-ants are usually attached to a bond. The stock option lowers the Interest on the 
bond but if exercised, dilutes the existing equity. The bond and warrant components are 
sometimes stripped and traded separately. 
Negative Basis. This exists when the cost of buying protection (in derivative mari<et) on 
a particular reference entity is less than the credit spread (generally expresses as a 
spread to Libor) on a bond or note of similar maturity issued by the reference entity. 
When this occurs, investors can lock in risk-less profit by buying bonds and buying credit 
protection. These arbitrage opportunities are generally only available to investors whose 
cost of funds is Libor flat or better (since funding the bond or note at Libor plus a spread 
will erode the ari^ itrage). Technical factors between the bond and credit derivative 
mari(et account for negative basis. 
Stock Index Future. These are futures contact on a stock index, mostly cash settled. 
The theoretical price of a stock index future equals the cost of carrying the underiying 
stock for that period, the opportunity cost of the funds invested minus any dividends. If 
the cost of buying and holding the underiying stockt It less than the futures price, an 
ari3itrageur can sell futures and buy the underiying stocks. 
1.7 OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
In compliance to the Basel Committee' emphasis for a sound practices for identifying, 
monitoring and control of operational risk, the banks with international presence have 
been on their toe to putting in place a comprehensive risk management structure. 
Stronger Risk Management Culture. In banks like Zions Bancorporation, based in 
Salt Lake City, emphasis is on building a stronger risk management culture that focuses 
on awareness, identification, measurement, monitoring, and control of risks, as well as 
better understanding and management of customer issues. These banks plan to meet 
Basel's Advanced Measurement Approach guidelines and to benefit from a reduction in 
capital for operational risk. 
Improved Audits and Better Audit Efriciency. Toronto based RBC Corporation 
expects that the improved a Jdits and better audit efficiency will help to leverage it to 
manage insurance coverage more effectively and to develop new risk-transfer products 
and mechanisms. They also expect to make operational risk more transparent, to 
improve investment decisions and improvo product pricing to better reflect underiying 
risks. 
Operational Risk Management Tool. Banks have incorporated many of the elements 
raised by the new Basel Accord. These elements relate to identification, measurement, 
monitoring, and control of risks across business lines, processes and products. A suite 
of customizable and user-friendly reports have been designed that their board of 
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directors, executive team, line management, staff and assurance departments can use 
to quicl<ly get the infonnation they need for decision making. 
Efforts have been made to work with (independent) internal audit to ensure that the 
system and framework meets audit's stancJards and are consistent with their efforts to 
validate business risk assess nents. 
Best Practices Tool for Operational Ristk Management. RBC Corporation, Toronto 
has four main tools, as the current best practices tools for managing operational risk. 
Firstly, these relate to risk and control assessment-all employees must know the 
controls that mitigate against risks. Secondly, with the launch of loss event database in 
February, 2002, the business lines have the ability to input their own data. 
Thirdly, economic capital is an important tool for raising awareness and changing 
behaviour and for making sure that the organization is making the right investment 
decisions. Fourthly, with the Risk Control Self Assessment (RCSA) program and loss 
event database in place, they are generating the reports frequently, as desired risk 
assessment especially with high exposures. 
Regulator Focus on Operational Risk Management. Boston based, State Street Bank 
and Trust Company, has observed a higher level of regulator focus on its operational 
risk management in the past two years. Regulators are driving their reviews down into 
the various business units and asking managers if they are aware of operational risk 
management practices and requirements. 
Operational Risk Management Structures. Several risk management structures are 
already in place. 
In Corporate-level-focused approach, the financial entity detemnines that the 
operational risk management framework should be designed, developed, implemented 
and monitored by one individual or a team of professionals at the corporate level. This 
may be appropriate in smaller institutions where there are only one or two major product 
lines, or where there are no geographical dispersions of operating locations. 
In a more decentralized model, corporate guidance is provided by a designated 
operational manager or risk committee, the business managers, or risk managers in the 
respective business units. In this model, the corporate level operational risk manager or 
committee is responsible for developing and implementing the operational risk 
framework and periodically monitoring its effectiveness. This model appears to fit large 
international banks, banks with a larger products and services and banks with multiple 
operating locations. 
Internal audit group model views that in many cases audit has the best corporate 
understanding about how the various products and services interact across the 
enterprise. In some banks, operational risk management is the responsibility of the 
auditors and in other cases, intemal audit performs the risk assessment, reviews 
operational losses and consults the business units to manage operational risks. 
Key Risk Indicators (KRIs). Zions Bancurporation have KRIs as an important part of 
their risk assessment process, wherein business lines are asked to attach measures to 
indicate when risks levels are changing and also to indicate control measures for the 
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effectiveness of controls. All of these measures can be viewed online via a static file or a 
dynamic link. 
The industry is also moving toward automated alerts for KRIs. This would contain setting 
up of thresholds for risks and control levels that, when breached, will trigger electronic 
notices to key business and assurance areas, thereby enabling real time information on 
risks and control environment. 
Globally active banks have been using sophisticated techniques for measuring, 
managing and constantiy monitoring various types of AIM risks. These banks are 
warming up for implementing the Basel II norms. Under Basel II accord, capital 
allocation will be based on the risk inherent in the asset The implementation of 
Basel II accord will strengthen the regulatory review process. 
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